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# RIOT AND ITS CONTROL IN LIVERPOOL, 1815-1860

*4th December 1989*

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Offered for the Degree  
of Master of Philosophy  
in the History Discipline.

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### Abbreviations Used in Text and Footnotes

|                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| CO                  | Colonial Office papers, PRO, Kew   |
| C on A & M          | 1825 (417.437) IV 499.525 4th Report of Minutes of Evidence<br>from Select Committee on Artisans and Machinery |
| Eng. Hist. Rev.     | English Historical Review  |
| HO                  | Home Office papers, PRO, Kew   |
| LRO                 | Liverpool Record Office  |
| Min. Com. Watch     | Minutes of Commissioners of Watch, Scavengers and Lamps,<br>LRO  |
| Munic. Corp. Report | PP 1833 (344.) XIII.589 Report of Commissioners on<br>Municipal Corporations in England and Wales              |
| n.d.                | No date  |
| PL                  | Papers of Palatinate of Lancaster, PRO, Chancery Lane  |
| PP                  | Parliamentary Papers   |
| PRO                 | Public Record Office   |
| RUO                 | Riot of Unknown Origin   |
| THSLC               | Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and<br>Cheshire   |





## **Abstract**

Within the context of the town of Liverpool between the years 1815 and 1860, the entire range of collective violence is considered, from brawls outside public houses to political protest. The forces available for the suppression and prevention of riot are also investigated. Particular attention is paid to the police, both to the miscellaneous organisations of variable efficiency available up to 1835, and to the new force established in 1836.

A simple method of categorizing riotous incidents according to their apparent motive is proposed. This is based on contemporary assumptions as revealed in Press reports; it is argued that these would be shared by those who determined the way collective violence was controlled. Using these categories, comparisons are made between the measures of prevention, dispersal, and punishment applied to incidents of different types. Where the nature of the available information permits translation into numeric terms, statistical tests are used. The findings for the years 1815 to 1835 are then compared with those for the years 1836 to 1860.

It is shown that before 1836 the severity of measures of control varied according to the category to which an incident belonged. After 1836, with the single exception of political protest, much more uniformity of handling is found. This finding can then be related to theories of the causes of riotous disorder implicit in local and contemporary records in a way which relates to the work of historians of crime of other types.



## Chapter One: Introduction

The object of this study is to propose an alternative approach to the problems of collective violence. By at first ignoring the question of motive, and examining the entire range, from public house brawl to attempted revolution, a scheme of classification can perhaps be developed which, while it cannot reflect the inaccessible beliefs and aspirations of the participants, makes use of such information as is available in a sufficient number of cases. This scheme can then be used to investigate collective violence within a limited area and time, with the hope that there will be some questions which can thereby be approached more effectively. In particular, it may help in assessing the motives of those using the law and the forces of law enforcement against collective violence, and to estimate the relative importance of the protection of individual citizens on the one hand and the maintenance of the existing distribution of power on the other.

The study of riot is in itself nothing new. In 1964, George Rudé wrote that "no historical phenomenon has been so thoroughly neglected by historians as the crowd".<sup>1</sup> This is no longer true. Before that date there had been the work of Beloff on disorder in the seventeenth century, Darvall on the Luddites, Mather on the Chartists, and Hobsbawm on the machine-breakers and other pre-political protest movements (or movements in which he found elements of protest).<sup>2</sup> Since then, as the boundaries between history and the social sciences have grown

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<sup>1</sup> G. Rudé, The Crowd in History 1730-1848, London, 1981, p. 3

<sup>2</sup> M. Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, 1660-1714, London, 1938; F. O. Darvall, Popular Disturbances and Public Order in Regency England, London, 1969 (1934); F. C. Mather, Public Order in the Age of the Chartists, Manchester, 1959; E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels,

more permeable, more attention has been paid to the crowd, and, in particular, the crowd as involved in riot or disorder. Rudé's choice of this neutral word was necessary to avoid the assumption that "the mob" was a permanent phenomenon, continuing to exist even between riots in some area of mean streets like London's St. Giles'. Perhaps now that he has shown that rioters were drawn from a much wider area of society the word can be used again to describe a crowd when engaged in a riot.

The eighteenth century has been a productive field for historians of riot. The typical form has usually been taken to be the bread riot, and it has been argued that trade disputes are closely related, either because both can be seen as "class protests" or, more simply, because early trade disputes were often mainly concerned with the adequacy of wages in relation to bread prices. Works like Thompson's on the "moral economy" of the crowd and Stevenson's study of English riots<sup>3</sup> have described a system of interactions between the law, as invoked by local JPs, and popular protest, characterised by restrained and ritualised violence and seizure of goods. It has been shown that such riots were frequently successful. Thompson's influential paper on the legitimisation of disorder by shared community values has played a part in concentrating attention on the protest-based motivation of riot. It is probable that many rioters believed themselves justified in using violence, yet in some cases the belief was less tenable than in others; assaulting a constable who was attempting to stop a fight, for example. By collecting information mainly from major protest-based riots, the existence of riot motivated by the self-interest of smaller and less reputable groups of people can be obscured. The same narrow focus applies to John Bohstedt<sup>4</sup> who has placed this system of protest in its context as typical of small urban communities. He has shown how disruption of these communities by

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Manchester, 1978; E. J. Hobsbawm, "The Machine Breakers" in Past and Present, 1, Feb 1952, pp. 57-70.

<sup>3</sup> E. P. Thompson "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" in Past and Present 50, February 1971, pp.76-136; J. Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England, 1700-1870, London, 1979.

<sup>4</sup> J. Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales, 1790-1810, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1983.

urbanisation and capitalist industrialisation destroyed the political relationships upon which riots of this kind relied, and how the destruction of this "viable politics of riot" was crucial to the development of new political movements.

Although many features of eighteenth century riot persist into the nineteenth century, it is these new political movements, characterised by labour historians<sup>5</sup> as looking forwards to radical changes in society rather backwards to tradition, which have attracted most attention. Yet it is questionable whether the pattern which Bohstedt discerned in Manchester was necessarily to be found in all areas of rapid urbanisation.

Bohstedt himself states that Manchester was an extreme case, "at one end of the social spectrum", and that other forms of class alienation existed elsewhere.<sup>6</sup> The Liverpool case, however, cannot be easily fitted into a linear "spectrum". Riot no longer served as a viable political mechanism, although it continued to be a well-known phenomenon. This loss had not led to class politics developing in the pattern which Bohstedt discerned in Manchester. Perhaps Bohstedt's theory, powerful though it is, requires some enrichment before it can account for the full range of ways of undergoing urbanisation.

Liverpool, too, grew fast during the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Although smaller than Manchester, Liverpool was of the same order of size, being one of the largest towns in Britain. Urbanisation proceeded similarly in the two towns, but industrialisation did not. The Liverpool economy was, and remained, principally commercial. From this different economic background developed very different social relationships, and these relationships were reflected in a very different pattern of riots. Between 1815 and 1860, a later and (at least in the sense of size) a more "urban" period than Bohstedt's, riotous behaviour in Liverpool seems to have consisted to a great extent of fighting between groups of working men. The use

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<sup>5</sup> G. Rudé The Crowd in History ..., and Ideology and Protest, London, 1980; E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, London, 1962; E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Manchester, 1978.

<sup>6</sup> Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics ..... p. 223

of riot to constrain the actions of more powerful groups was rare in comparison with its use between Catholics and Protestants, between Tory working men and Radicals, or between strikers and strike-breakers.

Bohstedt derives his concept of class from E. P. Thompson, whose words he slightly adapts:

Class happens when as a result of experience a group of people come to feel and to articulate their common interests as opposed to those of other groups of people<sup>7</sup>

The experience of Liverpool shows that phenomena other than class can develop out of shared experience. It may be that the difference arose out of the tendency of prosperous workers to take a short-term rather than a long-term view of their prospects for either improvement in their individual lot or, in bad times, for maintenance of their small privileges. It may be that the much greater variety in types of employment divided the workforce and thus made it less capable of developing a united consciousness than the workforce of a city such as Manchester. However it arose, there was little sign, either in peaceful or in violent activity, that workers here felt themselves to be united in opposition to the exploitation of their employers. The shipwrights, the elite of the town's workforce, came instead to identify their interests as opposed to those of competing workmen from other towns, but linked to those of Liverpool's merchants. Many of the Protestant workers came to see the Catholic Irish immigrants as their opponents. Many of the Irish inhabitants looked to a rectification of the relations between Ireland and England for the amendment of their condition. Many if not most of the town's native workers appear to have inclined towards the view that they and their employers were jointly engaged in promoting the fortunes of their town and trade. Perhaps Manchester, with a narrower range of industry, could be seen as moving towards the possession of a united working class during the first half of the nineteenth century; in Liverpool, the phrase "working classes" can still be used to describe the fragmented groupings of workers. The community as a single entity could arguably be said to have been replaced, not by a population divided according to class interests, but by a complex structure of groups of individuals linked by ties of acquaintanceship, trade, sect, and neighbourhood.

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<sup>7</sup> J. Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics....., p. 69

The boundaries of some groups were drawn more clearly than others. The freemen of the town, sole holders of the parliamentary franchise before 1832, were perhaps the most neatly defined group. It can be claimed that most freemen felt more strongly than other townsmen that they belonged to the town of Liverpool, and indeed that Liverpool belonged to them, as collective owners (at least in name) of the town's estates. Other groups expressed their identity in other ways. Men employed in the trades of the port, for example, proclaimed their unity (at some periods) by marching together in procession. For others, the defining factor was nationality; the Irish were the most prominent such body, but there were also Welsh and Scottish immigrants who celebrated their identity on national saints' days. Sectarian divisions often corresponded to national ones, but the relationship was not exact.

Riotous crowds could often be identified as being drawn from one or another of these overlapping groups. The degree of to which groups accepted violent means of self-expression or protest varied. Men in port-related trades, for example, generally used more violent measures in trade disputes than those employed in the town.

As the nineteenth century progressed, the development of policing combined with the rapid expansion of the press to increase the recording of minor incidents, including attacks on the police, so that more riots and affrays could be identified. This helps the study of crowd violence, while at the same time it confuses estimates of frequency.

Many historians have concentrated on periods of severe rioting such as the Swing riots or the Luddite or Chartist years.<sup>8</sup> Stevenson's is the most comprehensive of the surveys of riot.<sup>9</sup> His wide coverage is achieved at a cost, which includes the need to group riots together into epidemics without the possibility of examining the credentials of each incident for membership of its group. This method of handling also means that less attention is paid to small riots

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<sup>8</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm and G. Rudé, Captain Swing, Harmondsworth, 1973; F. O. Darvall, Popular Disturbance and Public Order in Regency England, London, 1969; F. C. Mather, Public Order in the Age of the Chartists, Manchester, 1959.

<sup>9</sup> Stevenson, Popular Disturbances....,

unrelated to epidemics. While the nature of major outbreaks has been thoroughly examined, and the degree of protest or rebellion inherent in each has been much discussed, less is known about smaller incidents. When statistics of committals are quoted, they include riots of differing natures, in proportions which are not known. Stevenson is clearly aware of this problem, and at times he stresses the difficulty; for example:

there are two very different questions involved ... one which involves the threat of revolution and one which refers to a ... degree of more general disturbance.<sup>10</sup>

It is not always clear, however, which riots are to be counted under which heading. It has been necessary to make use of secondary sources, where classification has sometimes had to be adopted from the original.<sup>11</sup> Stevenson's main concern is with protest; the result is that, while it is scarcely possible to doubt that there was a considerable reduction in the level of protest-related collective violence in England after about 1848, he does not enter into the question whether this reduction extended to other kinds of collective violence, such as public-house affrays.

Perhaps only a local survey can explore fully the entire range of collective violence. One such is David Philips' study of disorder in the Black Country, but here the selection of cases has been left to the authorities, since cases are included either because the Riot Act proclamation was read or because charges of rioting were brought.<sup>12</sup> This excludes cases of collective violence not treated as riot by magistrates or police.

In most studies, stress has been on the causes and forms of riot, and less attention has been given to control. Darvall and Mather give good accounts of the mechanism of the law in their periods. Critchley's The Conquest of Violence is flawed by an insufficiently critical approach;

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<sup>10</sup> Stevenson, Popular Disturbances....., p.319.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. pp.306-307,

<sup>12</sup> D. Philips "Riots and Public Order in the Black Country, 1835- 1860" in Stevenson and Quinault, Popular Protest and Public Disorder, London, 1974.



the very title betrays his unjustified optimism. Stevenson has given an account of methods of control before 1829, but in a short paper dealing with the whole of England which necessarily concentrates on well-defined protests.<sup>13</sup>

After 1829, histories of the police often deal only incidentally with operations against riot. The debate as to the importance of riot as a reason for the foundation of the new police forces apart, the group of criminal offences which can be classified as riotous (small when compared with the entire range of crime) is not often handled separately. Even when "disorder" is set apart, it links riot with offences such as drunkenness, street gambling, and prostitution, to which it is only tenuously related. Exceptions include Storch on hostility to the new police, and Emsley, who shows that riot control before and after 1829 exhibits considerable continuity.<sup>14</sup>

The interaction between police, magistrates, local government, and Home Office has similarly been only partly analysed. Philips' study of the changes in the mechanism of law and order concentrates on first beginnings, and therefore on London.<sup>15</sup> Keller examines the dialogue between police, crowds, government and law in the context of London, where a special relationship between Home Secretary and police applied, and also selects riots and public meetings which were productive of legal change.<sup>16</sup> It has been argued that heavy reliance on official sources for such studies can produce an artificial coherence between incidents widely

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<sup>13</sup> Darvall, Popular Disturbance ...; Mather, Public Order...; T. A. Critchley, The Conquest of Violence, London, 1970; J. Stevenson "Social Control and the Prevention of Riots in England, 1798-1829" in A. P. Donajgradzki (ed), Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, London, 1977.

<sup>14</sup> R. D. Storch "The Plague of the Blue Locusts" in International Journal of Social History 20, pp. 61-90, and "The Policeman as Domestic Missionary" in Journal of Social History, Summer 1976, pp. 481-509; C. Emsley, Policing and its Context, London, 1983, pp. 68-71.

<sup>15</sup> D. Philips "A New Engine of Power and Authority" in V. A. Gatrell et al (eds), Crime and the Law, London, 1980.

<sup>16</sup> L. Keller, Public Order in Victorian London, Unpublished PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1976.

separated geographically, and arising out of differing local conditions.<sup>17</sup> This approach is also likely to lead to a bias towards types of disturbance seen as dangerous by the government of the day, with a consequent neglect of minor or apolitical incidents. This in turn can support an assumption that riot and protest are identical. For example, a recent police historian uses figures for a number of crimes, including riot, to calculate "Protest Offences".<sup>18</sup> This blurring of the distinction between protest and casual violence is particularly misleading when the incidence of riot is correlated against some other variable, as for example in the Tillys' The Rebellious Century, where the relationship between protest and urbanisation is explored.<sup>19</sup> Riot is thus regarded as an index of social protest. Even when the incidents concerned form a recognisable group having (at least in part) common motivation, this takes a good deal for granted. Where statistics of riot are used merely as numbers of arrests or sentences, the assumption that collective violence demonstrates the existence of undercurrents of rebellion or of dissent is unjustified. The equation of riot with protest arose partly from legal definitions; disturbances which were not directed against constituted authority or towards changing existing conditions were often treated less seriously (unless very dangerous to life or property) and thus became less visible. Even though the law distinguished between riot having an object "of a public nature" and affray where the motivation was purely private, it would scarcely be safe to assume that this distinction which was significant to a contemporary magistrate would now be helpful to a modern historian. Riot as a felony originated in a statute of Edward III which stretched the meaning of "levying war on the king" to cover warlike mobs whose intention was to diminish the power of the crown by enforcing some alteration to the law. This became treason, as opposed to "mere riot" which was only a misdemeanour. This sometimes difficult

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<sup>17</sup> Introduction to J. Stevenson and R. Quinault, (eds), Popular Protest and Public Disorder, London, 1979.

<sup>18</sup> S. H. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 550-1.

<sup>19</sup> Charles, Louise and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, London, 1975.

distinction was further confused by the 1714 Riot Act which created a new felony out of the continuing assembly of a crowd after due warning.<sup>20</sup>

If legal definitions are disregarded, it becomes necessary to redefine the limits of the behaviour to be investigated. The legal definitions of riot are inapplicable, as the purpose of this study is partly to discover how legal definitions were applied, and the widest possible definition will be adopted. Five criteria can be considered essential to a definition of riot. There must be a certain minimum number of participants, who must show some degree of cooperation with each other; there must be at least a threat of illegality, normally violence; the incident must happen in a place which is open to the public, and those acting must have some common motive

Each of these criteria offers scope for variation, but three can be specified fairly clearly. The number of people can be set as three, or twelve, or some other arbitrary number. Ten has been chosen as large enough to exclude two types of relationship; close kinship, and partnership. Mutual assistance among small numbers of persons in family quarrels, or in enterprises such as robberies carried out by gangs, is essentially different in kind from that found among larger groups. At the same time this figure is small enough to include most cases where collective violence was spontaneous.

The illegal action is either itself of a violent nature, or accompanied by either real or anticipated violence; legal definitions usually include a phrase such as "in a tumultuous manner". This violence can be defined either in terms of the fears aroused in a legal fiction, the reasonable man, or in terms of wounds and damage. Here both actual and anticipated violence must be considered. The public nature of the site is not usually in doubt. The allied questions of cooperation and motive are more difficult. Cooperation can probably be assumed in most cases where the other criteria are fulfilled. It would be harder to explain, perhaps, how a crowd could chance to act illegally and together without cooperation. In a large crowd there may be many motives, perhaps as many as there are members, but they may presumably be taken to cooperate at least minimally in continuing to form a disorderly crowd. Motive presents more

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<sup>20</sup> W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, London, n.d., Vol.VIII, pp. 328 -32.

problems. Normally there is little direct evidence of this, and what there is comes frequently from records created during the legal process, or at any rate written by those whose interests were at odds with those of the rioters. For legal purposes too the distinction between a private motive and one of a public nature can be crucial in deciding whether an incident is riot or affray. The object here is to include both without distinction. To avoid question-begging and pedantry, the word "riot" will be used, as in colloquial English, for both.

While there is a clear difference between a drunken brawl outside a public house and, for example, the Chartist-inspired crowd activities of 1842, there were many gradations between the two. What of the resistance to police interrupting a brawl? What about sectarian or loyalist demonstrations which became violent? What about fighting as entertainment? It is important to remember that disorder, even of the most violent type, need not protest against anything. If two men fighting by fixed rules can be sport, then it must at least be borne in mind that twenty or two hundred men fighting by their own rules may be no more motivated by protest. Recent studies of crowds at football matches have shown violence to be largely expressive rather than instrumental.<sup>21</sup> There are obvious dangers in applying the results of modern studies to earlier periods, but the similarity of football violence to, for example, some aspects of riotous behaviour at elections, is very striking. It is also important to realise that there may be a strong element of protest even where the "sporting" aspect is most visible. In dealing with riots where no immediate motive is apparent it is essential not to assume that either must necessarily be the explanation.

It is desirable to divide incidents of collective violence according to motivation, to separate protest from casual violence. This would make it possible to ask a number of important questions. It is impossible to achieve this where there is no direct knowledge of the state of mind of participants, unfortunately. Yet all is not lost. The authorities' interpretation of the rioters' motivation is much more accessible, and it is this rather than the 'true' motivation which would influence measures of control and punishment. It would be possible, for example, to ask whether the severity of handling of riotous incidents related to the severity of the

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<sup>21</sup> SSRC/Sports Council, Public Disorder and Sporting Events, London, 1979; P. Marsh, E. Rosser, & R. Harré, The Rules of Disorder, London, 1978.

incident in terms of danger to life or property, or whether some types were more harshly repressed than others. Were some types of riot tolerated? It is generally accepted that there was a reduction in collective violence after about 1850. Was this a reduction in those specific types of riots which the authorities were anxious to repress, or a general decrease in violence? How far did it reflect changes in the rioters? Did different kinds of people join in different kinds of riot?

The sources used for this thesis include both local and national official papers; the Home Office papers provide much information about riots which were thought serious enough to involve the central authorities, and occasionally, by chance, about minor riots. Of local official papers, the minutes of the Corporation, the "Town Books", give mainly negative information of the lack of official interest in riots. The minutes of the Commissioners of the Watch, Scavengers and Lamps and the later Watch Committee are more useful both directly, in reports of riots, and indirectly, in items such as the replacement of damaged clothing. Other official sources used are the Quarter Sessions and Assize records. The former exist for 1835 onwards, almost complete although damaged, yet are of less assistance than might be expected, because so many rioters were tried summarily (the police court records do not survive); and also because charges such as common assault or causing grievous bodily harm may relate to riot, yet (unless there is evidence from elsewhere) the accused cannot be identified as rioters. The Assize courts were less commonly involved; only the most "serious" (in contemporary terms) of offenders were tried there. It will be seen that this was more common with some types of riot than with others.

For the many riots which escape the net of official records, the newspapers are the principal recourse. At the start of the period there were three weekly newspapers which have survived almost intact: the Radical Mercury the Ultra-Tory Courier, and the predominantly commercial and a-political Gore's General Advertiser. The number increased from the mid 1820s with the addition of the Whig Albion the Tory Saturday's Advertiser, and the Radical Chronicle. By the mid 1830s, a weekly paper was published every day of the week, with three on Saturdays. With the gradual reduction of the taxes on newspapers in the 1840s a number of papers began to publish two or three times per week. Abolition of the last penny of tax in 1855 was followed

by the publication of the first daily, the Liverpool Daily Post.<sup>22</sup> There was thus a steady increase in the volume of locally-printed news. This was not always the same as an increase in local news. Periods such as the Crimean War found papers giving more space to events of national importance, while at other times the pressure of advertising reduced the space available, for example during the railway boom of 1847-8.

Within the available space the proportion given to riot was very variable. Most reports originated from the police court. Before 1835, this was only sporadically reported; after that date, about half the newspapers carried regular police court news, ranging from one-third of a column to half a page. The proportion of riot cases was never high, and varied both from one newspaper to another and from year to year for the same paper. This variation was quite independent of events, and fortunately there was almost always at least one newspaper at any one time which reported a reasonable number of incidents. Only serious incidents involving thousands of participants and taking place in the town centre were guaranteed a report. For smaller incidents, no pattern emerges to suggest any coherent policy of reporting. A newspaper's political bent did not correlate with the choice of news items in any systematic fashion, although it did of course often colour the report, particularly its estimates of severity. The Liverpool Journal and the Liverpool Daily Post, being edited by an ex-Head Constable, interested themselves in police matters; otherwise, the treatment of major incidents was reasonably consistent across the period, and across the range of papers; the selection of minor incidents was uniformly chancy.

The problem of classification must now be considered. Debate has centred on the element of protest, and the subject of protest has been a favourite means of classifying riots -- bread-prices, recruitment, taxation, parliamentary reform, and so on. This classification has sometimes been used partly because such groups of riots have tended to occur as epidemics and have formed neat topics for papers or chapters.<sup>23</sup> There is, however, a similarity between some of these groupings -- recruitment and taxation, for example -- and a definable difference

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<sup>22</sup> For the reduction in taxation, see Arthur Aspinall, Politics and the Press, , Brighton , 1949, pp16-23.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, D. Richter, Riotous Victorians, Ohio, 1981, passim.

between others. For example, riots concerning parliamentary reform, being concerned with an alteration in the distribution of power, have a quasi-revolutionary aspect which is not necessarily to be found in protests about the way in which political power is used (or abused) by its current holders, such as recruiting riots. It is clearly necessary to transcend such accidental distinctions of causation as whether a protest concerns toll-gates or selection of militiamen.

Classifications have also been proposed which delve deep into theories of crowd behaviour for their basis. These cannot be considered as useful to the historian since it is rare to find data available about historical riots to enable a complex analysis such as that proposed by Smelser.<sup>24</sup> The sources are necessarily coloured by the prejudices and patterns of thought of the period. Instead of attempting to burrow beneath this to reconstitute (with very little evidence) the underlying motivation, it is proposed to adopt the basic framework of interpretation from the contemporary sources. The kind of assumption about the origin of riots which would have influenced the authorities in controlling disorder may thus be taken into account. The next step, then, is to derive a small number of categories seen as meaningful by the local authorities of the period. There must not be too many; to divide incidents too finely is as little help as to leave them undivided.

The local press has been taken to offer the best guidance here. At the start of the period, a newspaper cost perhaps a quarter of a workman's daily wage. Undoubtedly they were read by some workingmen yet in general they were written to accord with the views of their more characteristic readers, the wealthier townsmen, and particularly the merchants upon whom their advertising revenue depended. It was from this group above all that magistrates and town councillors came. By 1860, newspaper reading was less exclusive, but so was access to local power. Newspapers took more account of small tradesmen, but so did the authorities since these men now elected the town council.

Although newspapers differed in political allegiance, their treatment of the topic of collective violence was on the whole similar. Tory and Radical newspapers often differed in their

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<sup>24</sup> N. J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour, London, 1962, pp. 67-130.

allocation of blame (for electoral disorder, for example) while revealing shared assumptions regarding the relative importance of different types of incident. This was demonstrated by the amount of space given to each, the nature of the information given, and the vocabulary used. Even for political protest meetings, the more radical of newspapers demonstrated, by their anxiety to show the peacefulness of meetings of their own supporters, that they were at least conscious of the same expectations as their competitors.<sup>25</sup> When describing events in other towns, there was even more common ground. The Reform Act riots were universally deplored as the work of extremists;<sup>26</sup> when William Cobbett visited Liverpool and delegates arrived from other Lancashire towns to meet him, the local Radical press accounted for the scuffles which took place by saying that local men had been trying to remove troublemakers from the square in which the meeting took place.<sup>27</sup> Among the Tory press the ideas of protest and disorder were clearly linked to such an extent that it was not necessary to give any other explanation for such precautions as might have been taken than that such a meeting was expected. Speeches at meetings to oppose the corn laws were described as "calculated to inflame the passions of the multitude"<sup>28</sup> despite the local multitude's lack of inclination even to attend such meetings; at the time of Parliamentary Reform the "inflammatory" nature of placards displayed about the town was a cause of Tory concern.<sup>29</sup> This connection between political innovation and fears of angry crowds is not remarkable; it is brought forward only to show that political protest was one category of disorder, real or threatened, which was recognised in Liverpool then -- as it has been in most places at most times.

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<sup>25</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 3 Sep 1819, 1 Oct 1819, 14 Oct 1831

<sup>26</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 4 Nov 1831

<sup>27</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 3 Dec 1819

<sup>28</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 18 Nov 1826

<sup>29</sup> Liverpool Courier, 16 May 1832



The treatment of elections is in strong contrast. If collective violence was expected and feared at protest meetings, at elections it was expected but largely accepted. Until the 1830s, it was so normal as to be scarcely newsworthy. In 1816, when a number of rioters were tried at the assizes, the only record in the press to electoral disorder is the Mercury's brief reference, an erroneous claim that they were not local men.<sup>30</sup> Later in the period, when election riots were seen as more important, it was still deemed sufficient to state that supporters of opposing parties were involved; no further explanation of fighting was required.<sup>31</sup>

In contemporary terms, sectarian disorders were very similarly regarded. The party was at least as significant as the sect, and fears of violence resulted from the display of political banners as well as of religious symbols.<sup>32</sup> Although at the start of the period this phenomenon was new, and there were hopes that it would prove transitory,<sup>33</sup> it became well-known during the 1840s. As with elections, the press reveals striking contrasts in the allocation of blame, but clearly fighting surprised nobody when the two sides came together.

These were not the only groups of residents of whom this could be said. In a sense, sectarian battles were a special case of a class of disorder which can be designated private battle. Even apart from sectarian loyalties, riotous behaviour was expected of Irish immigrants. As one newspaper put it, in describing a battle between two factions which were named as "Irish" and "Connaught Rangers", both sides were "natives of the sod, to have trodden which in youth seems to communicate a certain eccentricity to the character somewhat unfriendly to peace..."<sup>34</sup> Even the Mercury, more friendly towards the Irish than most, felt that the cause of one such incident had been adequately stated as: "It appears that two Irish factions, the

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<sup>30</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Jun 1816; PRO PL26.79 Indictments, Lancaster Summer Assizes, 1816.

<sup>31</sup> E.g. Saturday's Advertiser, 17 Jun 1826; Liverpool Courier, 7 Jul 1841

<sup>32</sup> E.g. Saturday's Advertiser, 21 Feb 1829; Liverpool Times, 22 Mar 1842

<sup>33</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 30 Jul 1819

<sup>34</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 23 Sep 1826

Leinster and the Ulster, came into contact."<sup>35</sup> Similar behaviour was also expected of navvies and schoolboys.<sup>36</sup> In all such cases, press coverage is erratic.

In other styles of riot, the press stressed the reason for the use of violence rather than the identity of the rioters. The cause given can range from protest at the dismissal of an actress<sup>37</sup> to lack of food,<sup>38</sup> and the reason stated can of course be inaccurate, or (as in the latter case) be stated only so that the grievance can be dismissed as unfounded. This group has been termed direct action riots.

Two types of grievance, however, have been separated from this group because their special character was (and still is) clearly recognisable. The first of these is trade disputes. Here the threat of violence was almost always described in terms of intimidation of workmen not on strike and considerable space was devoted to reporting magistrates' remarks condemning the strikers for interfering with a fellow-worker's right to work.<sup>39</sup> Invariably, the press was hostile to the strikers.

The other special case of direct action was the anti police riot. This most frequently consisted of resistance to arrest or to the dispersal of crowds, or attempts to rescue those arrested. Such battles were given little news-space unless they became very severe. One was reported because a magistrate became personally involved<sup>40</sup> while in another case, a series of riots were reported

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<sup>35</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 7 Mar 1834

<sup>36</sup> E.g. Saturday's Advertiser, 23 Sep 1826; 11 Jul 1829; 14 Aug 1830

<sup>37</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 16th Dec. 1824

<sup>38</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Feb 1855; 27 Feb 1855

<sup>39</sup> E.g. Gore's General Advertiser, 29 Jan 1824; Saturday's Advertiser, 9 Jun 1827; Gore's General Advertiser, 12 Sep 1833

<sup>40</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 24 Dec 1830

only when a constable was so injured that his life was in danger.<sup>41</sup> In reporting these riots, journalists assumed that police would frequently meet such incidents. In comparison with trade disputes, there is a noticeable absence of moralising comment; such riots were made by the incorrigibly corrupted who, unlike decent working men, would not be open to reason.

The last category of the eight is an unfortunate necessity. There are many cases where nothing is known of the origin of a disturbance. This category, riots of unknown origin, is likely to overlap with most of the other categories, and particularly with anti-police riots. (Incidents will only be classed for statistical purposes as "anti-police" if there is evidence that the riot began after the police arrived.) Incidents may fall within this group for one of two reasons. It may chance that no information about an incident has escaped destruction; this becomes less probable if there are a good number of surviving records relating to the area and period concerned. On the other hand, it may be that the incident was of a type which aroused little contemporary interest; perhaps an outbreak of fighting in a street where this was "only to be expected" by the newspaper-buying public. An affray arising out of a private quarrel is likely to fall into this category, but it cannot be assumed that all riots in this category are private.

These eight categories, simplistic as they are, are proposed as a step towards a more detailed approach to riot. It would be desirable to be able to reflect much more sophisticated distinctions; the absence of contemporary evidence makes this impossible. The questions which we can hope to answer now must be strictly limited by the questions which seemed significant to the writers of the source-documents; relevant facts will have gone unrecorded if they did not relate to questions implicit in the writer's mind. Yet although categories are derived from the assumptions of the local press, it is not always necessary that their categorisation will be accepted. The riots of 1836 to 1844 which arose from political meetings are one case. There is evidence to show that these incidents had much in common with other incidents which have been classed as sectarian, and that this influenced the police and the courts even if the press chose to regard political protest as the cause.

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<sup>41</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 19 Nov 1833

It is tempting to try to arrange the categories here derived in a linear fashion according to their political sophistication. Clearly, political protest could come at one extreme; it would probably be safe enough to put private battles at the other. There are more difficulties in between. Trade disputes are concerned with economic rather than political power; these are more tricky to place. And what of election riots? If they tried to exert force in any way, it was to influence the choice between members of the ruling class; there was not generally an intention otherwise to alter the distribution of power. Nor was this motive always paramount; there were also holiday aspects to election riots. Sectarian riots have sometimes much in common with election riots; the equation between sect and party has at times been almost complete.

Regrettably, a linear relationship is not to be expected. Instead, a rough grouping according to political impact is possible. Political protest stands alone, as intending radically to alter the distribution of political power. Next can be grouped trade disputes, anti-police riots, and direct action riots. All these attempt, in one way or another, temporarily to usurp, or to prevent a free exercise of, authority. Election and sectarian riots form a third group, being concerned rather with the expression of party or sectarian loyalties and sense of identity than with any attempt to produce specific changes. Non-sectarian private battles perhaps expressed other types of loyalties, unconnected with politics, and therefore remain alone.

Certain trends emerge when the reporting of incidents of different types is compared. The activities of crowds at political protest meetings were always given considerable attention by reporters who would be present primarily to report the speeches; elections were of course similarly reported, but here crowd violence was often discounted as "only to be expected", at least before about 1830. Sectarian riots were reported very differently by different papers, but the major incidents occurred normally on July 12th, and for most of the period even a peaceful 12th was worthy of report. Trade disputes were also fairly comprehensively reported, considerable detail of trials being given. In all these types of incident, it was usual at least after 1835 to find the same incident reported in several newspapers.

In contrast, reports of direct action riots, private battles, and anti-police riots were more often reported only in one paper, unless they were extremely large. They often owed their news-space to factors such as humour, often that of Irish witnesses reported in "quaint" dialect, such as:

I niver offended Mary Mallowney in me life, plase yer worships, but she shtruck me tree times and offended me very bad entirely.<sup>42</sup>

Other cases appeared by being recounted as part of the history of a further incident. One Irishwoman, for example, gave evidence of two incidents involving up to fifty people, otherwise unrecorded, during the prosecution of a police constable for assault.<sup>43</sup>

Clearly the number of unrecorded cases, whilst of course not measurable, is very much higher in these types of incident than in elections, political or sectarian riots, or trade disputes. It would therefore be wrong to base any argument on the relative frequency of different types. However, comparisons of the nature and handling of different types do not rely on their being countable; all that is required is that there should be a sufficient number of incidents of each type among the data, and the the mechanism by which these incidents have been selected for survival should not be such as to suggest that the sample would be significantly biased.

It seems fair to suppose that the ratio of reported incidents compared with unreported incidents might remain fairly constant for any one type. For example, nearly every case of riotous political protest could be expected to be recorded, whereas the proportion for anti-police riots may well have been something like 2%. This cannot be proved, however; and at times when news-space was short, "less interesting" types would be excluded more freely than "more interesting" cases. There are also likely to have been long-term variations. The main argument therefore will not rely even on regularity in the proportion of cases recorded within each type; the only assumption is that those recorded form a representative sample of their type.

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<sup>42</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 24th September 1839.

<sup>43</sup> Liverpool Courier, 24th April 1839.

For each type of riot, consideration will be given to frequency, severity, and typical form. The nature of the groups taking part must also be considered. The main consideration, however, is control. This can be seen as consisting of prevention, policing, and punishment.

Prevention of riot at its most general level can operate at a great distance from actual disturbances. It is possible to see education, religious teaching, poor-relief and other charitable efforts as having a role in the avoidance of protest-based disturbances. Even if it is accepted, however, that these measures were intended to preserve order, they would operate in so general a manner as to be of no help to a comparative study.

Some types of riots occurred without warning, of course, and therefore could only be handled using emergency methods. Unless the incident lasted for some hours, private battles and direct action riots were usually dealt with by the police who chanced to be at hand, without the intervention of magistrates. The normal police also bore the brunt of anti-police riots.

Some types of riot gave more warning. Elections, political meetings, and sectarian processions were all advertised in advance. Preparations for expected riots could be of several kinds, including the relocation of police, the enrollment of special constables, patrols by troops already in the town, and reinforcement by troops from elsewhere. Among those incidents where preparation was possible, comparison of levels of precautions can be informative.

Once a riot was a reality, the measures taken were largely determined by its scale, location, and duration, and the availability of police or troops. Evidence may perhaps show whether the choice between dispersal and arrest was related to the type of riot. However, lack of arrests can be due to the short duration of an incident and its distance from the nearest police. Only if this is taken into account can numbers of prosecutions be taken to show intention to deter further such offences.

The final stage in the progression was punishment based on the verdict of the court. The sentence given was determined by the choice of charge, the type of trial, and the discretion of the judge or magistrate. There was considerable scope for variation in all these factors. The relationship between charge and sentence was partially laid down by law, when a range of possible sentences was prescribed; in practice this did not constrain judges or magistrates very

greatly. Only murder was likely to be punished by death; manslaughter similarly gave a much higher maximum sentence than was possible for riots which did not result in death; other differences were less hard and fast. The penalty for riot, either as a felony or as a misdemeanour, could be much higher if the accused were sent for trial at the assizes than if they were tried at the police court. This decision lay with the magistrates; the choice between felony and misdemeanour was also theirs, although this depended on whether the riot act proclamation was read at the time of the riot rather than being decided at the time of the trial. In trade disputes in particular there were higher penalties available, for example for intimidation; there was, however, no compulsion for magistrates to use such a charge rather than, say, assault. It is probably fair to assume, for purposes of comparison, that the length of sentence for all offences other than killing was within the control of magistrates.

To facilitate comparisons, as much information as possible has been translated into numeric codes. Their meaning is given in an appendix. In many cases, these codes are arbitrary labels; some hide an assumption or a potential loss of accuracy, and must be justified. They are of different types.

The sentences for riots can be converted into a number by taking the length in days, regardless of whether the option of a fine was offered, and taking a month to consist of 30 days. The resulting figure is proportional to the variable it measures; a sentence of 14 days is twice as long as a sentence of 7 days. Most codes do not share this property; for example, the size of an incident (the number of people involved) is never accurately known. The numbers 1 to 5 are used, in ascending order of size; each corresponds to a range of values. An incident of size 4 is larger than one of size 2, but it is not twice as large. Although approximate figures are given in the appendix to indicate the number of people involved in a riot of each type, it is not claimed that they can usually be accurately known. The codes 1 to 5 are best regarded as meaning "trivial", "small", "moderately large", "large" and "exceptionally large", all within the local context. If riots of a very much greater size were to be handled, there is no reason why extra codes should not be used. The codes for "duration", "severity", "prevention" and "policing" can similarly be regarded as showing increasing values. In all cases, the range of codes used reflects the variation actually found in the current study. As with "size", it would be possible to extend the range to cover greater variation.

The definition of degrees of severity was to some extent handicapped by the small attention paid by the sources to reporting injuries. No precise count of damage or wounds is possible; instead, the general style of reporting must be taken into account in forming an estimate; if no information is available, no entry is made, but quite a brief report can indicate whether it is probable that many injuries were caused. If a report mentions jostling or verbal abuse alone, it is probably reasonable to assume that no worse violence took place, unless the reporter could have some reason to minimise the damage done. Damage to property is a useful criterion, as claims for damages are often very detailed.

All the codes so far mentioned can at least be arranged in order of size; others do not even have this property. An assault charge, for example, is coded as 3, and incitement as 7, but this does not imply that incitement is "larger" than assault. Such codes are merely labels.

The choice of statistical tests must take these differences into account if the result is to be meaningful, and is therefore restricted to tests of the type described by statisticians as 'non-parametric'. The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance can be used to test for any significant relationship between the type of riot and the length of sentence. Correlations are also calculated between sentences on the one hand and size and severity of riots on the other. Size and severity are estimated (where evidence permits) on a scale of 1 to 5, in increasing order. In this way, an estimate can be made of the relative importance of injury as opposed to motive in the the sentencing process. These numerical tests can then be combined with more traditional methods to produce a comparative overview of the control of different types of collective violence. The first section deals with the years up to 1835. Early in 1836, the new police force for the borough started its operations. The second section will consider the methods used thereafter. The geographical area to be covered is the area of jurisdiction of the mayors of Liverpool from 1836 onwards; this coincided with the Liverpool police district. Before 1836, the mayor's area of control was smaller, as was the town itself.

The method of analysis described here has been developed during an investigation of collective violence in Liverpool. It is hoped that its use will serve to demonstrate its potential as a tool for use in other such studies, and that it will also provide local answers to a number of



questions about the pattern of riotous behaviour and its control. Perhaps similar studies elsewhere may then suggest informative contrasts and comparisons.



## Chapter Two: Liverpool, 1815 to 1835

Liverpool was a merchants' town; its prosperity depended upon their trade, its function was to act as the main port of Lancashire.<sup>44</sup> It grew in the eighteenth century from a minor creek attached to the port of Chester to a major port as the result of the slave trade; surviving abolition, it continued to grow, and by the census of 1861 the population neared half a million.

The main import was cotton; the volume of this trade tripled in the years 1820 to 1850.<sup>45</sup> From 1815 to 1860, trade suffered only brief setbacks, and the tonnage of ships annually using the port rose from under a million in 1815 to over five million by 1860.<sup>46</sup>

There was little manufacturing industry in the town or its immediate area, and what existed was very diverse; ironfounding, soapmaking, engineering, sugar-boiling, and watchmaking. The majority of the working population, however, worked either in port-based trades, or in the provision of goods and services to the town and its surroundings. There were also large numbers of seamen based in Liverpool, beside larger numbers of foreign seamen passing through the town. Unskilled work was mainly casual; dock-portering provided at least

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<sup>44</sup> Sources for the economy of Liverpool; S. Marriner, The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside, London, 1982; B. L. Anderson and P. J. M. Stoney (eds), Commerce, Industry and Transport, Studies in Economic Change on Merseyside, Liverpool, 1983; J. R. Harris (ed), Liverpool and Merseyside, New York, 1969; C. Aspin, Lancashire, the First Industrial Society, Preston, 1969.

<sup>45</sup> D. M. Williams, "Liverpool Merchants and the Cotton Trade" in Harris (ed), Liverpool .....

<sup>46</sup> D. Caradog Jones (ed), The Social Survey of Merseyside, Liverpool, 1934, p. 24.

sporadic work for very large numbers; this and the building trade attracted large numbers of immigrants to the town.

Underemployment was always a problem; dock porters' pay, for example, was throughout the period something like 2s6d per day, but often for two or less days per week. Wages for skilled workers could be up to 6s per day, and they were less prone to underemployment; there were, however, periods when unemployment affected both, not only during trade depressions, but also during prolonged bad weather, which could stop the work of the port for weeks together in winter.

In 1815, patterns of employment and methods of production had altered little over the previous century. Industrialisation brought growth rather than change to Liverpool. Between 1815 and 1860 there were more changes. Iron ships powered by steam became common, although this had less impact on shipbuilding than the expansion of the docks, which by 1860 had almost displaced shipyards from the town's waterfront to Birkenhead and Widnes. The use of steam power produced other changes; in sawmills, it reduced work for sawyers, and steam cranes produced changes in methods of stevedorage. In other trades, such as ropemaking and tailoring, skilled male workers were increasingly replaced by unskilled or female labour. Yet many trades experienced little or no alteration during these years, and others declined only gently. Such changes as occurred were dispersed both in time and across the range of trades, and produced gradual and localised results.

The diversity of nineteenth-century urban life is increasingly being recognised by social and economic historians, and just as the economic history of a town in the woollen districts of Yorkshire differs from that of Manchester, so is the economic history of Liverpool very different from that of industrial towns generally. The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries brought urbanisation but not industrialisation to Liverpool. They brought problems of poverty, bad living conditions, and ill health. They did not, however, produce any large body of workers whose skills had been suddenly superseded by machinery, nor did they replace traditional small-scale workshops with factories. The skilled workforce was still divided into small groups which had been working in the same ways for many years. A crisis in one trade

might have no impact on others. There were thus few factors to encourage feelings of common interest among workers.

Liverpool was governed until 1836 by the Common Council, which had 41 members; vacancies were filled by nomination by the remaining members; this self-perpetuation produced a very close-knit oligarchy. Members were freemen, which reduced possible candidates to a very small number. Of 160,000 inhabitants in the early 1830s, only about 5,000 were freemen. Sales of the freedom were stopped in 1777,<sup>47</sup> to preserve the revenue from the town dues, which freemen did not pay. It had since then been granted only to sons or apprentices of freemen. This favoured the skilled working class, and the great majority of freemen came from this social stratum.<sup>48</sup> The choice of new Council members was made from among the few hundred freemen having sufficient wealth and status, and was usually influenced by family connection. In 1832, 37 members were said to be related to current or former councillors. They were, without exception, Anglicans, and, with few exceptions, Tories.<sup>49</sup> Radical sympathies, however, were not an absolute barrier to higher office. The three chief officers were the mayor and two bailiffs; on at least two occasions the mayor was an advocate of reform; in 1823-4 all three were Reformers.

The mayor was elected annually, on October 18th, by the whole body of freemen. Mayoral elections were often accompanied by much bribery and drinking and a good deal of rough humour.<sup>50</sup> The phrase "common hall" was often heard at these elections.<sup>51</sup> This was a meeting of all freemen, on whose authority the common council based its claim to power, but which

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<sup>47</sup> Picton, Memorials of Liverpool, London, 1852, Vol.1, p.218.

<sup>48</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, pp. 2704-5.

<sup>49</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p.2730.

<sup>50</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 22 Oct 1819, 12 Oct 1821; Gore's General Advertiser, 25 Oct 1827; Liverpool Courier, 21 Oct 1829; Liverpool Mercury, 10 Nov 1816.

<sup>51</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 24 Sep 1824; Liverpool Albion, 19 Oct 1829.

it never allowed to meet. Some candidates came close to offering to call a common hall; none actually did so.

The mayor was, *ex officio*, a JP. He presided at the quarter sessions, aided by the recorder, who was appointed by the corporation. Ex-mayors (aldermen), who usually numbered twelve or thirteen, acted as magistrates of petty sessions in the town and at the dock police office.<sup>52</sup> Juries for the quarter sessions were appointed from freemen who were also "merchants or considerable tradespeople"; the foreman of the Grand Jury was often a common councillor.<sup>53</sup> Trials for offences within the town were removed from the control of the corporation only when they were sent to the assizes, which for most of this period were held in Lancaster. Corporation responsibility for law-enforcement was handled by a sub-committee consisting of the mayor and magistrates.

In principle, the dock estate was controlled by a separate body, the dock trustees; however, the majority of them had to be council members,<sup>54</sup> and there were very strong links between the two bodies.

The council did not have a monopoly of power; vestry ratepayers voted, in proportion to their payments, to elect the select vestry, which controlled poor-relief, and most of the commissioners of the watch, scavengers, and lamps, who controlled policing at night and the lighting and cleansing of the streets. These bodies provided some opportunity for political activity to many wealthy men debarred from the council. A minority of the dock trustees were also elected from dock-rate payers who were not councillors. Yet the power of these men was small in comparison with that of the council.

The combination of dock trustees and common council had control of the spending of very large sums of money, and the employment of many men. The corporation income, from the

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<sup>52</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, pp. 2698-2700.

<sup>53</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p. 2714.

<sup>54</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p. 2706.

corporate estate, and from a local tax on goods entering the town by sea, came to some £108,000 p.a.<sup>55</sup> They made free use of patronage. Appointments often went to family members; in 1834, two-thirds of the clergy were related to present or former councillors, and the recorder was the brother of an ex-alderman.<sup>56</sup> Lesser appointments were also used; in 1829 the superintendent of the town constables complained that men were appointed, regardless of suitability, on the recommendation of friends of the corporation.<sup>57</sup> The common council cannot, however, be regarded as unduly corrupt according to the standards of the time. Some of their servants made good profits -- the town surveyor was said to have received £175,000 as commission on the building of the custom house,<sup>58</sup> in the 1830s -- but there is no suggestion that the profit of the councillors went beyond lavish public dinners. Many improvements were made: dock-building, street-widening, public buildings. Yet a petition in 1826 for parks and baths for the working classes was rapidly rejected without reason given.<sup>59</sup> Other such requests met a similar fate. Although the council worked well for their town, they saw that town as a machine of commerce.

The maintenance of order did not rank particularly high among their responsibilities. Of the full-time police, only the town constables were directly under the control of the mayor. In 1815 they consisted of a superintendent, seven head constables, each with two assistants, and a keeper and three constables at the main bridewell.<sup>60</sup> These numbers remained unchanged until

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<sup>55</sup> Town Books, Vol.16, p.546, 25 Jul 1835.

<sup>56</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p. 2730; *ibid*, p.2699.

<sup>57</sup> Town Books, Vol.16, p.156, 7 Oct 1829.

<sup>58</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p. 2708.

<sup>59</sup> Town Books, Vol. 15, p. 562, 5 Apr 1826.

<sup>60</sup> Town Books, Vol. 14, p.488, Oct 1814.

1826, when the total rose to 43; by 1835, it was 53.<sup>61</sup> The constables did not patrol the streets, and were often difficult to find as their duties in connection with the courts and the execution of warrants occupied much of their time. In 1825, riotous ropemakers paraded for hours throughout the town before the constables caught up with them.<sup>62</sup> In 1829, a Grand Jury presentment complained of serious delays in emergencies, and suggested that a police officer be stationed at each of the lock-up houses, of which there were at least two, and probably three.<sup>63</sup> This suggestion seems not to have been acted upon. In 1831, no police were available at the police office for over an hour to go to a riot.<sup>64</sup> It was only in 1834 that three police stations were established, to be manned during the daytime.<sup>65</sup>

Even when police could be found, their efficiency was not remarkable. Improvements were attempted in 1829, when the Mayor agreed to dismiss "all officers who appear totally unfit for their situation." Their superintendent thought there were many such, blaming it on the exercise of Council patronage, and recommended that "In future before any appointment takes place ... some enquiry and examination as to the qualification and ableness of the candidate for office be made."<sup>66</sup> It is not clear how effective this was. In 1831, a new superintendent, a Mr. Parlour, was appointed; he had been superintendent of the nightly watch for eleven months.<sup>67</sup> Formerly an inspector in the Metropolitan Police, Parlour had introduced several organisational changes in the watch, and may have done the same for the constables. Even so, on the establishment

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<sup>61</sup> Town Books, Vol. 15, p.564, 5 Apr 1826; Munic. Corp. Report, p. 2715.

<sup>62</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 17 Nov 1825.

<sup>63</sup> Town Books, Vol. 16, pp.130-131, 3 Jun 1829.

<sup>64</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 2 Jul 1831.

<sup>65</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 10 Jan 1834.

<sup>66</sup> Town Books, Vol. 16, p.156, 7 Oct 1829.

<sup>67</sup> Liverpool Courier, 22 Jul 1831,



of the new police force in 1836, it was stated that "a vicious system" had prevailed among the town constables, and that "upwards of one thousand pounds per annum" had been received from publicans wishing to avoid prosecution. The watch committee had grave reservations about appointing such men to the new force, and although at least half of them were eventually re-employed, many were restricted to duties in the offices and the courts which provided less scope for bribery.<sup>68</sup>

The Mayor and magistrates could also appoint special constables. It is not clear how they were selected, but the fact that they were paid<sup>69</sup> suggests that they were largely of working class origin. They were enrolled in advance for occasions such as elections, and when disorder was severe could be appointed or reinforced at very short notice.

The dock police were not controlled by the mayor but by the dock trustees; however, of 21 trustees, 13 were members of the common council.<sup>70</sup> This police force was established in 1811: by 1824, it consisted of one superintendent and 31 watchmen "who act as constables in the docks during the day but are obliged to be also on duty during the night."<sup>71</sup> As the docks expanded, so did this force, and in 1833 there were 138 privates, 12 serjeants, 4 inspectors and a superintendent.<sup>72</sup> Less is known of their efficiency than of that of the constables. In 1833, following the example of the Nightly Watch, a Metropolitan Police officer was appointed as

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<sup>68</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p.12, 28 Jan 1836; *ibid*, p. 24, 24 Feb 1836; *ibid*, p. 133, 20 Aug 1836.

<sup>69</sup> Town Books, Vol.15, p.90, 5 Apr 1820; Munic. Corp. Report, p.2723.

<sup>70</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p.2752.

<sup>71</sup> HO40.18 fo98, Mayor to Hobhouse, 22 Apr 1824.

<sup>72</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p.2768.

superintendent.<sup>73</sup> He brought two Metropolitan inspectors with him.<sup>74</sup> Soon afterwards, the first uniforms were issued; this may be a sign of more basic changes.<sup>75</sup> All three local forces had now had the benefit of chief officers with Metropolitan Police experience.

Much more is known of the nightly watch; the minute books of the commissioners of the watch, scavengers and lamps survive from 1824 on. The commissioners consisted in theory of all aldermen -- they numbered about 13 -- with eighteen others elected by the vestry.<sup>76</sup> In practice, the aldermen rarely attended meetings, and active committee members were usually men debarred from any other part in local government by lack of family connection, by not being freemen, or by religious or political persuasion. Most were moderate Tories; a few were Whigs or Reformers. Political bent and lack of conflicting public duties combined to produce more energetic management than the council could provide.

The watch patrolled each night, with extra patrols during the earlier part of the long winter evenings. In 1815, 83 men were employed;<sup>77</sup> by 1830, the force consisted of eight captains and about 120 men.<sup>78</sup> In 1834, ten additional watchmen were taken on.<sup>79</sup> A list of "extramen" was maintained at least from 1824 as reserves and reinforcements. Vacancies were filled from their number. In 1835, several extramen were appointed as full-time employees; reasons for this

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<sup>73</sup> Liverpool Courier, 20 Mar 1833.

<sup>74</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 12 Apr 1833.

<sup>75</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Sep 1833.

<sup>76</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p.2715.

<sup>77</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 17 Feb 1815.

<sup>78</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 10 Aug 1830.

<sup>79</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 24 Jan 1834.

decision included "fires, riots, and walks left unexpectedly vacant", and to provide a probationary appointment for new watchmen.<sup>80</sup>

For much of this period, the efficiency of the watch was unimpressive. In 1815, a petition to the Mayor claimed that they must watch by night and sweep by day, and were fined so often that men died of starvation.<sup>81</sup> The commissioners offered a reward of fifty pounds for the conviction of the author for libel, and indignantly denied that fines were excessive.<sup>82</sup> A resident describes in his memoirs<sup>83</sup> the feebleness of the "Old Charleys", employed to be kept off the parish, but says that they were replaced later by men "who looked as if they would stand no nonsense, and could do a little fighting at a pinch."

If there was any profound change, it was brought about by a sequence of campaigns. In 1826, a sub-committee investigating the Watchmen found 20 to be "aged and infirm"; the rest could be "effective" if discipline were stricter. They recommended an age limit on appointment of 40.<sup>84</sup> Two years later, 73 were found "effective", and 12 infirm from age or disease; this included those injured on duty.<sup>85</sup> In 1830, a superintendent, Mr. Parlour, was appointed, recommended by Richard Mayne of the Metropolitan Police. He brought with him the Metropolitan Police rule book.<sup>86</sup> Although he moved to the town constables only eleven months later, for a higher salary, Parlour introduced many alterations in equipment and routine, based on the

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<sup>80</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 5 Jun 1835.

<sup>81</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 10 Feb 1815.

<sup>82</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 17 Feb 1815.

<sup>83</sup> "An Old Stager" (Aspinall); Liverpool A Few Years Since, Liverpool, 1885 (1852), pp.104-107.

<sup>84</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 2 Jun 1826.

<sup>85</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 26 Sep 1828.

<sup>86</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 20 Aug 1830.

Metropolitan model. These included the provision of a standard truncheon in place of sticks of varying sizes provided by the men themselves. New men must be 35 or less, literate, and 5' 6" or taller. Sweeping duties were much reduced.<sup>87</sup>

Parlour was succeeded by another metropolitan policeman, John Shipp. Although he was a remarkable man -- he had twice risen from the ranks to hold an army commission -- he served the commissioners unremarkably from August 1831 to May 1833, when he became governor of the workhouse.<sup>88</sup> The third superintendent, Michael James Whitty, was an Irish journalist with no previous police experience. Despite this, he was to be the first Head Constable of the new Liverpool police from its foundation in 1836 until 1844. During his time with the Watch, he also became head of the fire police, the firemen being watchmen paid extra for work at fires.

Standards of discipline are difficult to evaluate. Drunkenness was the most frequent problem, disciplinary actions being needed in most weeks. A decision that men found drunk should be dismissed was passed in 1830, but rescinded the following year.<sup>89</sup> The turnover of men was fast, contributing further to the drink problem as the custom of paying "footings" was impossible to stamp out.<sup>90</sup> There is no indication whether the word "drunk" meant intoxicated so as to impair efficiency, or merely "having taken drink"; many of the commissioners were supporters of the temperance movement.

Assaults by the watch on members of the public were recorded two or three times a year; the circumstances were given in detail only if indecency was in question. The usual punishment

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<sup>87</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 7 Sep 1830 and 10 Sep 1830.

<sup>88</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 31 May 1833.

<sup>89</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 1 Jan 1830, 7 Jan 1831.

<sup>90</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 14 Oct 1831, 8 Mar 1833.

for any assault was dismissal.<sup>91</sup> There were also more bizarre offences; in 1835, a watchman was discharged for keeping fowls in his watchbox and killing them with his truncheon.<sup>92</sup>

It was unusual for the watch to be used against daytime riots, and they seem never to have been used at public meetings or elections. Indeed, during celebrations of the Queen's acquittal in 1820, they marched in the procession rather than policed it.<sup>93</sup> The men could not easily be called out when off duty, and could not be used both day and night. There may also have been a lack of cooperation between commissioners and council. It is notable that in listing police strength for the Home Office in 1824 the Mayor omitted the watch.<sup>94</sup> During their hours of duty, however, the watch routinely dealt with many riotous affrays; they patrolled in strength in areas like Vauxhall Road on Saturday nights and on the night of St. Patrick's day when drunken riots were expected. Injuries to watchmen were frequent, and the commissioners often prosecuted rioters at the expense of the parish.

There were frequent clashes between these three police forces, often resulting from members of one arresting members of another.<sup>95</sup> Relations between their superiors were little better; in 1823, the dock trustees refused the watch the use of their lock-up; in the next year, the commissioners asked their clerk to report obstruction of rate collection by the magistrates, and in 1826 the commissioners clashed with one of the aldermen over an alleged assault by a

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<sup>91</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 24 Nov 1826, 20 Dec 1827, 27 Feb 1835.

<sup>92</sup> Liverpool Journal, 1 Aug 1835.

<sup>93</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 24 Nov 1820.

<sup>94</sup> HO40.18 fo98, Mayor to Hobhouse, 22 Apr 1824.

<sup>95</sup> E.g. Min. Com. Watch, 3 Dec 1824, 8 Jun 1825, 27 Nov 1829, 25 Oct 1833; Saturday's Advertiser, 9 Sep 1826.

watchman.<sup>96</sup> In 1834, conflict between commissioners and council became acute when the Council applied for an act of parliament for a new day police force.

A daytime patrol was by then generally admitted to be necessary. Tentative experiments had been made, at the instigation of the commissioners, in 1828; ten men were appointed to patrol the main streets, their duties being to remove vagrants, clear obstructions, and assist the public in cases of felony.<sup>97</sup> This experiment had had little result, the number of "streetkeepers", as they were called, being reduced to zero over the next three years.

In 1834, the common council again raised the question of day police, and drafted a bill to empower them to appoint such a force. This became known as the Parson-Police Bill, since the parish was to pay two thirds of police costs in return for being relieved of the cost of supporting the clergy. The commissioners objected most strongly to this bill, which had been approved by the vestry at a time when the great majority of ratepayers could not vote; the rate having recently been laid, they were technically in arrears.<sup>98</sup> They petitioned parliament against the bill, and this roused the Mayor and Aldermen to use their right to sit as commissioners to engineer the removal of many of the elected members on grounds such as non-residence.<sup>99</sup>

Before producing any result, this squalid business was overtaken by municipal corporation reform. It is probable that the main concern of the corporation was the maintenance of the clergy, threatened by proposed changes in legislation, but the terms of the bill throw some light on the common council's ideas on policing.<sup>100</sup> The preamble makes no specific mention of riot or disorder, merely of "offences against persons and property". The strength of the force is not

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<sup>96</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 26 Dec 1823, 13 Aug 1824, 24 Nov 1826.

<sup>97</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 3 Oct 1828; Town Books Vol.16, p. 71, 5 Nov 1828; *ibid* p.83, 3 Dec 1828.

<sup>98</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 17 Mar 1835.

<sup>99</sup> Liverpool Mercury; 1 May 1835.

<sup>100</sup> See Gore's General Advertiser, 19 Mar 1835, for a summary of its provisions.

stated; in view of the reluctance of the council to increase the number of town constables, it is unlikely that they envisaged a large force. They were to be controlled by the mayor, the last mayor, and the two churchwardens, only. These men were to have powers to arm the police, the type of arms not being specified. The police were to be empowered to arrest anyone "whom they shall have cause to suspect of any evil design", or anyone out at night without good reason. Most of these provisions seem better fitted to prevent robbery than riot. Even the use of arms may have been intended for use in remote areas; after the foundation of the new police in 1836, cutlasses were first issued to patrols in isolated areas where robberies from the person were most to be expected.<sup>101</sup> Probably the mayor and magistrates were more satisfied with the resources available against riot than with those available against other crimes.

The general trend over this period is thus toward increasingly numerous and effective police. In 1815 there were probably about 140 police of all kinds, with troops available only after considerable delay. By 1835, this figure had risen to 336, with troops also permanently stationed in the town. Riot was never quoted to justify increases to the police forces; theft loomed much larger in the consciousness of the authorities. Nevertheless, the commissioners for municipal corporations reported that "this force has been found perfectly adequate to the preservation of the peace of the town.....the inhabitants consider themselves a very well protected community".<sup>102</sup> Probably there were inhabitants in the poorer areas of town who would not agree, yet on the whole this is a fair assessment; Liverpool was likely to be as well policed as any town outside London.

For Liverpool, as for most provincial towns, Home Office involvement in questions of law and order was small. Although the prevention of riot fell within the area of responsibility of the Home Secretary, he was only necessarily involved if the civil power required the assistance of military force. Where the civil power alone was used, the Home Office was unlikely to be concerned unless local magistrates lacked the skill, confidence, or resources to act effectively.

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<sup>101</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p. 225, 24 Dec 1836.

<sup>102</sup> Munic. Corp. Report, p.2715.

This was partly because the scale of riots was usually small, their nature not very threatening; and partly because the mayors of these years were able to cope without assistance.

Until January 1822, the Home Secretary was Lord Sidmouth, whose contact with Liverpool consisted largely of expressions of his confidence in the current mayor.<sup>103</sup> This trust was also displayed when a visitor to Liverpool wrote to warn of the seditious activities of the Club of Independent Freemen; the reply was curt and dismissive.<sup>104</sup> Later Home Secretaries did not express their confidence so explicitly, but it can be deduced from their equal lack of intervention.

The loyalty of the Common Council was expressed not only in addresses to the Crown containing extravagant condemnation of sedition<sup>105</sup> and by judicious gifts of the freedom of Liverpool,<sup>106</sup> but also in practical assistance in matters of national security. A considerable proportion of the correspondence between the Home Office and the Mayors concerned public order in Ireland. The Mayor or Town Clerk might be asked about seditious Irish meetings or the export of arms.<sup>107</sup> Although Irish immigrants were seen as a fertile source of lesser riots,

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<sup>103</sup> HO41.1 fo208, Addington to Mayor, 1 Nov 1816; HO43.25 fo297, Addington to Byng, 19 Dec 1816; HO41.4 fo157, Hobhouse to Mayor, 26 June 1819; HO41.4 fo250, Hobhouse to Mayor, 23 Sep 1819; HO41.5 fo1, Hobhouse to Mayor, 1 Sep 1819; HO41.5 fo24, Clive to Mayor, 20 Sep 1819.

<sup>104</sup> HO40.3/1 fo745, Thomas Baker to Lord Sidmouth, 1 Jan 1817; HO41.1 fo98, Addington to Baker, 20 Jan 1817.

<sup>105</sup> Town Books, Vol.15, p.54, 12 Oct 1819; *ibid.* pp.141-2, date illegible (Dec 1820).

<sup>106</sup> See, e.g., HO40.13 fo314, Byng to Hobhouse, 17 Jun 1820, for the gift of the freedom to the C.in C. Northern District, and HO79.4 fo69 Hobhouse to Byng, 21 Jun 1820 for Sidmouth's expression of satisfaction.

<sup>107</sup> E.g. HO79.4 fo172; Hobhouse to Statham, 16 Mar 1827; HO79.4 fo67, Hobhouse to Mayor, 18 May 1820; HO79.4 fo93, Hobhouse to Mayor, 16 Apr 1822; HO79.4 fo94, Hobhouse to Mayor, 30 Apr 1822; HO43.37 fo442, Phillipps to Mayor, 12 Sep 1829.



as will be seen later, the local authorities showed no fear before 1835 of politically motivated disorder from this source. Replies were generally reassuring and steps were taken to prevent the export of arms.<sup>108</sup> Home Office concern was also expressed on some occasions when a national event led to fears of riot, such as the celebration in support of the Queen in 1820 or the reform crisis of 1831. On such occasions, the mayor was not the only source of information; in 1820, a Major Drake, "on the staff at Liverpool", reported via the Commander-in-Chief for the North, General Byng, on the use of "dangerous" (seditious) language<sup>109</sup> and in 1831 a report was received, via the Post Master General, from the postmaster of Liverpool.<sup>110</sup> The Home Secretary thus had ways of watching the local authorities which did not differ greatly from those found over the previous half-century.<sup>111</sup>

During this period problems which concerned the Home Office were not usually the cause of riots in Liverpool, and the riots which occurred were almost entirely dealt with by the local authorities. The obvious exception is the handful of incidents which required the use of troops. In these cases, the approval of the Home Secretary was needed. In practice, this approval might be assumed, if troops were available. If they had to be brought from a distance, prior approval was sought, either directly<sup>112</sup> or via the senior military officer present.<sup>113</sup> Particular cases will be examined later; in general, the troops were used, as if they were an extension of the town's police forces, at the discretion of the mayor.

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<sup>108</sup> E.g. HO52.1 fo3, Mayor to Hobhouse, 1 Jul 1820; HO52.3 fo90, Mayor to Hobhouse, 30 Apr 1822; HO43.37 fo497, Phillipps to Mayor, 16 Oct 1829.

<sup>109</sup> HO40.15 fo133, Byng to Hobhouse, 17 Nov 1820.

<sup>110</sup> HO40.29/2 fo303, Banning to Freeling, 12 Oct 1831.

<sup>111</sup> See Clive Emsley, "The Home Office and its Sources of Information and Investigation 1791 to 1801" in *E H R*, XCIV (1979), pp. 532-561.

<sup>112</sup> E.g. HO40.18 fo55, Mayor to Peel, 22 Mar 1824.

<sup>113</sup> E.g. HO40.22/1 fo130, Lt. Col. Jordan to Maj. Eckersley, 6 Jun 1827.

Out of 79 recorded incidents, only 9 involved troops. The remainder were handled by the civil power. The local volunteer cavalry, the Liverpool Light Horse, were used only once, for an illegal meeting of protest about Peterloo.<sup>114</sup> More usually, regular troops were used. For much of the period, the military presence in the town was small or non-existent, with a maximum of three troops of cavalry, or one troop of cavalry and two companies of infantry, being brought from Manchester or Chester as needed.<sup>115</sup> These troops withdrew as soon as the immediate danger had passed; the council had decided not to provide barracks.<sup>116</sup> In 1831, accommodation was provided in a former lunatic asylum,<sup>117</sup> and a permanent military presence was maintained thereafter.

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<sup>114</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 2 Sep 1819.

<sup>115</sup> HO43.32 fo257, Dawson to Mayor, 24 Mar 1824; HO79.4 fo124, Hobhouse to Byng, 1 May 1826; HO40.26/1 fo61, Bouverie to Peel, 3 Sep 1830.

<sup>116</sup> Town Books, Vol.15, p.97, 7 Jun 1820.

<sup>117</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 26 Nov 1831; HO41.11 fo235, Phillipps to Mayor, 29 Mar 1833.

## Chapter Three: Riots, 1815 to 1835

The year 1815 was in many ways, of course, a watershed; but it is not claimed that there was any major significance for it in Liverpool's riotous behaviour. Riots had been frequent during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; memoirs of the period describe the almost routine riotous resistance to pressgangs.<sup>118</sup> Most elections were attended by serious disorder, 1807 being particularly notable; and once the nomination of a candidate was prevented by violent means.<sup>119</sup> There were also serious sectarian attacks, on a Catholic chapel and the houses of Catholics, as early as 1746,<sup>120</sup> whilst the town's most serious riots to date had been during the sailors' strike of 1775 when the Town Hall was bombarded by cannon.<sup>121</sup> The mob was frequently loyalist, in 1794 surrounding the Town Hall and breaking windows to demand that the Council should produce a Loyal Address to the King.<sup>122</sup>

For the years between 1815 and 1835, 79 incidents have been discovered which justify inclusion, actual violence (sometimes minimal) occurring at 74 of them. Details are given in abbreviated form in Appendix 2. They range from small brawls of unknown origin to riots

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<sup>118</sup> "An Old Stager" (Aspinall); Liverpool A Few Years Since, Liverpool, 1885 (1852), pp. 7-11.

<sup>119</sup> Picton, Memorials of Liverpool, London, 1875, Vol. 1, pp. 278, 206.

<sup>120</sup> Picton, Memorials....., p.180.

<sup>121</sup> R B Rose "A Liverpool Sailors' Strike in the Eighteenth Century" in THSLC, Vol 68, 1958, pp. 85-92.

<sup>122</sup> Picton, Memorials....., p. 234.

which convulsed large parts of the town for over 24 hours. One sectarian riot, one anti-police riot, and one trade dispute shared this distinction, but the type which above all affected the whole town during this period was election disorder.

### *Election Riots*

In Liverpool, the franchise extended to the freemen; that is, sons of freemen, or men who had served an apprenticeship of 7 years to a freeman, who paid a fee of two pounds (or had it paid for them by candidates). Of the 5,271 men who were freemen by 1830, over 3,000 were artisans.<sup>123</sup> Many were members of trade societies which at election time formed a forum for canvassing, when voters and non-voters alike enjoyed the hospitality of the candidates. The franchise was to such clubs almost a joint possession.

The political parties active from 1815 until about 1827 were three in number. The "Ins" were the town council party, making free use of the patronage of the Corporation. Their candidate was General Isaac Gascoyne, a man more famous for his blunders than his political acumen. The "Outs" were gentlemen excluded from influence with the Corporation, most of them being merchants first and politicians second. A mixture of moderate Tories and Whigs, they required a candidate of ability and influence to protect the town and its trade at Westminster, and supported first Canning and later Huskisson. They had wealth, which enabled them to practice effective bribery. The third party was the hapless Radicals; short of both money and influence, long on conscience, they were unable to offer direct incentives. Their main organisational body was for a time the Concentric Club, which existed from 1812 to 1823, and whose members even after that date continued to be recognisable as a political body.<sup>124</sup> Although rarely able to prevent the election of two Tories, they could at times command a fair amount of popular

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<sup>123</sup> Report of the Proceedings before the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to try the matter of the petition against the return of William Ewart Esquire for the Borough of Liverpool, Session 1830-31, from the shorthand notes of Richard M Bousfield, (Bribery Report 1831), Liverpool, 1831, pp: 13-20.

<sup>124</sup> Liverpool Albion, 8 Jan 1827, gives a brief summary of its rise and fall.

support. During the early part of the period, this was orchestrated by a local auctioneer known as "General" Green, whose "army" of some hundreds of freemen took an active part in the selection of candidates, visiting them en masse accompanied by large numbers of non-voters.<sup>125</sup> However, they lost even this support in 1827 when the question of parliamentary reform took on a new urgency. In Liverpool this was the beginning of a six-year campaign by middle-class Radicals to use evidence of the corruption of the poorer freemen to obtain a local act of parliament to disfranchise them in order to transfer their votes to the allegedly more independent middle classes. This alienated poorer freemen to such an extent that the Conservatives could still make electoral capital from it in the 1850s.<sup>126</sup> A further factor in the Radicals' lack of support was their lack of the common touch. Earnest talk about the brotherhood of man was often of less use than the generous if temporary conviviality of the Tories. They also included few merchants; this meant not only a lack of direct employer influence, it more crucially robbed them of a claim to a joint interest with the artisans in the commercial prosperity of the town. In a town whose prosperity was built up out of the slave trade, their earlier, and continuing, agitation against slavery cannot have endeared them to many. Together these factors explain why the poorer freemen gave their support in the main to the Tories.

Elections in the early part of the century were convivial. Music, ribbons, banners, all helped the festive air, but drink was the most powerful influence. Voters were received only in groups of ten ("tallies"), which were formed in public houses and held there until required. Bribery in cash was usual; in some years the sum was only that lost in wages by taking time off to vote, in other years it was much more.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 7th June 1816, 26 June 1818, 14th June 1826.

<sup>126</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 2nd July 1852.

<sup>127</sup> Bribery report (1831); Result of Evidence given before the Select Committee appointed to enquire into the petition on Liverpool Borough, London, n.d. (1833).

Nine elections led to fears of disorder during this period; the size of crowds in itself justified precautions. The extent of violent disturbance at parliamentary and mayoral elections is particularly hard to estimate because it was so much expected as to be considered normal. In 1826, one paper reports "A very few acts of outrage only, and not of an aggravated character," while in 1820 the only indications of trouble are the payment for special constables and an oblique reference in the words "...if the town is in disorder..."<sup>128</sup>

Such disturbances as are described include large noisy gangs parading through the town, sometimes breaking windows where party emblems were displayed, or carrying effigies of unpopular local personalities.<sup>129</sup> Party insults sometimes led to fighting, and candidates appearing in public were showered with hisses and invective, and occasionally with heavier objects.<sup>130</sup> This was all fairly normal for the times; earlier Liverpool elections had been, and later ones were to be, very much more riotous. In 1768, a party of men armed with blubber-knives had prevented the nomination of a third candidate, and ensured that no election was held.<sup>131</sup>

It is not surprising that elections were disorderly. Drink would account for a good deal; the evidence at enquiries into electoral bribery shows that accusations of treating were not merely party propaganda.<sup>132</sup> The holiday atmosphere of processions, of bands of music accompanying voters to the poll in their "tallies" of ten, the fact that on this day the gentleman canvasser

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<sup>128</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 17 Jun 1826; Town Books, Vol. 15, p. 90, 5 Apr 1820; Liverpool Mercury, 14 Mar 1820.

<sup>129</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 28 Jun 1816; Liverpool Journal, 22 Oct 1831; Saturday's Advertiser, 17 Jun 1826; Liverpool Journal, 10 Jan 1835; Liverpool Albion, 9 May 1831, 24 Oct 1831.

<sup>130</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Jun 1816; Gore's General Advertiser, 5 May 1831; Liverpool Courier, 12 Dec 1832; Gore's General Advertiser, 27 Oct 1831.

<sup>131</sup> Picton, Memorials of Liverpool, London, 1875, Vol. 1, p. 206.

<sup>132</sup> Bribery Report (1831), *passim*.

addressed the artisan as man to man, all would contribute to a loosening of restraint. Electoral squibs were produced by all parties in a vein of cheerful scurrility:

Old cockfighting Sefton declares he will stand

Back'd by Rushton, Tom Green, and the Jacobin band...<sup>133</sup>

This atmosphere of misrule was probably more important in producing disorder than any desire to influence the outcome of the election, and much more serious violence would have been necessary to do so.

The formation of partisan groups was probably assisted by the participation of those societies which had freemen among their members. Their involvement in elections was considerable; candidates approached many of the artisan voters by way of their clubs, trade-based or convivial, and both types of association marched in procession at the "chairing" of the victorious candidates. Such groups could reduce as well as increase disorder; the relative orderliness of the elections of these years may owe something to the fact that voters were not anonymous among the mass. Among individuals, coloured ribbons given by the candidates served to announce party allegiance. Fights may have started with these favours being torn off, as happened elsewhere.<sup>134</sup>

Few measures were used to reduce disorder at Liverpool elections. Special constables were routinely enrolled, being posted at the hustings and outside the candidates' lodgings. Further specials were added later if disturbances took place.<sup>135</sup> In 1816, the dock police were used. A number of rioters were committed to the assizes for trial. On this occasion, sentences were

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<sup>133</sup> LRO: The Squib Book, being a collection of the addresses, songs, squibs, and other papers issued during the contested election at Liverpool, in June 1818, Liverpool, 1818, p. 5.

<sup>134</sup> PP 1826-7 (394) IV.1114; Report from the Select Committee on Electoral Polls for Cities and Boroughs, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 3, 17, 19, 26.

<sup>135</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 25 Nov 1830; Liverpool Mercury, 9 Jan 1835.

severe, seven men being imprisoned for eighteen months.<sup>136</sup> This probably reflects current fears aroused by working-class Radicalism in Manchester and other areas rather than any influence acting purely in Liverpool. Apart from this occasion, few arrests are recorded, and no sentences. Electoral rioters would usually be tried summarily, and maximum sentences would therefore be lower than those which could be passed at Sessions or Assizes.

Two organisational changes were made before 1835 with the intention of preventing disorder. The first was the use of booths, with voters divided alphabetically, which meant the end of tallies. They were first used in 1831, at the insistence of supporters of reform.<sup>137</sup> The second was the end of the chairing of victorious candidates. The chairing was cancelled in 1832, again at the instigation of the reform party, after an election where sectarian war-cries had been important. Although there had been more noise than violence, it was said that the threat of disorder was too great; no chairing was held after that date. The Reformers' tolerance of disorder seems to have been rather lower than that of Tories; where the common council was in control, tradition seems to have been more important than order. This need not imply that they used or encouraged violence; there is no evidence to support such an idea. It only means that, where a moderate degree of disorder was traditional, they (unlike the reformers) made no great effort to prevent it.

### *Political Protest*

More than any other occasion, political meetings led to unjustified fears of disorder. Precautions were taken on five occasions, at only one of which was there even the smallest violence. There was also one politically-motivated window-breaking which occurred without warning.

Radicalism was on the whole a phenomenon of the middle classes in Liverpool. The sympathy between a large proportion of the town's artisans and the dominant Tory merchants which

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<sup>136</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Jun 1816; Town Books, Vol. 14, p. 613, 5 Feb 1817; PRO PL26.79, Lancaster Assizes, Indictments, Summer 1816.

<sup>137</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 6 May 1831.



was notable at parliamentary elections is also relevant to political protest. Until about 1827, Radical sympathies among the town's artisans were not uncommon. The Concentric Club maintained friendly relations with the artisans who followed "General" Green, and trade societies drank toasts at their annual dinners such as those of the Operative Printers to Sir Francis Burdett and "Orator" Hunt.<sup>138</sup> More typical, though, was the town's anticlimactic response to a visit from Cobbett.<sup>139</sup> The disfranchisement question in the later 1820s served to reduce even the small degree of popular political protest activity previously shown. For these reasons, parliamentary reform never aroused the working classes of Liverpool to the extent that it did elsewhere.

Even while the Six Acts were in force, the mayor of a corporate town could permit public meetings, and the mayors of Liverpool frequently did so. There seems to have been no fear that disturbances would develop merely because people gathered together. The frequent processions of trade and friendly societies were not interfered with, and neither they nor public meetings having mayoral permission seem to have required any large police presence. There is no evidence that special constables were appointed.

Meetings within the town were generally organised by gentlemen, and no requisition to the mayor seems to have been made without the support of men of reasonably high standing in the town. When working men met, the venue was Mosslake Fields, outside the town boundary. Several meetings took place there over the question of the disfranchisement of the poorer freemen, but none led to disturbance sufficient to call for any action.

The mayor probably consulted the town magistrates when deciding. If he approved, he called the meeting, which might take place indoors or out. Reasons for such meetings range from the expression of condolence at the death of Princess Charlotte to protests against the corn

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<sup>138</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 5th July 1820.

<sup>139</sup> Liverpool Courier, 17th May 1826.

laws.<sup>140</sup> When permission was refused, as it was whenever parliamentary reform was involved, there was no attempt to prevent the meeting. In the handful of cases when the meeting still went ahead, there were no arrests of persons attending.

The only disturbance at any public meeting other than elections was when William Cobbett visited Liverpool and held a meeting attended by Liverpool reformers, their opponents, and delegates from elsewhere in Lancashire. The disorder was mainly shouting and jostling. The Liverpool Mercury reported that the majority overcame trouble-makers and "shouldered them out of the square."<sup>141</sup> The Mayor had decided not to intervene unless there was actual breach of the peace.<sup>142</sup>

Despite this trivial measure of actual violence, however, the mere idea of political protest could produce quite disproportionate measures of prevention. While it was unusual for any extraordinary precautions to be taken or for the mayor to consult the Home Office, this did happen at times when there had been serious rioting at similar meetings elsewhere in the country. In August 1819, a meeting was held to protest about the events at Peterloo. The Mayor had been advised by the Home Office to observe the meeting with a view to providing legal evidence of seditious speeches; there was implicit approval of the decision not to stop the meeting, which was held without mayoral permission. The yeomanry, the Liverpool Light Horse, stood by (in heavy rain), and the Mayor was able to report that all had passed off quietly.<sup>143</sup> In 1820, when local reformers wanted to celebrate the Queen's acquittal, the Mayor used the threat of troops to negotiate a compromise whereby a procession was held (peacefully,

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<sup>140</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 5 Dec 1817, 3 Apr 1825.

<sup>141</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 3 Dec 1819.

<sup>142</sup> Billinge's Advertiser, 29 Nov 1819.

<sup>143</sup> HO41.4 fo 267, Hobhouse to Mayor, 28 Aug 1819; Gore's General Advertiser, 2 Sep 1819; HO41.5 fo1, Hobhouse to Mayor, 1 Sep 1819, acknowledging that information.

as it turned out) and an illumination was replaced by a firework display in Mosslake Fields.<sup>144</sup> The peace of the procession is remarkable in view of attempts by ultra-loyalists to "introduce into the procession carriages containing their frail female friends".<sup>145</sup> And in 1831, after dangerous riots in Bristol over parliamentary reform, the Mayor asked for troops to be sent to Liverpool, even though a recent reform meeting attended by a crowd estimated at ten thousand had been peaceful.<sup>146</sup>

### *Trade disputes*

Liverpool men were not so sympathetic to the middle classes that they refrained from disputes with their employers. Thirteen riotous incidents were recorded during these years, and precautions were taken on one further occasion. Many trade associations existed. The shipwrights, described below, were undoubtedly the strongest. Each had its own style; as Clive Behagg argues, beside its official rules each of these societies had unwritten rules determining its attitude to the use of violence.<sup>147</sup> Some specialised in the use of violent methods by individuals; the shipsawyers, vulnerable to competition because of their relative lack of skill and powerless because their apprenticeship was too short to entitle them to qualify as freemen, were particularly noted for extreme violence exercised by individuals or small groups. One murder, some serious assaults, and several acts of arson were committed in this way.<sup>148</sup> These acts may, of course, have resulted from collective decisions; the difficulty of getting evidence,

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<sup>144</sup> HO40.15 fo135, Drake to Byng, 13 Nov 1820; Billinge's Advertiser, 21 Nov 1820.

<sup>145</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 24 Nov 1820.

<sup>146</sup> HO52.13 fo274, Mayor to Lord Melbourne, 2 Nov 1831; HO40.29/2 fo303, W. Banning, Postmaster in Liverpool, to Sir. F. Freeling, 12 Oct 1831.

<sup>147</sup> Clive Behagg "Secrecy, Ritual and Folk Violence: The Opacity of the Workplace in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century" in R D Storch (ed), Popular Culture and Custom in Nineteenth Century England, London, 1982, pp. 154-179.

<sup>148</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 12 Feb 1824; Liverpool Mercury, 14 Sep 1821 and 28 Jun 1833;

despite offers of rewards or pardons and the use of Bow Street officers, could reflect equally general solidarity or individual secrecy.<sup>149</sup> Other trade associations tended towards collective violence. The most serious riots were among the shipwrights, but ropemakers, shoemakers, ironfounders, and builders used similar methods during these years.<sup>150</sup>

Violence was only one method of protecting the interests of workers, and must be seen in context. In many, probably most, cases, wage rates were agreed peacefully.<sup>151</sup> Petitions were often used, and trade societies sometimes bought advertising space to publicise their complaints.<sup>152</sup> In one case, the powerful Shipwright's Club prosecuted their employers under the Combination Acts, but without success.<sup>153</sup> Strikes, which resulted most often from the reduction of wages, did not necessarily involve violence, nor was violence always collective.

Violent acts which are known to have been collective were usually directed against blacklegs; "black sheep" as they were then called. At least once they were offered money before being

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Liverpool Mercury, 27 Feb 1824 and 19 Mar 1824; Town Books, Vol. 15, p. 419, 3 Mar 1824; Liverpool Courier, 24 Dec 1834.

<sup>149</sup> HO43.46 fo41, Phillipps to Mayor, 26 Dec 1824; HO40.33/1.154, Mayor to Goulbourne, 14 Feb 1835.

<sup>150</sup> Shipwrights: Liverpool Mercury, 29 Mar 1822; Gore's General Advertiser, 19 Apr 1827 and 7 Jun 1827; Liverpool Albion, 21 May 1827. Shipsawyers: Gore's General Advertiser, 29 Jan 1824; Ropemakers: Liverpool Mercury, 21 Mar 1823; Shoemakers: Liverpool Journal, 11 Jul 1835; Ironfounders: Liverpool Mercury, 13 Jan 1835; Builders: Liverpool Courier, 13 Nov 1826; Saturday's Advertiser, 12 Sep 1833.

<sup>151</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 2 Apr 1824; agreement was usually no news.

<sup>152</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 12 May 1826, 10 Feb 1815 and 16 Feb 1827; Saturday's Advertiser, 18 Feb 1826.

<sup>153</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 3 May 1816.

offered violence.<sup>154</sup> In some riots, often the smallest, considerable injuries were inflicted.<sup>155</sup> In larger riots, violence often amounted only to rough handling. In some, the ceremony was that of "rough music", using shame to enforce conformity to group norms, as when ropemakers carried two men around the town in a cart, their coats inside-out and placards around their necks,<sup>156</sup> or when shipwrights burned the effigy of an apprentice who had obeyed a magistrate's instruction to do work traditionally done by journeymen.<sup>157</sup> In other cases a show of strength was a threat of future violence.<sup>158</sup>

Only two attacks on employers are reported; in 1818, a master shipwright is said to have been beaten by strikers during an incident during which blacklegs and their tools were thrown from the ship on which they were working,<sup>159</sup> and in 1835, ropemakers stoned their employer's junior partners; the fact that they were performing journeymen's work at the time may have encourage the strikers to treat them as if they were fellow-workers.<sup>160</sup>

In all cases, the object was not to coerce employers directly, but to make strikes effective by preventing the use of blackleg labour. Such tactics seem to have had much success, particularly among trades where a seven-year apprenticeship was served, and the supply of skilled men was limited. These were also the trades with the highest proportion of freemen.

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<sup>154</sup> Liverpool Journal, 11 Jul 1835.

<sup>155</sup> 1825 (417.437) IV 499.565, Report of Minutes of Evidence from the Select Committee on Artisans and Machinery (1824), (C. on A. and M.), p.184; Gore's General Advertiser, 29 Jan 1824.

<sup>156</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 17 Nov 1825.

<sup>157</sup> Liverpool Courier, 18 Apr 1827.

<sup>158</sup> E.g. Billinge's Advertiser, 22 May 1827; Liverpool Courier, 13 Nov 1826.

<sup>159</sup> C. on A. and M., p. 198.

<sup>160</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 2 Oct 1835.

For most of this period, the Shipwrights' Club was the most powerful trade organisation in Liverpool. Founded in 1810, it succeeded in existing under the Combination Acts because of its real but partial function as a benefit society, its readiness to use force, and its organisation, and because its members were employed by master shipwrights but paid by merchants or shipowners, so that the masters' control was limited. It was able to enforce high wages, manning levels, and proportions of apprentices to journeymen.<sup>161</sup> Its membership numbered about 900; almost half were freemen, and at election times it received supposedly charitable donations from supporters of the common council's candidate. An annual procession on the anniversary of the restoration of Charles II, shared with other trades but known as Shipwrights' Day, was followed by a dinner of the club.<sup>162</sup> These dinners and the frequent meetings at election times<sup>163</sup> strengthened the links formed in working together. As journeymen were employed by the day, and moved freely between yards, each would have been acquainted with many others. These close links must have been one of the factors which made it possible to mobilise up to 400 men from the trade.<sup>164</sup>

No other club had such power or prestige, but several functioned similarly. Some had links with national unions in the same trade,<sup>165</sup> but links between trades seem not to have been formed until 1833-34, when most if not all of the building trades joined a general trades union, probably the Operative Builders' Union.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> C. on A. and M., pp.183-248, 350-355.

<sup>162</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 2 Jun 1820 and 1 Jun 1827.

<sup>163</sup> E.g. Liverpool Journal, 13 Nov 1830.

<sup>164</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 7 Jun 1827.

<sup>165</sup> Ropemakers: Liverpool Mercury, 25 Jul 1823; Sawyers: HO40.18 fo239, accounts of Sawyers' Union, April 1825; Hatters: HO40.32/4 fo220, accounts of Hatters' Union, 16 Jun 1829;

<sup>166</sup> Liverpool Courier, 14 Aug 1833; Liverpool Journal, 22 Jun 1833; R. W. Postgate, The Builders' History, London, n.d., Ch.III, pp. 55-76.

As the nature of trade associations developed, so did methods of control. The police available to the mayor were entirely insufficient against such numbers, as was shown in the case of the ropers' "carting" when it took more than an hour to find constables. For some years, little action was taken against the most formidable bodies, the shipwrights and shipsawyers.<sup>167</sup> The official reason was that legal action could be taken only while a riot was in progress, or if evidence of identification was available. It was suggested that the Mayor looked "rather to the pollbook than to the statute book" in acting against the shipwrights,<sup>168</sup> but this scarcely explains the similar lack of action against the shipsawyers. They served only two years' apprenticeship, whereas seven years was required to qualify as a freeman. The answer is more likely that given by the town clerk: "They are a great body of men for a magistrate to put his shoulder against."<sup>169</sup>

A strike combined with the burning-down of a sawmill in 1824 produced the first sign of severity. Both master shipwrights and master sawyers petitioned the Mayor to apply for military assistance; he did so at once, and it was immediately granted.<sup>170</sup> Troops were used only for the protection of sawmills on this occasion. In 1827, a further series of riots was caused by a joint campaign by merchants, shipowners, and master shipwrights to destroy the Shipwrights' Club. Troops were again requested, and granted, following the first attacks on blacklegs.<sup>171</sup> This time, they were used with considerable effect to protect the blacklegs at work; direct confrontation between strikers and troops appears to have been minimal, the troops providing a show of force to support police or special constables. The club was eventually

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<sup>167</sup> C. on A. and M., pp. 184, 187, 195.

<sup>168</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 29 Mar 1822.

<sup>169</sup> C. on A. and M., p.195.

<sup>170</sup> HO40.18 fo53-58, Petitions of master sawyers, master shipwrights, and Mayor to Peel, 22 Mar 1824; HO43.32 fo257, Dawson to Mayor, 24 Mar 1824.

<sup>171</sup> HO41.7 fo232, Hobhouse to Mayor, 16 Apr 1827; HO40.22/1 fo80, Eckersley to Hobhouse, 20 Apr 1827.

replaced by a benefit society run by the masters.<sup>172</sup> Troops were used similarly during a building strike involving a nation-wide general union in 1833.<sup>173</sup> In all these cases, requests for troops were granted without hesitation. The maintenance of public order in the case of trade disputes seems to have been given equally high priority by both local and national government at this time.

The importance given to the prevention of intimidation in strikes in some cases extended to the sentences passed by courts, which were occasionally although not usually long; long or short, they were usually accompanied by a sermon from the bench about the "true" interests of the working man.<sup>174</sup> In the case of the ropemakers' highly ceremonial treatment of blacklegs it seems to have been thought necessary to show that even such relatively non-violent behaviour would not be tolerated; the prisoners were committed to the assizes "in order that they might hear the law of the land propounded to them by the highest authority"<sup>175</sup> The use of troops, and the sentences given, show that trade disputes were surprisingly severely treated in these years. It is clearly not their violence which caused this to be so; sentences almost as high as those given for violence were passed on apprentices who gave way to intimidation and stopped work.<sup>176</sup> A similar concern with the mere possibility of interference with trade is shown by the fact that some of the local churches refused communion to known members of general trades unions.<sup>177</sup> It was the attempt of workmen to exert economic control at all, rather than the use of violent means of doing so, which produced so disproportionate a reaction.

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<sup>172</sup> Liverpool Courier, 2 May 1827; Liverpool Albion, 16 Jul 1827.

<sup>173</sup> HO40.31/1 fo35, Bouverie to Phillipps, 30 Jun 1833.

<sup>174</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 29 Jan 1824 and 12 Sep 1833.

<sup>175</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 23 Mar 1826.

<sup>176</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 18 Apr 1827; Gore's General Advertiser, 17 Nov 1825.

<sup>177</sup> Liverpool Courier, 4 Sep 1833; PP 1836 (40) XXXIV.427, Report on the State of the Irish Poor in Great Britain, (Poor Inquiry (Ireland)), Appendix G, p. 18.



## *Direct Action*

Violence was also used in other cases of grievance or anger. "Direct Action" riots were fairly frequent, but usually rather small. Of 14 cases, nine happened during the cholera epidemic of 1832.<sup>178</sup> They arose out of fears of "burking" -- that doctors would dissect the bodies of cholera victims, and perhaps even murder them in order to do so. The Burke and Hare murders were comparatively recent, and the 1832 Anatomy Act had made dissection a widespread source of fear among the poor, some of whom found it hard to believe that doctors could have any concern for their welfare. Such riots occurred in several towns during this epidemic, fears of murder by medical men being discernible in several cases.<sup>179</sup> In Liverpool, doctors and the constables protecting them were assaulted, and the "palanquin" used to take patients to the temporary cholera hospital was destroyed. Those involved included men, women and boys, and were described as "chiefly composed of low Irish". This may have been prejudice; two men described as "comparatively respectable" and one "Englishman" are listed among the six people known to have been arrested. It is supported, however, by the evidence of the town's first medical officer of health, Dr. Duncan.<sup>180</sup> The press alleged that the motive was to justify a wake.<sup>181</sup> It is also possible that Roman Catholic beliefs concerning the disposal of corpses could have been involved; cremation was not accepted by that church until more than a century later, the burial of the entire body being important. Perhaps, too, the close-knit social groups within the Irish community made collective action more likely.

The cholera riots were taken very seriously by both press and authorities; patients were moved when near death, and risks of infection were increased when patients remained in overcrowded

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<sup>178</sup> Liverpool Journal, 2 Jun 1832; Liverpool Times, 5 Jun 1832; Liverpool Courier, 6, 13, 20, 27 Jun 1832.

<sup>179</sup> M. J. Durey, The Return of the Plague: British Society and the Cholera, 1831-2, Dublin, 1979, pp. 158-9, 183-4; Ruth Richardson, Death, Dissection and the Destitute, London, 1987, pp. 223-230.

<sup>180</sup> Poor Inquiry (Ireland), Appendix G, p18.

<sup>181</sup> Liverpool Courier, 13 Jun 1832.

homes. Some doctors refused to visit patients in areas where riots had occurred,<sup>182</sup> but most persisted; they were provided with escorts of constables. An address by Catholic priests was perhaps one of the most useful measures.<sup>183</sup> There were also a number of exemplary trials. In most cases no arrests were made; only six people were arrested. At least five were sent to the quarter sessions, bail being allowed in only one case. Magistrates declared that they would "visit such offences with the utmost severity",<sup>184</sup> and persisted in sending the one prisoner who was granted bail for trial in spite of his "comparative respectability", his apology, and his employer's evidence.

In the other cases in this most miscellaneous category the nature of the links between participants was also varied. On one occasion, a chance-assembled crowd took violent action to rescue a child from a drunken mother; there were three riots in the town's theatre, two being protests against the dismissal of an actress. There was also an attack on a temperance meeting.<sup>185</sup> These incidents gave no opportunity for special policing, and were treated by magistrates on their "merits". The highest sentence was three months imprisonment, apparently because of damage to theatre property, whereas in the child rescue the mother was arrested, not the rioters.

### *Sectarian Conflict*

The sectarian riot was to become a notably Liverpool event. As Frank Neal has written, in the preface to his comprehensive account of Liverpool sectarian violence,

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<sup>182</sup> Liverpool Courier, 20 Jun 1832.

<sup>183</sup> Poor Inquiry (Ireland) ... p.18.

<sup>184</sup> Liverpool Courier, 13 Jun 1832.

<sup>185</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 7 Jun 1822; Gore's General Advertiser, 16 Dec 1824, 27 Jan 1825; Saturday's Advertiser, 26 Aug 1826; Liverpool Mercury, 9 Oct 1835.

Anyone born and raised in working-class Liverpool in pre-slum clearance days could not fail to be aware of religious differences within that society.<sup>186</sup>

In the nineteenth century, however, the difference was seen as primarily one of "party". Conservatives were Protestant; Radicals supported Catholicism and non-conformity. This division seems to date from the 1820s; the Tories had for many years claimed for themselves a monopoly of true religion. During the years when they labelled their opponents "Jacobin", they made much use of accusations of lack of religion. The question of Catholic emancipation, coinciding with the arrival of growing numbers of Catholic Irish, led to the replacement of "irreligion" by "popery". The granting of increased rights to Catholics in 1829 was followed by the establishment of a number of Protestant organisations; the Liverpool Protestant Association, the Society for the Education of the Native Irish, the Protestant Reformation Society all existed by 1835. Their meetings heard ancient slanders such as tales of priests murdering babies in order to cast out the devil, and allegations that the Catholic laity were kept in ignorance of the existence the second commandment.<sup>187</sup> The Liberal press equated this extreme protestantism with Conservatism,<sup>188</sup> and the principles of the Tradesmen's Conservative Society, which concentrated on the need for the Established Church as the chief protection of the state, gives support to this idea. Nor was Unitarianism any more acceptable; Thornley, the Liberal candidate in 1832, met much opposition on the grounds of his beliefs, which were said by one correspondent of the Liverpool Albion to deny Christ's divinity, and thus render him unfit to represent the town.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Frank Neal, Sectarian Violence: the Liverpool Experience, 1819 to 1914, Manchester, 1988, p. ix.

<sup>187</sup> Liverpool Courier, 28 Mar 1827, account of meeting of the Society for the Education of the Native Irish.

<sup>188</sup> E.g. Liverpool Journal, 31 Oct 1835; Liverpool Times, 27 Oct 1835.

<sup>189</sup> Liverpool Albion, 10 Dec 1832.

Although much worse violence was to come after 1835, there were five incidents between 1815 and that year which arose because of the Loyal Orange Order.

The major occasion for Orange pageantry, the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, July 12th, was first celebrated in Liverpool in 1819, and produced the town's first Orange riot.<sup>190</sup> About 100 Orangemen from Liverpool and from other parts of Lancashire marched through the main streets of the town carrying banners bearing protestant devices, many of which were deeply provocative to Catholics. At the bottom of Dale Street, in the heart of the town, they were attacked by a crowd said (probably correctly) to be made up of Irishmen. Stones were thrown, and several marchers were injured. Eleven of the attackers were arrested, and troops called out to prevent a recurrence of fighting.<sup>191</sup>

The 'ringleader' was imprisoned for six months, the others for three. A similar march in the following year met a similar fate, eight arrests being made.<sup>192</sup> The Mayor attempted to exclude Manchester Orangemen and to test the legality of Orange processions by indicting the order at the quarter sessions; the precise charge used is not recorded. The Grand Jury threw out the bill against the order; the prosecution against those who attacked its members was dropped. The inference is that these events were connected.

No further procession was held in Liverpool until the 1840s, although an incident in 1823 showed that Orange lodges still met, and that town constables were members. A constable was attacked by a small group of men as he left an indoor celebration of the 12th July. He ran for help, finding several other constables so soon that it is likely that they had been attending the same meeting. Five men were imprisoned for six months for the attack.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 22 Jul 1819, 29 Jul 1819; Billinge's Advertiser, 19 Jul 1819, 26 Jul 1819.

<sup>191</sup> Billinge's Advertiser, 19 Jul 1819.

<sup>192</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 15 Jul 1820; Billinge's Advertiser, 18 Jul 1820, 25 Jul 1820.

<sup>193</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 17 Jul 1823, 31 Jul 1823.

A secondary date in the Orange calendar was November 5th, anniversary both of the downfall of the papist Fawkes and of the arrival in England of William of Orange. Surprisingly, it produced no recorded sectarian problems, although there was concern about the use of gunpowder in fireworks which led to precautions being taken.<sup>194</sup>

The relative quietness of the local Orangemen was not brought about by local preventive measures alone. In 1821, the order was forced both to move its headquarters from Manchester to London,<sup>195</sup> and to change the form of its oaths to comply with the law. In Ireland, too, the order was at a low ebb.<sup>196</sup>

Liverpool seems to have had few Orangemen before the 1830s. The 1819 procession consisted of only about 100 men, not all of them from Liverpool. Occupations of some members are known; most were small tradesmen or skilled workers.<sup>197</sup> Local reformers supported the rioters imprisoned then, arranging a heroes' welcome on their release.<sup>198</sup> This arose from an identification of Orangeism and Toryism which had some justification nationally -- such upper-class support as the order had was from Ultra-Tories -- but which in view of the actions of the Mayor seems to have scarcely been justified locally as yet. There is no evidence at this date of any sympathy towards the order among leading Tories. Senior states that English

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<sup>194</sup> Billinge's Advertiser, 10 Nov 1829; Saturday's Advertiser, 12 Nov 1831; Liverpool Courier, 11 Nov 1835.

<sup>195</sup> PP 1835 (603) XVII.1, Report of Select Committee on Orange Lodges in Great Britain and the Colonies, App. II, p. 3.

<sup>196</sup> H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795-1836, London, 1966, pp. 175 and 199.

<sup>197</sup> Billinge's Advertiser, 26 Jul 1819.

<sup>198</sup> Picton, Memorials ..., pp. 354-5.

members at this time were mainly Irish immigrants, and almost entirely working-class,<sup>199</sup> and this is supported by the evidence of the Head Constable M. J. Whitty:

There are sometimes battles between the Orangemen and the Ribbonmen.....these silly people retaining here, where there is no sympathy for either, the absurd enmities which disgraced and degraded them at home.<sup>200</sup>

The Ribbonmen mentioned here were members of Catholic societies which were in some ways equivalent to Orange lodges. Local clubs were linked by a tenuous central organisation whose main function was the coordination of passwords. They were not terrorist organisations, although the name was often misused to describe Irish agrarian secret societies which used terrorist tactics. Ribbon societies were more usually urban, and sometimes acted as trade societies.<sup>201</sup> Their main purpose was opposition to Orangemen, often exhibited in battles which took place almost by appointment. Broeker mentions an information centre in Northern Ireland where lists of fairs were maintained where such battles were expected.<sup>202</sup> The existence of Ribbon societies in Liverpool at this period is suggested by a letter of the Manchester Grand Lodge of the Orange Order<sup>203</sup> and confirmed by the evidence of an informer, among Dublin Castle records, which refers to a schism between Liverpool Ribbonmen from Leinster and those from Ulster in 1822.<sup>204</sup> It is possible that opposition to the 1819 march may have been

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<sup>199</sup> Senior, Orangeism....., pp. 152,154,158,176;

<sup>200</sup> Poor Inquiry (Ireland)...., p. 20.

<sup>201</sup> G. Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-1836, London, 1970, pp. 1-13; Lynn Hollen Lees, Exiles of Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London, Manchester, 1979, pp. 213-4, 223-4.

<sup>202</sup> Broeker, Rural Disorder....., p.15.

<sup>203</sup> HO 40.11 fo206, M. A. Woodburne to Lord Sidmouth, 14 Mar 1820.

<sup>204</sup> PRO CO904.8.8, M'Gloin to Drummond, 4 Jan 1840.

organised by such a society, particularly as the evidence that one man gave the order for the attack to start is rather more circumstantial than most alleged identifications of ring-leaders.<sup>205</sup>

The remaining two incidents came at a time when anti-Catholic feeling was becoming much more general among the town's Protestants, although in neither case was there any Orange activity. One was small; charged with having raised a mob to attack an alleged Orangeman in the street, a defendant claimed in court that he had been too drunk to know whether he had done so. He was fined 20s.<sup>206</sup> The other was the largest riot of the years 1815-1835, and is classed as sectarian only because unfounded expectations of an Orange march caused large numbers of people to gather in the main thoroughfares of the Irish areas of town.<sup>207</sup> During the day, no action was taken to disperse the crowds, but about 10 p.m. a localised disturbance led to the watchmen making an arrest. This produced a rescue attempt which rapidly became a mass attack, by a crowd armed with sticks and axes, on the bridewell. The outer door was broken down, and those besieged inside rang a bell designed as a fire-alarm. Help soon arrived, the first being Whitty, superintendent of both fire police and watch. The first watchmen to arrive came as fire police, carrying axes; others soon followed, and this force had done much to disperse the crowd by the time that the Mayor arrived, with 200 troops, 100 of the dock police, and a number of town constables. It is not known whether the Riot Act proclamation was read; the troops were used only as a show of force. The bulk of these forces patrolled during the following day as disorder still seemed likely, and 500 special constables were sworn in to prevent the rescue of the 51 men arrested. 43 of these were satisfactorily identified, receiving sentences ranging from one to six months.<sup>208</sup> The sentences reflected the fact that most had been in custody for three months before trial.

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<sup>205</sup> Billinge's Advertiser, 27 Jul 1819.

<sup>206</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 7 Aug 1835.

<sup>207</sup> Liverpool Courier, 15 Jul 1835; Gore's General Advertiser, 16 Jul 1835; Liverpool Mercury, 17 Jul 1835.

<sup>208</sup> Liverpool Courier, 4 Oct 1835.

This incident clearly shows the problem of classifying riots according to cause. Although it could also be considered as an anti-police riot, it has been included here mainly because it was the expectation of a sectarian battle which drew the crowd together, and which kept them together for much of the second day. During this day, the various police bodies made great efforts to persuade the crowd that no Orange march would be permitted. No purely anti-police riot attracted a crowd of comparable size.

In these early sectarian disturbances, the bonds linking the individuals on the Protestant side are clear. They belonged to the Loyal Orange Order, membership of which was at least a clear statement of hostility to the ideas of Catholicism, and in practice was usually evidence of hostility to individual Catholics. The Catholic side, however, was probably not entirely composed of Ribbonmen; the numbers involved in the 1835 incident<sup>209</sup> suggest that a large proportion of the Catholic population took to the streets. As yet, the Orange faction was not so important a part of Liverpool society as Irish Catholic immigrants were, but sectarian riots were clearly taken very seriously, in contrast to other battles which took place among the poorer sections of the community. One reason for this is probably that they were likely to happen in the centre of town; another, which applies to the 1830s but probably not to the earlier incidents, is the number who had allegiance to one or other side. Later years show these fears were not groundless.

### *Private Battles*

Ten incidents have been found where violence seems to have been directed neither against those in authority nor towards the direct achievement of any objective, but to have sprung from the shared sense of identity of those who formed one or both sides. Children, navvies, and some Irish immigrants were among groups participating.

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<sup>209</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 17 Jul 1835, 24 Jul 1835.



Four cases of gang-fighting among children were found.<sup>210</sup> The participants were described twice as "gangs of schoolboys", once as "opposing bands of boys", and once as "boys and girls". In this last case, the gangs were drawn from two neighbouring streets; in the other three, there is no hint of the basis on which sides were formed. They are included on the fragile evidence of the word "gang", combined with the tendency of the wilder games of children to involve taking sides which, even if they only last as long as the game, develop a certain temporary reality. Their battles consisted mainly of stone-throwing, and seem to have occurred, in three out of four cases, on several successive days before any action was taken. The fourth case came to the notice of the police when the riot escalated to involve the parents of the children. At least two boys were arrested, but appear to have been discharged. Perhaps the fact of arrest was thought a sufficient deterrent.

The one case involving navvies is scarcely more securely classified. They were regarded as a lawless and outcast group who formed their own unconventional style of life and rejected, as well as being rejected by, all that was respectable. The incident took place during the building of the North Docks, while large numbers of navvies lived temporarily in the town. It was said to have been unprovoked, promiscuously directed against all passers-by, and to have ended before the Watch could arrive. The supposed brutality of the navvies was much discussed in the press, and it was said that the Mayor had taken steps to prevent such outrages; unfortunately, these steps were not described.<sup>211</sup>

In the case of the Irish, private battles were fully expected. The more adventurous Victorian tourist might even attend an Irish fair in the hope of seeing a faction fight, as they were described. This showed an exaggerated degree of expectation of fighting, but there was some justification for it. Broeker describes how fights were used in rural Ireland to settle local feuds

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<sup>210</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 23 Sep 1926; Liverpool Journal, 22 Nov 1834 and 7 Feb 1835; Liverpool Courier, 20 May 1835.

<sup>211</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 11 Jul 1829 and 14 Aug 1830.

over problems like the occupancy of land,<sup>212</sup> and shows that they were generally tolerated by magistrates. When Irish law was in the hands of the English there were reasons for such methods of settling quarrels, and emigrants carried the tradition with them. Lees describes similar incidents among the London Irish at about the same period.<sup>213</sup> Although these battles appeared fearsome, it was often remarked that surprisingly few serious injuries were inflicted; this might reflect the existence of an unwritten code of rules. Ribbon societies were provided with passwords specifically for use when a fight threatened; one such password was "provoke me not, Sir", the countersign "I hope you will not give me reason" identified a member of the same organisation.<sup>214</sup> Contemporary estimates of the criminal activity of Irish immigrants were often inflated by prejudice; nevertheless they do seem to have been disproportionately frequently involved in assaults and affrays. Finnegan's study of the Irish community in York<sup>215</sup> found that these crimes, together with drunkenness, led to the Irish contribution to total crime being higher than that of other sections of the city's population.

The tradition of fighting pitched battles seems to have travelled with the Irish. Witnesses for the Parliamentary enquiry into the state of the Irish poor remarked on the tendency for allegiance to their region of origin to lead to fighting among immigrants.<sup>216</sup> In at least one case, a fight described as being between factions from Ulster and from Leinster is said to have been adjourned from Liverpool to Cheshire, presumably to avoid police interference.<sup>217</sup> This only becomes eligible for inclusion because some of the returning combatants continued the battle

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<sup>212</sup> G. Broeker, *op. cit.*, pp.15-16.

<sup>213</sup> L. Hollen Lees, Exiles of Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London, Manchester, 1979, pp. 167, 213-4.

<sup>214</sup> PRO CO 904.7.77-92, Statement of John Kelly, 6 Dec 1839.

<sup>215</sup> F. Finnegan, Poverty and Prejudice, Cork, 1982, pp.132-154.

<sup>216</sup> Poor Inquiry (Ireland)..., pp.20, 27.

<sup>217</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 5 Mar 1834.

in Liverpool, which led to seventeen arrests, and sentences of from one to nine months imprisonment. A large number of both watchmen and constables were involved; several were hurt.

Four other cases of faction fighting have been identified before 1835; one took place on St. Patrick's Day 1826, and the fact that those involved were armed suggests that this was not spontaneous. Another began as a fight between two Irish groups, police being brought in apparently only when it spread to include passers-by. There were many arrests on both occasions.

The information available about these private battles is usually slight. Those involving navvies aroused considerable concern, those involving children were often ignored. The treatment of Irish fights fell mid-way; the watch or other police made some attempt to stop them, but the only measure to against their recurrence was the use of strengthened patrols on Saturday nights, described below.

### *Rescues and Anti-Police Riots*

Fourteen incidents can be placed in this category. Only two are reported as unprovoked assaults;<sup>218</sup> this suggests that there was little generalised resentment of policing at this time. The rest were resistance to police actions. Two of these cases also involved resistance to Excise officers, one happened when the Watch helped a publican to clear his premises,<sup>219</sup> and another (which happened outside the town boundary, in Toxteth Park) when a JP, assisted by two of his gardeners and the one local constable, attempted to stop a prizefight, and all four were attacked by the audience of 600-700 men.<sup>220</sup> A further three happened when the Watch attempted to stop fights between individuals.

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<sup>218</sup> Min Com Watch, 28 May 1824; Liverpool Courier, 23 Jan 1826.

<sup>219</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 26 Jan 1826.

<sup>220</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 24 Dec 1830 and 1 Jan 1831.

The remaining cases were attempts to rescue prisoners. Two occurred on the same day, and were related; a prisoner, arrested for being in possession of rope, called to passers-by for aid, appealing to them as "fellow Irishmen"; an affray developed between dock police and a crowd described as Irish. A few hours later, while excitement was still high, the watch attempted to arrest two women, and a further rescue attempt collected a much larger crowd, estimated at some thousands. It was rendered unusually formidable by the chance presence of Irish recruits en route for South America to fight as mercenaries.<sup>221</sup> This mischance was balanced by the fortuitous presence of English troops just disembarked from Ireland,<sup>222</sup> who were used to disperse the crowd and prevent recurrence.

The size of this riot and the use of troops made Home Office involvement inevitable; other cases in this category were much smaller. A further three rescues involved prisoners from two battling Irish groups, the seizure of an illicit still, and an assault on a customs official.<sup>223</sup>

It is noticeable that, where the original reason for arrest or intervention is known, it was often for an offence against the law rather than against an individual victim -- drinking after hours, revenue offences, prizefighting, or "disorderly behaviour". Frequently, also, these offences might be expected to be sanctioned by the community as defence of traditionally legitimate pastimes. From about 1829, the commissioners of the watch began a campaign against breaches of licensing regulations by publicans. Watchmen were instructed to report publicans to the Committee, who would interview offenders, and prosecute in some cases. This may have increased the incidence of attacks on watchmen, or have reduced their popularity. Records of such attacks before 1835 are too sparse to give numerical support to that idea, however, and

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<sup>221</sup> Billinge's Advertiser, 28 Jun and 2 Aug 1819.

<sup>222</sup> HO41.4 fo157, Hobhouse to Mayor, 26 Jun 1819.

<sup>223</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 25 Jan 1816; Saturday's Advertiser, 23 Sep 1826; Liverpool Mercury, 23 Aug 1833.

the fact that offences were reported rather than immediately dealt with would reduce the chance of crowd reaction.<sup>224</sup>

Two facts in connection with the formation of anti-police crowds suggest that Irish immigrants were particularly active in this type of riot. The first is that the prisoner in the dock police rescue was said to have used his Irish nationality specifically in his appeal to the crowd. The second was the use (by those resisting the clearance of a bar) of a shrill whistle, said to be the signal of an Irish organisation called the Rosannah Gang.<sup>225</sup> The existence of such a gang would be in keeping with what is known of societies such as Ribbon clubs, part of whose function was to provide mutual support in mass quarrels. In other cases, little is known of how these crowds were formed, but Irish names and streets known to have a high proportion of Irish residents were often mentioned. The rescue of prisoners was also common as a feature of other riots, particularly trade disputes, and therefore cannot be taken as an Irish monopoly; all that can be said is that the Irish seem to have been better able to mobilise support specifically for a rescue, whereas other groups usually attempted such rescues or assaults on the police only when a riot was already in progress. In both cases, the rescue was very often successful; rearrest would present considerable difficulties among overcrowded and hostile back-streets.

The cases given here are almost certainly a very small proportion of actual occurrences. Measures against assault are known only in the case of the watch; records for other police do not survive. The commissioners attempted whenever possible to prosecute after any assault, collective or individual.<sup>226</sup> Patrols were strengthened on Saturday nights in disturbed areas.<sup>227</sup> This measure was felt by the superintendent in 1833 to be counter-productive; he claimed that

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<sup>224</sup> Min. Com. Wat., 22 Feb 1833.

<sup>225</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 26 Jan 1826.

<sup>226</sup> E.g. Min. Com. Watch, 23 Jan 1824, 20 May 1824, 10 Jan 1826, etc.

<sup>227</sup> E.g. Min. Com. Watch, 24 Sep 1824, 30 May 1835.

fights were often started by the watch, when they attempted, unnecessarily, to arrest drunks who could have found their way home. "On Saturday nights, the Watchmen are Bullies, and the extramen their seconds", he claimed.<sup>228</sup> However, he based his argument on the small numbers of arrests on nights when extramen were not available. This circular logic does not seem to have impressed the commissioners.

Rescues were seen as a serious problem by the commissioners, who were refused the use of the dock lockup and were forced to build another.<sup>229</sup> There was also a vehicle fitted with chains to transport prisoners.<sup>230</sup> As early as 1816, the governor of the gaol had requested such a vehicle.<sup>231</sup> In 1820, the Mayor and magistrates deliberated on the problem of rescues,<sup>232</sup> although their decision is not known. From the early 1820s onwards, there were many improvements to courtrooms, bridewells, and gaols which would tend to ameliorate this problem, among others. Attention to the problem of rescues cannot be seen as purely directed to the prevention of riot. The enforcement of law requires that prisoners be secured.

### *Riots of Unknown Origin*

Seven incidents must remain in this category. Most public house brawls would be likely to remain in this group, for lack of press or official interest in searching out any cause beyond strong drink. In this half of the period particularly, however, incidents are also likely to end up in this group because of the longer odds against preservation of information. In most cases, the sentence of quarter sessions is the only information available. Then there was an attack

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<sup>228</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 5 Apr 1833.

<sup>229</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 26 Dec 1823; Min. Com. Watch, 29 May 1829.

<sup>230</sup> Min. Com. Watch, 28 Mar 1834.

<sup>231</sup> Town Books, Vol.14, p. 597, 6 Nov 1816.

<sup>232</sup> Town Books, Vol. 15, p. 95, 7 Jun 1820.

by "a mob of fellows" on a resident of Read's Court,<sup>233</sup> while the remaining two were ascribed to Irishmen, one (in North Street) probably correctly,<sup>234</sup> the other less convincingly; the names of the eight men arrested include not one which sounds Irish.<sup>235</sup>

In the absence of more evidence, very little can be said. These cases serve to demonstrate the lack of press coverage of minor riots, and it is probable that many more cases were completely unreported. One case was described as "one of those disgraceful riots of so frequent occurrence in that neighbourhood", a phrase reminiscent of the Wolverhampton papers' pejorative headline "Another Stafford Street Row".<sup>236</sup> If riots were so frequent, however, it seems to have concerned the Liverpool authorities very little. As with private battles, only the commissioners of the watch appear to have taken any action; their involvement probably arose partly from the need to protect the watchmen from assault, and partly from the connection between drink and violence. Their main measures, extra patrols and prosecution, have already been mentioned. Prosecution must have been very hit-and-miss among the overcrowded courts and back-alleys. Arrests at the time would be very difficult if rioters outnumbered the watch, and identification after the event even harder.

## Conclusions, 1815-1835

Riot must have been much more frequent than appears from recorded cases, and as has already been stated the relative frequency of different types cannot be established. There are, however, sufficient cases in each category to demonstrate certain differences in handling.

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<sup>233</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 2 Jul 1831.

<sup>234</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 28 Nov 1833.

<sup>235</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 20 Dec 1827.

<sup>236</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 28 Nov 1833; R. Swift "'Another Stafford Street Row': Law, Order and the Irish Presence in mid-Victorian Wolverhampton", in R. Swift and S. Gilley (eds.), The Irish in the Victorian City, London, 1985.

Precautions were taken very much more readily in some cases than in others. Table 1 in Appendix 3 summarises the findings. The highest level was the use of troops; they were called out when political protest meetings were expected, and when trade disputes were in progress. Otherwise the army was used only when rioters were out-of-hand. Precautions taken against electoral riot were small in comparison; even though some riot was invariably expected, significant number of special constables were not enrolled until there was no alternative. Clearly, a degree of disorder was acceptable during elections. This difference cannot be explained by relative severity of violence, since it was extremely rare locally for either political protest or trade disputes to result in more than minor injuries.

Sectarian riot was not as yet predictable by the calendar, so that precautions could not be routinely taken. However, strong rumours of a procession in 1835 produced no reaction until Irish crowds gathered to oppose it. Even less warning was possible for private battles, anti-police riots, or direct action riots; only precautions of a general kind were relevant, such as the doubling of police patrols or the provision of a secure vehicle to carry prisoners. It can be seen that these precautions were directed towards anti-police riots in particular.

Police activity during riots is much harder to analyse. Table 2 in Appendix 3 lists the level of activity against the type of incident. The size and violence of the mob, their location, the practical difficulties in alerting the police and bringing them to the scene, were the major variables. There was little scope for differentiation in reactive measures except where the police had the chance of preparing in advance.

The evidence of numbers of arrests is disappointing, since this was above all influenced by practical considerations. Table 3 in Appendix 3 gives numbers. The high figure for Sectarian riot results from the single major incident of 1835; that for private battles probably comes from the fact that most such riots were reported only if a trial took place. The high figure for Anti-Police riots is self-explanatory.

Comparison of sentences is a much better indication of discrimination according to type. Higher sentences could of course be given at quarter sessions and assizes than in summary trials. The choice of court is clearly part of the process which decides sentence length. It might be expected that that the severity of the incident, and also perhaps the number of rioters



involved, might influence both the choice of the method of trial and the sentence. Surprisingly, no correlation was found. Table 4 in Appendix 3 gives the results of this test. Whatever influenced magistrates and judges in sentencing rioters, it was neither the number of people involved in a riot, nor the damage caused. In two categories there were not enough cases to justify a conclusion as to the relative severity of sentencing. In Political Protest, the low level of violence meant a lack of arrests, and for Elections, the only sentences known were given in 1816 at Lancaster assizes; these extremely heavy sentences originated outside the town, at a time when popular disorder was a major issue in Lancashire. Summary sentences would of necessity have been shorter. Their absence from the records could result from a lack of arrests but is more likely to reflect the pressure on news-space at election times. There is reason to suppose that a very large number of short sentences have been lost, so that to include this group could tend to exaggerate the separation of sentences for riots of different types. For all other types of riot, there were sufficient cases to justify comparisons of sentences.

For these types of riot, the chance of being sent to quarter sessions or assizes clearly varied. Table 5 in Appendix 3 gives percentages. For this period, very few summary trials were reported, so that comparisons are limited and also the proportion of trials at quarter sessions seems high. However, trials at the assizes were relatively unusual. Apart from the election rioters mentioned already, the majority so tried had been involved in trade disputes; three quarters of such trials found were at the assizes, compared with little more than one-eighth of trials connected with attacks on the police. The choice of so expensive a method of trial was presumably influenced by the publicity which could be achieved as a warning to others. The theatrical setting of the trial and the publicity which could be obtained made this an excellent method of stating publicly that such riots would not be tolerated; whatever the popular view, they were illegal.

In order to make comparisons, however, it is possible to regard the method of trial as being only a step in the determination of the length of sentence. Sentences can then be compared regardless of their origin. Details of the method are given in Appendix 1. The result is that there were statistically significant differences in sentences recorded during this period for riotous offences of different types. When sentences are arranged in order of severity, the mean ranks for riots of different types can be represented as in figure 1. All sentences are ranked according

to length. The rank of the median sentence for each type of incident is plotted on a line having the lowest ranks (shortest sentences) on the left, and the highest ranks (longest sentences) on the right. This shows in visual form the considerable discrimination shown in sentencing rioters according to the type of riot in which they were accused of taking part. Anti-police riots were severely punished; this reflects the need to protect the police in the only way possible short of establishing a more efficient and more expensive force. Trade disputes and Sectarian riots were next in order. Sectarian disorder occurred in the centre of the town, disrupting trade and threatening shops and public buildings. Trade disputes were similarly heavily punished; more significantly since those on trial were frequently respectable working men who would have more to lose by the mere fact of being accused. In comparison, both direct action riots and private battles were much less severely handled.


The relative priorities revealed by the two factors, preventive measures and punishment, can be drawn up as in Figure 2. Punishment for political protest and election riots has had to be omitted for lack of information. The main difference between these two lists is that preventive measures against trade disputes were given much more weight than were punishments for taking part. The frequent use of the assize courts also suggests that they were regarded as more serious than even the sentences would suggest.

It is apparent that the authorities at this time did distinguish between riots of different type, on a scale with political protest at the upper end; sectarian and anti-police riots and trade disputes were highly placed; together with election disorders, direct action riots and private battles were ranged towards the lower end.

Can any underlying theory be sketched in to account for this differentiation? There is evidence to suggest that those involved accounted for violence in a number of different ways. By some, or perhaps in some contexts, violence was seen as merely a property of the 'lowest of the low'; and sometimes not only of the lowest. Before better policing, even a well-to-do young man might be expected to engage in "nocturnal brawls, riots and dissipations."<sup>237</sup> The Irish in particular were understood to enjoy a good fight, the race "who broke each others' heads as

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<sup>237</sup> Brooke, Liverpool in the Last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century, Liverpool, 1853, pp. 298-300.



2 = Private Battle

6 = Anti-police

3 = Sectarian

7 = Trade Dispute

4 = Direct Action

No value for type 5, Election, or type 8, Political Protest.

Figure 1. Relative Severity of Sentence by Type, 1815-1836.

an amusement".<sup>238</sup> This explanation can be referred to as "brutishness". Disgraceful though it might be, such fighting was thought to be of no great consequence. Mere injury was unimportant. It could be written at election time that "there may have been a broken head or two," yet "never, perhaps, was an occasion of this sort less deformed by any ill-humour."<sup>239</sup> Even the Recorder, addressing the Grand Jury on the subject of unprovoked assaults on passers-by explained that they should concern themselves in case the attackers should turn to highway robbery.<sup>240</sup>

<sup>238</sup> Liverpool Times, 11 Mar 1834.

<sup>239</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 27 Oct 1827.

<sup>240</sup> Saturday's Advertiser, 24 Jan 1829.




Figure 2. Relative Strength of Prevention and Policing by Type.

Injuries, then, did not suffice to make a riot a matter for concern. However, disorder so readily produced could be used to provide an opportunity for theft. This explanation could be called "criminal motivation." One such example was a mayoral election, when disturbances were explained as designed to permit pocket-picking.<sup>241</sup>

Between them the theories of "brutishness" and "criminal motivation" were probably predominant in most cases of private battles, elections riot, anti-police riot and riot of unknown origin, while the notorious tendency of the Irish towards "brutish" riot could account for sectarian riots in many minds.

Both "brutishness" and "criminal motivation" would be expected to be intractable, the best measure of prevention being severe punishment for the most serious cases. Violence directed against the police could only thus be discouraged.

<sup>241</sup> Liverpool Courier, 27 Oct 1831.

In contrast, some riot might be recognised as having a rational object. Occasionally, this might even justify the use of violence. This would be relatively unusual; one example was the rescue by a small crowd of a child from a drunken mother<sup>242</sup> where the mother rather than any member of the crowd was arrested. More often, the crowd was held to be misguided; moderate punishment, accompanied by explanation, might be hoped to have a beneficial effect. This can be seen in the cholera riots, but is much more frequent in trade disputes where the magistrate had a set speech on the right of all men to sell their labour without intimidation. Here, too, the prisoners might be sent to the Assizes, in order that the illegal and unjustifiable nature of their actions could be stated unequivocally and with maximum publicity.

None of these three explanations, "brutishness", "criminal motivation" or "rational motivation" gave much cause for serious anxiety, apparently. This was reserved for the most alarming rationale, "subversive riot". This was so much to be feared that it was rarely openly named. The "demagogue" wishing to "marshal a formidable host, and make a physical demonstration for carrying some popular doctrine or political scheme..<sup>243</sup> or "a few ill-disposed persons" who might steal gunpowder from an unprotected magazine<sup>244</sup> were typical bogeymen. "Inflammatory" was a much-used word; the populace, well-known as tending to brutish or criminal riot, was seen as tinder, ready to be ignited by any stray political spark. For some, subversive riot was the only "real" riot; there can be no other explanation for the startling statement by Parlour, head of the Dock Police, that "there have been no riots at Liverpool while I have been in office".<sup>245</sup>

Disorder used to coerce or blackmail the authorities into yielding political power was insubordinate, disruptive of the social fabric, to be prevented at all costs. It was to guard

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<sup>242</sup> See page 60, above.

<sup>243</sup> Liverpool Courier, 21 Aug 1833.

<sup>244</sup> HO44.26/1 fo 114, Jordan to Bouverie, 5 Nov 1830.

<sup>245</sup> Poor Inquiry (Ireland), p. 20.

against this that political meetings were so highly policed. Perhaps trade disputes owe their severe handling to the direct self-interest of the corporation in the maintenance of the trade of the town, but the stress laid on "insubordination" might show that they were seen as related to this most dangerous category. The next question to answer is whether this schema survived the major changes in local government and policing which the 1835 Municipal Corporation Act introduced.

## Chapter Four: New Corporation and New Police

### *Local Government and Local Politics*

On January 1st 1836, under the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, the oligarchic common council of Liverpool was replaced by a council elected by ten-pound householders. The first such council consisted almost entirely of Whigs and Radicals who united themselves under the name "Reformers". Only five of 48 members were described as Conservatives.<sup>246</sup> In consequence, fifteen out of sixteen aldermen were also Reformers.<sup>247</sup> This majority, apparently brought about by the temporary enthusiasm of new voters and a dislike of the old style of Tory local government, did not last long. It decreased, at first slowly, with each municipal election, until in November 1841 the Conservatives gained control, which they retained for many decades.<sup>248</sup>

The new corporation was quick to set up its committees and take over the running of the town. A few senior employees of the old council were dismissed, including the superintendent

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<sup>246</sup> This name was already being used almost exclusively in the context of local government in Liverpool to describe the party of the right.

<sup>247</sup> Liverpool Times, 29 Dec 1835, 5 Jan 1836.

<sup>248</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 3 Nov 1836; Liverpool Times, 7 Nov 1837, 6 Nov 1838, 5 Nov 1839, 3 Nov 1840, 2 Nov 1841.

of constables, but most remained.<sup>249</sup> Law enforcement was very important to the Reformist corporation. At its first meeting, the council discussed the appointment of magistrates, and resolved to petition for the appointment of a stipendiary police magistrate. Two days later a watch committee was set up; within two months a new police force took to the streets.<sup>250</sup>

The reasons underlying the creation of the new police forces are still a subject of debate; the latest major contribution is that of Palmer<sup>251</sup> who argues that the Irish constabulary, formed with the intention of controlling rebellion, provided a model for the English forces, set up in response to working class protest movements. Whatever the truth may be nationwide, the Liverpool experience does not fit this theory.

Liverpool had suffered very little from protest-related disorder, yet was both prompt and thorough in setting up its police. The Reformists were prepared by their earlier involvement in the running of the watch, and their new police force was the logical culmination of the reforms they had proposed. The day police which had been created at their suggestion in 1828 had had the main duty of supervising the streets, preventing obstructions and overloading of carts, and removing beggars.<sup>252</sup> As described in Chapter 2, they had justified their attempts to police the out-townships by reference to robberies from the person.<sup>253</sup> Their increase in the number of captains of the watch was directed against theft; juvenile theft was particularly mentioned.<sup>254</sup> The preamble to the abortive police Bill of 1835 mentioned the increase in

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<sup>249</sup> Town Books Vol. 17 p. 39, 3 Feb 1836.

<sup>250</sup> Town Books, Vol. 17, p.11, 6 Jan 1836; pp. 19ff, 8 Jan 1836; pp. 87ff, 27 Feb 1836.

<sup>251</sup> S H Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850, Cambridge, 1988.

<sup>252</sup> Town Books, Vol. 16, p. 76, 13 Feb 1828; LRO 353 PAR3/1/2, Min. Com. Watch, 20 Apr 1827; Liverpool Mercury, 20 Jun 1834.

<sup>253</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 18 Nov 1830;

<sup>254</sup> Liverpool Journal, 19 Jan 1833; Liverpool Mercury, 10 Jan 1834.



offences against persons and property.<sup>255</sup> Nor did the force which they set up show any sign of being designed to combat disturbances. Patterns of duty concentrated on night patrols against burglary. Riot control was to be merely one of many police functions.

While the police force was under the immediate control of the watch committee, the magistrates, under the chairmanship of the mayor and advised by the town clerk, continued to be responsible to central government for the peace of the borough. There was no question of delegating this responsibility to the watch committee where major disturbances were concerned; this point was made very clearly at the parliamentary election of 1841, when the watch committee made a formal offer of co-operation with the magistrates; the reply was that "... the conservation of the peace of the Town being the peculiar duty of the magistrates, they had before the receipt of the resolution of the watch committee taken such measures as seemed to them desirable ..."<sup>256</sup> The Head Constable's reports on major riots were normally addressed to the Mayor, the Watch Committee receiving copies.

The magistrates maintained direct involvement also in political surveillance. When local socialists, a very small and utopian body, met in 1841, police observations were reported to both watch committee and magistrates; and in 1842, the Stipendiary Magistrate and Town Clerk, with the Head Constable, attended a Chartist meeting "to observe its tendency..."<sup>257</sup>

A stipendiary magistrate was first appointed in 1836, and was an important addition to the legal establishment of the town. Appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the council, he would normally continue to serve regardless of which party locally held office. Legal qualifications were of course a prerequisite, and he thus offered an alternative source of legal advice, formerly provided mainly by the town clerk. Equally valuable was the great experience which he acquired in the police courts, greater than any other magistrate could

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<sup>255</sup> Gore's General Advertiser, 19 Mar 1835.

<sup>256</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 414-5, 19 Jun 1841; *ibid*, p. 419, 26 Jun 1841.

<sup>257</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/4, p. 748, 27 Sep 1841; Liverpool Times, 23 Aug 1842.

claim. Presiding there daily, he gained a wide knowledge of local patterns of law-breaking, and formed a close working relationship with the police. Perhaps equally importantly, he was able to see disturbances in context, and was less likely to over-react than were part-time justices. The first to hold this position was T. J. Hall, who held it from 1836 until 1839, when he was appointed chief magistrate to the Metropolitan Police.<sup>258</sup> He was replaced by Edward Rushton, a noted local Radical, formerly a member of the Concentric Club, who was known as "Roaring Rushton" because of his loud voice and vehement speeches. Appointed on the recommendation of the Reformers, he held office under both parties until his death in 1851. He was succeeded first by J. B. Mansfield, who served until 1859, then by T. S. Raffles; both were conventional figures in comparison to Rushton.

The appointment of magistrates was clearly politically influenced. In 1836, the list of 24 names proposed to the Home Office included only one Tory; the Home Secretary added five more. Similarly, when five additional names were put forward in 1838, the Home Office took the precaution of checking that they were "not all of the same politicks".<sup>259</sup> The Conservative appointment of twelve further magistrates in 1841 reduced the bias,<sup>260</sup> yet the original appointments ensured a strong Reformist presence long after the control of local government returned to the Conservatives.

Unlike the council and watch committee, the magistrates did not admit reporters to their meetings, and only occasionally communicated their resolutions to either council or public. Minutes of their meetings do not survive. In cases involving the police, they seem to have dealt directly with the Head Constable, involving the watch committee only rarely. The Head

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<sup>258</sup> HO60.3 fo284, Lord John Russell to T. J. Hall, 2 Sep 1839.

<sup>259</sup> HO52.29 fo468, Mayor to Lord John Russell, 12 Jan 1836; HO43.48 fo332, Phillipps to Mayor, 22 Jan 1836; HO52.37 fo26, Mayor to Lord John Russell, 21 Feb 1838, minuted.

<sup>260</sup> HO90.1, List of Borough Justices.

Constable would in turn report to the Mayor, although the watch committee might receive copies of reports.<sup>261</sup>

The magistrates also handled almost all communication with the Home Office; usually this meant the mayor or his deputy, sometimes the town clerk, and the stipendiary magistrate became involved increasingly. Both he and the mayor were consulted when the question of the legality of rewards to the police was investigated in 1839.<sup>262</sup> However, a request for assistance for a spy trying to infiltrate Irish Ribbon societies was sent only to the stipendiary,<sup>263</sup> which suggests that the Home Secretary considered him (as his predecessors had seen customs and postal officials) as an independent source of aid where tact was essential. The collector of customs and the mayor were also both involved in delicate cases such as the observation of suspected transatlantic passengers or interviews with would-be informers.<sup>264</sup>

Home Office concern with general policing was at first slight. Individual complaints might lead to a brief correspondence,<sup>265</sup> and bye-laws affecting the police were forwarded for approval, without much result. One reply remarked that the Home Secretary had had some reservations about the wide powers given to the police, but had paid little attention "as the act was purely local."<sup>266</sup> In other matters, such as the gaols, however, Home Office concern was increasing.

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<sup>261</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 340ff, 6 Feb 1841; *ibid*, p. 748, 27 Sep 1841.

<sup>262</sup> HO43.57 fo131, Phillipps to Hall, 21 Mar 1839; HO43.57 fo133, Phillipps to Mayor, 21 Mar 1839; Liverpool Mercury, 15 Feb 1839.

<sup>263</sup> HO43.58 fo393, Maule to Rushton, 8 Feb 1840; HO52.45 fo183, Rushton to Maule, 10 Feb 1840.

<sup>264</sup> HO79.4 fo232, Phillipps to Collector of Customs, Liverpool, 2 Feb 1838; HO41.15 fo186, Phillipps to Mayor, 2 Dec 1839; HO41.15 fo218,219, Phillipps to Mayor, 14 Dec 1839, etc.

<sup>265</sup> E.g. HO43.53 fo308, Maule to Mayor, 14 Sep 1837; HO43.53 fo348, Maule to Hall, 9 Oct 1837; HO52.41 fo133, Mayor to Phillipps, 21 Mar 1839.

<sup>266</sup> HO43.62 fo218, Phillipps to Rushton, 3 May 1842.

A long correspondence over some years was necessary before the Liverpool gaol was considered satisfactory. More relevant is the correspondence after a local resident warned the Home Office of an impending Orange Day procession in 1842.<sup>267</sup> This was the first time the Home Office made serious demands for measures to be taken against threatened disorder; all previous communications had either been raised first by the Liverpool authorities, or had been minimal. Thereafter, such communications became more pressing, particularly those concerning the Orange disorders of 1850-1852 described below.<sup>268</sup> There was less occasion for Home Office involvement in the later 1850s. Sectarian and election riots were the main causes of such alarm. The official view of Liverpool, as lacking troublesome Radical political groups, is implicit in the report of the Commander in Chief (North), at the time of the "plug plot" riots, that Liverpool was the one northern town from which troops could be withdrawn.<sup>269</sup>

Troops continued to be available to the magistrates, however. Despite government attempts to persuade the town to pay for the barracks, troops seem to have been kept there largely because the army itself required them for recruiting and escort duties.<sup>270</sup> Five requests for extra troops were made between 1836 and 1844. One quoted wild rumours of politically-motivated attacks on shipping in the docks; this was refused. The other four, three for elections and one

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<sup>267</sup> HO43.62 fo355, Phillipps to Mayor, 23 Jun 1842; HO45.249D fo42-50, Mayor to Sir James Graham, 24 Jun 1842 and encs.; HO45.249D fo5, Resolution of Magistrates, 25 Jun 1842; HO45.249D fo2, Mayor to Sir James Graham, 28 Jun 1842; HO43.62 fo271, Phillipps to Mayor, 29 Jun 1842; HO43.62 fo381, Phillipps to O'Connell, 4 Jul 1842; HO43.62 fo390, Phillipps to Mayor, 7 Jul 1842; HO45.249D fo11, Mayor to Sir James Graham, 8 Jul 1842; HO45.249D fo13, Mayor to Sir James Graham, 9 Jul 1842; HO45.249D fo16, Mayor to Sir James Graham, enc. report of Head Constable, 15 Jul 1842.

<sup>268</sup> See pp. 116 to 117 below.

<sup>269</sup> HO45.268 fo66, Warre to Phillipps, 10 Aug 1842.

<sup>270</sup> HO41.15 fo519, Phillipps to Mayor, 24 Jul 1840; HO40.54 fo781, Mayor to Lord Normanby, 8 Aug 1840; HO45.249 fo243, Deputy Mayor to Sir James Graham, 20 Aug 1842; HO50.451, Report on Northern Barracks, 1840; HO45.3236, Report of Office of Ordnance, 4 Feb 1850.

for Orange Day, were agreed, but the troops were not called out.<sup>271</sup> Indeed, between 1836 and 1860, troops caused more riots than they prevented.<sup>272</sup> The Liverpool police proved sufficient throughout the remainder of the period with the exception of 1848, when fears of an Irish insurrection led to large numbers of troops being moved to the district. Thereafter the military presence was increased, together with the magistrates' nervousness. As late as 1853, the Mayor objected to the removal of men, in case of subversive disturbances.<sup>273</sup> Clearly, the liveliest fears of local authority still related to political malcontents. In normal times, however, the peace of the town was better protected than it had ever been before.

## *The New Police*

On February 29th 1836, two hard-working months after the new corporation took office, the new police force went on duty. It consisted of 290 constables, with 60 extra-men as reserves or reinforcements, supervised by 24 inspectors and four superintendents; the rank of sergeant was not yet used. There were also a small number of clerks, bridewell keepers, and other ancillary staff. Forty of the constables ranked as "firemen", receiving an extra shilling per week, on top of the constable's eighteen shillings, for serving at fires.<sup>274</sup> There were plans from the start to combine the borough force with the dock police as soon as administrative and financial problems could be sorted out with the dock trustees; this was brought about in June 1837, and

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<sup>271</sup> HO45.249 fo9 Mayor to Home Sec., 19 Mar 1842; HO41.16 fo292, Philipps to Mayor, 23 Mar 1842; See below, pp. 115, and 127 to 128.

<sup>272</sup> See below, page 145.

<sup>273</sup> HO45.5128 fo540, Mayor to General Commander in Chief, 21 Feb 1853.

<sup>274</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1 p.16, 28 Jan 1836; pp. 41-44, 24 Feb 1836.

made permanent in February 1840.<sup>275</sup> This brought the total number of police to something over 500; in 1838, the 88 dock gatemen were also sworn in as constables.<sup>276</sup>

Individuals continued to serve in one or other branch of the force; the dock police continued to be paid by the dock trustees and stayed within the docks under normal conditions. The number of police routinely patrolling the town was 202 at night and 88 during the day. Several reasons were given for the amalgamation of the two forces; better cooperation, shared knowledge of habitual thieves "as the dock thieves and the town thieves are two different classes of persons", and the creation of a larger force to deal with both riots and fires; in the case of riots, it was argued that this would save about £800 p.a. formerly paid to special constables.<sup>277</sup> At the election of 1841, the Head Constable had at his disposal 674 sworn police plus 30 scavengers with police experience; the docks were watched during this time by the dock sweepers, most of whom were ex-policemen.<sup>278</sup> It was thus possible to provide everyday patrols at an economical price, the availability of a much larger force for riot control being achieved by the use of men paid for out of the income of the dock estate. So soon after the Orange Day riot of 1835, the need for riot control could hardly have been ignored, yet the arguments put forward in favour of a sufficient police force rarely mentioned riot. A report on crime in the borough produced for the new corporation concentrated upon theft, prostitution and disorderly public houses.<sup>279</sup> The police instruction booklet printed in 1836 gives only one page out of 68 to the handling of riot, which it is assumed will be small and nocturnal.<sup>280</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 294 ff, 8 Apr 1837; p.327, 10 Jun 1837; 1/2, p. 156, 22 Feb 1840.

<sup>276</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1 p. 589, 24 Nov 1838.

<sup>277</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1 pp. 293-6, 8 Apr 1837.

<sup>278</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp.417-8, 26 Jun 1841.

<sup>279</sup> Town Books, Vol. 17, p. 101, 2 Mar 1836.

<sup>280</sup> Instructions for the Liverpool Constabulary Force, 3rd February 1836, in HO73/3, papers of Commissioners on County Police.

Nevertheless, riot control was expected to be a major police function, sometimes mentioned in connection with fire as a possible occasion of alarm. Even so, the danger to property was often put to the fore: "perhaps millions worth of property [at] the mercy of depredators..."<sup>281</sup>

The continuities of policing at the start of this period are as notable as the changes. The watch committee took over the tasks of the commissioners of the watch, scavengers, and lamps, a number of its members having had experience with that body. The operational division between dock and borough forces remained, and a number of constables were employed permanently at the central police station with duties like those of the old town constables.<sup>282</sup> These men were supervised by the Commissioner of Police, ranking immediately below the Head Constable. The job was designed for M. M. G. Dowling, superintendent of the dock police, and was not filled until he was available following the amalgamation of the two forces.<sup>283</sup> The Head Constable was M. J. Whitty, previously superintendent of the nightly watch. Thirty of the town constables, 81 of the watch, and, later, the whole of the dock police, were re-employed, and the watch committee also took over the payment of pensions to ex-watchmen.<sup>284</sup> This continuity reflects the fact that many of the Reformers who had worked for more than ten years to improve the town's police arrangements were now in a position to organise them in the form they had long wanted.

The men appointed were aged between 22 and 35, not less than 5' 7" tall, and literate.<sup>285</sup> References were required, and some independent enquiry was also made into character; it was discovered even before they took up their duties that several "worthless individuals" had been

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<sup>281</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, pp. 251-2, copy of letter Dowling to Mayor, 12 Dec 1850.

<sup>282</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1 pp. 39-44, 24 Feb 1836.

<sup>283</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1 p. 27, 15 Feb 1836; Liverpool Journal, 6 Feb 1836.

<sup>284</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1 p. 97, 14 May 1836.

<sup>285</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 22-25, 6 Feb 1836; p.358, 12 Aug 1837.

appointed on the strength of references.<sup>286</sup> Some form of training was given, probably military in style as it was known as "drill", the same name, however, being given to training in firefighting.<sup>287</sup> There was no fixed probation period until 1843, when it was agreed that extra-men must serve two months before becoming full constables.<sup>288</sup>

The rate of turnover of men was high, both because of dismissals and because many left, often to join other forces.<sup>289</sup> The force was no more undisciplined than its contemporaries, and was better than some. Taking the month of February for each of the years 1838, 1841 and 1844, there were respectively 129, 155, and 99 disciplinary cases handled by the daily board of the watch committee.<sup>290</sup> These were roughly equally divided between drink-related offences, absence, and petty neglect of duty or equipment. The figures for offences serious enough to merit demotion or dismissal were 9, 16 and 9 respectively. Dismissal was normal for a first offence only for theft and the giving of false evidence. Severe penalties were also imposed for repeated offences. Assaults on prisoners were often subject only to a caution unless the victim was female, when dismissal was probable. This contrasts with the practice of the magistrates, who normally recommended dismissal for any substantial unnecessary police violence.<sup>291</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p. 29, 15 Feb 1836.

<sup>287</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, p. 244, 2 Aug 1840; 21/2, p. 1, 27 Feb 1827; 21/7, p. 103, 1 Feb 1844.

<sup>288</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/3 p. 105, 8 Jul 1843.

<sup>289</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/1-21/5, throughout; Liverpool Mail, 7 Feb 1839, report of Watch Committee.

<sup>290</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/2, pp. 480-510, Feb 1838; 21/5, pp. 325-350, Feb 1841; 21/8, pp. 103-150, Feb 1844. The higher rate for 1841, including many offences related to drinking or to being off the beat, may reflect the extreme cold of that winter.

<sup>291</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mail, 29 Sep 1836; Liverpool Mercury, 26 Mar 1841.



The police were responsible jointly to the magistrates and, via the watch committee, to the council. The full watch committee met weekly, and until 1851 a board consisting of at least three members sat daily to consider matters such as disciplinary charges and requests for police attendance. Both the magistrates and the watch committee transmitted their commands via the Head Constable. At the start of the period, the watch committee in particular would give detailed instructions on the placing of men, but this gradually yielded to the practice of referring requests to the Head Constable to act as he saw fit.<sup>292</sup> Such requests, which might be handled either by the full committee or by the daily board, ranged from complaints of boys playing near churches on Sundays to employers asking for police protection during strikes, and included requests for police attendance at both charitable and profit-making events.<sup>293</sup> When complaints of inadequate patrolling were received, the Head Constable might be asked to investigate, his recommendations being usually accepted without further discussion.<sup>294</sup> A similar degree of reliance on the professional expertise of the police seems to have developed among the magistrates; although Whitty took instructions from the mayor, they were likely to be based on plans which he had submitted for approval.<sup>295</sup> As Head Constable, Whitty was charged as early as 1836 with deciding which constables on isolated beats were to be armed with cutlasses; his decision to issue them during the Carpenters' Day riots in 1839 was discussed by the watch committee after the event, but the town clerk's legal opinion vindicated his action.<sup>296</sup> Whitty, for his part, was concerned to establish the legal extent of his powers,

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<sup>292</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p. 79, 16 Apr 1836; p. 91, 7 May 1836; p. 93, 14 May 1836; p. 230, 31 Dec 1836, cf. 1/2, p. 458, 4 Sep 1841; pp. 489-90, 13 Nov 1841; p. 603, 4 Jun 1842.

<sup>293</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p. 146, 10 Sep 1836; p. 230, 31 Dec 1836; 1/2 p. 64, 12 Oct 1839; 21/2 p.144, 19 Jun 1837; p. 337, 6 Nov 1837.

<sup>294</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p. 538, 25 Aug 1838; 1/2, p. 65, 12 Oct 1839. p. 636, 6 Aug 1842.

<sup>295</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, p. 417, 26 Jun 1841.

<sup>296</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p. 225, 24 Dec 1836; Liverpool Mercury, 7 Jun 1839, 14 Jun 1839; Liverpool Courier, 8 Jun 1839.

rather than merely to follow the instructions of the magistrates. This is shown by his questions to the town clerk on an occasion when sectarian riots were feared. Could he prevent banners "obnoxious to a part of the population" from being displayed? Could he disperse a procession in the event of its being attacked? Could he remove interlopers at the request of the organising committee? The replies uniformly stated that his powers were subject to a breach of the peace being "imminent"; neither his opinion that breach of the peace would result, nor that of the committee organizing the procession, was sufficient to justify any police action. Indeed, the Town Clerk advised him that he could not recognize the organizing committee as having any authority.<sup>297</sup>

It is not surprising that relations between Whitty and the authorities were characterised by a high degree of trust during the Reformers' time in office. There can be no doubt as to his political opinions; after leaving the police, he became editor of the Reformist Liverpool Journal, and he was later to found the Liberal Liverpool Daily Post. It is more surprising that this Liberal and Roman Catholic Irishman seems to have been equally trusted by the Conservatives. He served them as Head Constable for two and a half years before retiring, for the sake of his health, in 1844. Although there were attempts by extreme Conservatives to discredit him, they were supported by only a handful of uninfluential councillors.<sup>298</sup> There is no evidence of either friction or lack of trust between Whitty and the Conservative magistrates or watch committee; indeed, he was to be called out of retirement by a Conservative mayor in 1848 to take charge of one thousand special constables enrolled against expected riots at the time of the Young Ireland "rising".<sup>299</sup>

The stipendiary magistrate was particularly important in the supervision of the police, because he was in a position to see many of the results of police activities. An editorial published in

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<sup>297</sup> HO45.249D fo7, Queries put by Head Constable, July 1841.

<sup>298</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/2 p. 163, 29 Jun 1837; E.g. Liverpool Courier, 10 Feb 1842; Liverpool Mercury, 14 Apr 1843.

<sup>299</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Mar 1848.

the Liverpool Journal shortly after Whitty became its editor shows his awareness of this. It argues that, unlike the Irish Constabulary, "...our force is local and unambitious, responsible to two public bodies, and obliged to take instructions from both .... all actions [are] soon brought out into open police court ..."<sup>300</sup> While the acts of individual constables were fairly frequently condemned, there is no evidence of criticism of collective police activity. It seems unlikely that the magistrates had any major misgivings as to the methods used by the police.

Where riots are concerned, these methods fall into two distinct categories, dictated to a great extent by prevailing circumstances. When serious disturbances were expected, and precautions could be taken, the force was mobilised on military lines, with constables in squads under strict discipline. In smaller or unexpected riots, the first men on the scene had to respond as individuals, relying upon their own judgement and discretion as in day-to-day policing.

In both cases, only two methods were legally permitted; the dispersal of crowds, and arrest. The law permitted the use of force in self defence, and of "reasonable" force in the dispersal and arrest of rioters. It did not permit either police or troops to make war on rioters, aiming to kill or disable them as a means of stopping their activities. Yet a considerable degree of force was sometimes needed before the crowd dispersed, or before an arrest could be enforced.

The reasonableness or otherwise of the use of force by the police is very difficult to establish. In major riots before 1844, the force took care to avoid unnecessary confrontation with potentially violent crowds; police were usually kept out of sight until needed, and the Head Constable or another senior officer would sometimes attempt to disperse a crowd by negotiating with its leaders.<sup>301</sup> Preparations were aimed at the movement of a sufficient force to the site of disturbances within the shortest time possible. Mounted police were used to maintain communication, and senior officers often used horses.<sup>302</sup> When confrontation was

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<sup>300</sup> Liverpool Journal, 15 Jun 1844.

<sup>301</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 22 May 1839; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 408-12, 12 Jun 1841.

<sup>302</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 417-8, 26 Jun 1841; pp. 421-7, 5 Jul 1841.

unavoidable, a variety of approaches were used; the foot police might be ordered to charge, presumably (although this is not stated) using their staffs; they might be ordered to stand firm to repel an attack; they might pursue small groups of rioters to prevent their uniting to form larger bodies. On one occasion, a crowd was successfully dispersed by the use of fire hoses, when reinforcements summoned by a fire-bell brought the fire-engine with them.<sup>303</sup> The water pressure during these years being notoriously weak, this can have had no more effect than a heavy shower, and the experiment was not tried with the most violent mobs.

In contrast to the policy of the Metropolitan Police,<sup>304</sup> there seems to have been no hesitation about allowing the police to take on a military appearance. Cutlasses were issued on several occasions, always to men used in squads, suggesting that it was their deterrent effect rather than their use in self-defence which was the deciding factor.<sup>305</sup> Armed police were sometimes also mounted; at the election of 1841 a troop of them, many of whom were said to have military experience, were used at least once to clear streets by a manoeuvre which, even though the arms which were carried were not used against the rioters, can only be described as a cavalry charge.<sup>306</sup> The Liverpool Journal, with which Whitty already had strong connections, argued the advantage of a police force which was "...thoroughly disciplined, well officered, and properly armed -- in fact, approaching as nearly in character to a body of regular troops as any civic force can ..."<sup>307</sup> This remark occurs in an editorial on the undesirability of the use of special constables. Throughout his period in office, Whitty was very reluctant to use them. When 175 enrolled pensioners were sworn in against his advice for the 1841 election, they were found

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<sup>303</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 350-1, 29 Jul 1837; 1/2, pp. 408-12, 12 Jun 1841; Liverpool Mercury, 31 May 1839; Liverpool Chronicle, 16 Sep 1843.

<sup>304</sup> P. Thurmond Smith, Policing Victorian London, London, 1985, pp. 113-120.

<sup>305</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 350-1, 29 Jul 1837; 1/2 pp. 408-12, 12 Jun 1841; pp. 421-7, 5 Jul 1841.

<sup>306</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 3 July 1841; Liverpool Journal, 3 Jul 1841; Liverpool Courier, 7 July 1841.

<sup>307</sup> Liverpool Journal, 29 Jul 1837.

to be so "excited" that a police superintendent (supported by a member of the watch committee) had them imprisoned in the market building. Whitty kept them there until midnight.<sup>308</sup> Apart from a small number used for specific semi-administrative tasks at elections, special constables were only sworn in on one other occasion between 1836 and 1844, when a number of gentlemen were enrolled at the time of the plug-plot disorders.<sup>309</sup>

The object of both strict discipline and avoidance of untrained men was the reduction of injury. It seems on the whole to have been successful. The Head Constable's report on the 1841 election states that the town's two hospitals reported only two serious casualties; one (a policeman) had been thrown from a horse, the other, who later died, had been shot by a publican whose house had been besieged by a mob.<sup>310</sup> Although this cannot be taken as the full story -- at least one further injury resulted in the trial of a rioter for manslaughter -- there is no evidence, even in the hostile press, of police causing serious injuries here or at other major riots during this period.

Much less is known about the handling of smaller riots. If a message could reach the central police station, and there was a likelihood of a serious riot developing, reinforcements, arms, and a senior officer would be sent as soon as possible. In one such case, a false report of a sectarian riot in Toxteth Park resulted in Whitty taking as many constables as could be found, with fifty cutlasses, to the scene using hired carriages.<sup>311</sup> Individual constables carried arms only when in isolated areas; there is no record of their use against rioters. A constable was normally equipped with a staff, which served both as a weapon and to call for assistance by rapping on

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<sup>308</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 421-7, 5 Jul 1841.

<sup>309</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/5, p. 543, 20 Aug 1842.

<sup>310</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 421-7, 5 Jul 1841.

<sup>311</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/5, p. 434, 21 Jun 1842.

the pavement.<sup>312</sup> This could bring together some four to twelve constables from nearby beats, depending on the area. Injuries to prisoners arrested for minor riots seem to have aroused little comment, so it is impossible to gauge their frequency or severity. The possibility of over-reaction by the police, although tempered by their small numbers, is shown by one case when rioters were arrested inside a house, the police gaining access by demolishing part of the roof.<sup>313</sup> Some constables also believed that they were within their rights in striking criminals. One PC, accused of using injuring a woman while arresting her, claimed in his defence that he could prove that she was "a disorderly character". He was dismissed.<sup>314</sup> The police certainly suffered the effects of violence themselves; injuries were frequent, and deaths not uncommon.

One of the most difficult decisions made by individual constables was at what point a crowd should be dispersed. There seems to have been a very wide variation in individual tolerance. In general, however, even peaceful crowds were seen as a potential source of crime, pocket-picking being probably vastly more significant than violent crime. Right from the beginning, the watch committee dealt with many requests for police to assist in crowd control. If a breach of the peace was expected, for example at party political meetings where sensitive topics were to be discussed, no charge was made for this service.<sup>315</sup> Crowds which gathered informally in public places were similarly policed, even where there was little likelihood of disturbance; for example, police were sent to supervise people gathering outside a house which was reputed to be haunted.<sup>316</sup> The fact that this level of crowd supervision so quickly became

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<sup>312</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 26 Mar 1836; Liverpool Journal, 20 Aug 1836; Liverpool police of the rank of sergeant and above still carry a signalling stick when in uniform.

<sup>313</sup> Liverpool Mail, 6 Jun 1837.

<sup>314</sup> Liverpool Mail, 29 Sep 1836.

<sup>315</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p.91, 7 May 1836; p. 127, 5 Aug 1836; p. 93, 14 May 1836; pp. 389-90, 14 Oct 1837; Liverpool Journal, 6 May 1837.

<sup>316</sup> Liverpool Journal, 1 May 1841.

normal suggests that this was another area where the lack of a police force had already been felt.

Crowd control was one of the police functions which produced a favourable reaction from those who benefited directly,<sup>317</sup> but there were unfavourable reactions as well. Criticisms were voiced both of too much policing and of too little. The prevalence of rescues of prisoners and of attacks on the police probably give the most coherent evidence of the opinions of the working population of the town. These will be discussed below,<sup>318</sup> but it should not be forgotten that, as Emsley points out,<sup>319</sup> some at least of the working class also made use of the benefits of more effective policing; it was by no means unusual for the complainant in the police court to be an artisan or a casually employed labourer, or a woman of similar social level.<sup>320</sup>

The opinions of other classes are more accessible. The most notable opponent of the police was the ultra-tory Liverpool Mail, which opposed on principle all things liberal or religiously non-conformist. It espoused also the cause of the publicans who suffered most directly from police attempts to enforce order. Personal attacks on Whitty -- "the high-horsed, well-paid, bog-colleged Head Constable" -- were frequent.<sup>321</sup> The usual accusation, apart from oppression of beer-sellers, was that control of the police gave the Reformers undue political power.<sup>322</sup> The

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<sup>317</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 349-351, 29 Jul 1837; 1/2, p. 278, 30 Oct 1840; 1/2, pp. 438-9, 31 Jul 1841.

<sup>318</sup> See below, "Anti Police Riots", pp. 142 to 145

<sup>319</sup> C. Emsley, Policing and its Context, London, 1983, pp. 158-9.

<sup>320</sup> E.g. Liverpool Chronicle, 24 Sep 1836, 15 Jun 1839; 12 Dec 1840, 22 Dec 1840; Liverpool Mercury, 20 Nov 1840; Liverpool Times, 17 Nov 1840, 4 Jan 1842.

<sup>321</sup> Liverpool Mail, 13 Jun 1837.

<sup>322</sup> Liverpool Mail, 25 Oct 1836, 29 Oct 1836, 18 May 1837, 20 Jun 1837, etc.

more moderate Conservative paper, the Liverpool Courier, complained rather of insufficient or inefficient policing.<sup>323</sup> The Liverpool Journal, for which Whitty had previously worked, was his strong supporter, and probably his mouthpiece; other Radical and Whig newspapers carried complaints about specific incidents, both of neglect and of excess, but were on the whole favourable.<sup>324</sup> Complaints received by the watch committee were usually of insufficient patrols in residential or business districts.<sup>325</sup> The police themselves seem to have experienced a considerable degree of hostility during the first two years; the Head Constable's report for 1838-39 states that the early "dislike and resistance" was by then being overcome.<sup>326</sup> This does not seem an accurate statement in general terms, but Whitty probably meant his conclusions to apply only to the middle class and the press. Such improvement may in part have been due to the work of the police during the hurricane of January 1839, which was highly praised even by the Tory Courier.<sup>327</sup> The campaign of the Liverpool Mail also lost much of its force when John Shaw, the author of some of the most virulent attacks, fled to America, to avoid imprisonment for keeping a disorderly house.<sup>328</sup> One letter at least expressed concern for the hardship suffered by the police during a severe winter.<sup>329</sup> It can perhaps be taken that requests for the services of the police demonstrate some degree of acceptance of their existence. These came from a wide variety of sources such as church and chapel congregations, householders living on the edge of areas thought dangerous, employers, and charitable organisations. The resistance of the respectable classes to innovations in police arrangements found in some

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<sup>323</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 8 Jun 1836, 1 Mar 1837.

<sup>324</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 10 Jun 1836, 3 Apr 1840.

<sup>325</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1-1/3, 21/1-21/8, throughout.

<sup>326</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, p. 630, 2 Feb 1839.

<sup>327</sup> Liverpool Courier, 16 Jan 1839.

<sup>328</sup> Liverpool Times, 1 Oct 1837.

<sup>329</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 27 Jan 1838.



areas<sup>330</sup> was scarcely noticeable in Liverpool, and such dissent as there was seems very quickly to have reduced itself to the level of those complaints about cost and inefficiency which are almost inevitable in the case of an expensive public service.

Although the Tories' recapture of control of the Council in 1841 produced no immediate impact upon the police, Whitty's retirement in 1844 did. The first choice for his replacement was Superintendent Miller of the Glasgow Constabulary, who was introduced to the Liverpool force by Whitty in April 1844.<sup>331</sup> This appointment proved disastrous. In October of that year a sub-committee of the Watch Committee was set up to examine police efficiency. Even before their report was produced, Miller by direct disobedience to an order from the Watch Committee rendered himself liable to dismissal, and was allowed to resign.<sup>332</sup> The local Radical press attempted a defence, with hints of corruption and conspiracy,<sup>333</sup> but the sub-committee's minutes of evidence leave no doubt of Miller's startling ignorance of procedures, his lax supervision, and the damaging increase in resignations produced by his high-handed style. For example, even men who were off duty only from 9am to 6pm were obliged to attend drill at 2pm once per week.<sup>334</sup>

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<sup>330</sup> Emsley, Policing....., Ch IV, IX; D. Field, "Police, Power and Community in a Provincial English Town: Portsmouth 1815-1875", and B. Weinberger, "The Police and the Public in mid Nineteenth Century Warwickshire", both in V. Bailey (ed), Policing and Punishment in Nineteenth Century Britain, London, 1981; D. Foster, Public Opinion and the Police in Lancashire, 1838-1842, Unpublished MA thesis, Sheffield, 1964-5.

<sup>331</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 19 Apr 1844.

<sup>332</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/3, pp. 382-5, 25 Oct 1844.

<sup>333</sup> Liverpool Times, 10 Dec 1844; Liverpool Mercury, 13 Dec 1844; ibid, 1 Jan 1845.

<sup>334</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/3, pp. 398-9, 16 Nov 1844; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 14/1, Police Force Sub-Committee Minute Book, 1844, p. 37.

Dowling, the second in command, had been passed over when Miller was appointed, but now became Head Constable. He was not a good choice to inherit a damaged force, as he was already in poor health.<sup>335</sup> He had, however, considerable experience. After a military career, he had been a superintendent in the Metropolitan Police, during which time he had been seconded to Bristol to set up a temporary police force during the trial of rioters in 1830-31. He had led the Liverpool Dock Police since 1833; a few years later he was to be called to the bar.<sup>336</sup> However, he had none of Whitty's personal flair, and under his leadership the standard of the force continued to decline.

The most important symptom was an increase in unwarranted assaults by the police. Cases chosen randomly include two constables sent for trial for an assault on a carter, an assault on a woman which the magistrate described as "atrocious", a number of constables disciplined for attacking gentlemen involved in a civil case, two constables sent for trial for attempting to quell a disturbance by hitting heads at random with their sticks.<sup>337</sup> This dangerous practice continued; an inquest in 1850 gave a verdict of "excusable homicide" on a prisoner who died as a result.<sup>338</sup> A letter to a newspaper claimed that the writer had witnessed two cases of police brutality against old women in one day.<sup>339</sup> The press was very critical of the force during these years, the Mercury carrying a long series of letters signed "An Old Police Officer"<sup>340</sup> The

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<sup>335</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/3, p. 89, 10 Jun 1843; *ibid*, p. 97, 24 Jun 1843; *ibid*, p. 133, 2 Sep 1843; *ibid*, p. 178, 25 Nov 1843.

<sup>336</sup> HO52.41 fo196-202, Dowling's application for the Commissionership of the City of London Police Force, 4 May 1839.

<sup>337</sup> Liverpool Journal, 14 Feb 1846; Liverpool Mail, 25 Sep 1847; Liverpool Mercury, 2 Jun 1848; Liverpool Chronicle, 2 Feb 1850.

<sup>338</sup> Liverpool Journal, 20 Jul 1850.

<sup>339</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 24 Jul 1849.

<sup>340</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 1847-8, *passim*.

magistrates also expressed concern; in 1852, the Stipendiary warned that police sticks would be withdrawn if they continued to be used in this way.<sup>341</sup>

The Watch Committee were apathetic, or at best slow. Occasions of public disorder provided ample evidence of the state of the force. Orange Day 1850 saw serious riots for which the police were unprepared;<sup>342</sup> an intervention of Liverpool police in a riot in neighbouring Birkenhead was a fiasco, with many injuries to both rioters and police;<sup>343</sup> and yet in 1851 the daily board ceased to sit, delegating responsibility to the Head Constable. In October of that year, following a royal visit, the Watch Committee sought to reward the force by erasing all disciplinary records; only as an afterthought was any recognition offered to the minority with clean records.<sup>344</sup> In November that year, the Head Constable's integrity was questioned in a case concerning the licence of a publican who had dealings with prostitutes and thieves. Before the outcome was known, Dowling offered his resignation, ostensibly on health grounds, but remained in office pending a decision about his pension. Whilst discussions continued, matters were brought unexpectedly to a head. The structure of the Catholic Holy Cross chapel threatened to collapse during a service. The police, seeing the congregation escaping, concluded that this was a sectarian attack, and joined in. There were many injuries to Roman Catholic Irish worshippers which required explanation. This led to an attempt by senior police officers to suppress evidence. Dowling's involvement was proved, and he was dismissed.<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mail, 21 Feb 1846. Liverpool Mail, 10 Jan 1852.

<sup>342</sup> HO45.3118, Mayor to Home Secretary, 13 Aug 1850.

<sup>343</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, pp. 237-9, 30 Nov 1850; HO45.3472 J&K fo3, Brotherton to Waddington, 27 Dec 1850; HO45.3472 J&K fo19, Williams to Home Secretary, 16 Apr 1851.

<sup>344</sup> LRO 352 POL 1/3, 11 Oct 1851.

<sup>345</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 21 Nov 1851; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 486, 28 Feb 1852; p. 494, 4 Mar 1852; pp. 546 ff, 1 May 1852.

The Watch Committee was the only body able to control the general standards of the force; the magistrates could take notice only of such individual cases as came before them. Following the election of a conservative council in 1842, two influences made themselves felt. Firstly, an attempt by the Reformist minority of the council to exclude brewers from the Watch Committee, from where they could interfere with police activity against licensees, was defeated.<sup>346</sup> Secondly, members of the Orange order were also elected. Orangeism was not yet the power in local politics that it was to become in the last decades of the century, but in some areas such as Toxteth it was of great influence. One councillor, James Parker, intervened to protect Orangemen from police activity; another, H. G. Harbord, marched openly at the head of Orange processions during his period as a member of the Watch Committee.<sup>347</sup> The problem of Orangeism among the police was a major issue in 1844. During the last months of Whitty's period of office, the magistrates had attempted, with the support of the Home Office and the cooperation of the Head Constable, to forbid membership of Orange or Ribbon clubs. The watch committee objected and obstructed, on the grounds that they alone had the authority to issue such a regulation. Although it was claimed that the very few men to whom the ban would apply had already voluntarily resigned their membership, there were rumours that there were many more who kept membership secret.<sup>348</sup> Certainly by 1852 it was felt necessary to renew the prohibition.<sup>349</sup> The precise degree of influence is impossible to determine, yet toleration of any such involvement from the two worst sources of public disorder, drink and sectarianism, argues a very lax approach to policing on the part of the corporation of these years.

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<sup>346</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 7 Apr 1843, 28 Apr 1843.

<sup>347</sup> Liverpool Journal, 4 May 1844; Liverpool Mail, 4 May 1844, 30 Nov 1844; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/3, p. 388, 9 Nov 1844, pp. 410 ff, 30 Nov 1844, p. 627, 10 Nov 1845.

<sup>348</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/3, pp. 276-9, 27 Apr 1844; p. 349, 31 Aug 1844; Liverpool Journal, 4 May 1844.

<sup>349</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5 p. 516, 27 Mar 1852.

The experience gained during Whitty's period in the handling of riots was lost along with force discipline under Dowling's command. Police belligerence will be further discussed in the next chapter, since it was closely related to an increase in anti-police incidents. Dowling's reluctance to take action against Orange disorders will also be considered there. The unjustified violence used by the police in clearing disorderly crowds was finally inescapably demonstrated by the incident which led to Dowling's dismissal.

Faced with the resulting vacancy, a faction within the Watch Committee canvassed for the appointment of one of their number, a Mr. Bigham. This was opposed by public petition,<sup>350</sup> and eventually Captain (later Major) J. J. Greig, commander of the town's enrolled pensioners, was appointed. A military man of integrity and energy, but perhaps with little imagination or humour, Greig set about curing the ills of the force. On taking office in April, one of his first public acts was to attend the police court, where he heard allegations against the police and promised a full investigation.<sup>351</sup> Introducing their new leader to the force, the chairman of the Watch Committee spoke of the unnecessary use of violence.<sup>352</sup> In August, at Greig's recommendation, the heavy bludgeon used by the police was replaced by a lighter stick. After repeated warnings even this was later removed.<sup>353</sup> In December he again addressed the men on the subject of unnecessary force, threatening the sanction of dismissal.<sup>354</sup> During his first year there were 161 dismissals out of a force numbering 806. With 153 resignations, this meant a turnover of nearly 40%.<sup>355</sup> It is not possible to tell how many dismissals were for violence; after

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<sup>350</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Apr 1852.

<sup>351</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Apr 1852.

<sup>352</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 28 Apr 1852.

<sup>353</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 654, 7 Aug 1852. *ibid*, 1/6, p. 298, 21 Jan 1854; *ibid*, 1/6, p. 308, 11 Feb 1854.

<sup>354</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/6, pp. 54-5, 24 Dec 1852; Liverpool Mercury, 28 Dec 1852.

<sup>355</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/6, pp. 148-152, 28 May 1853, p. 680, 25 Sep 1853.

the abolition of the daily board, detailed records were kept by the Head Constable in ledgers which have not survived. Only the summary of information in the annual report is available.

His first months were marred by the trial for manslaughter of a constable accused of causing the death of a woman during election disturbances; although the accused man could not be identified as the constable concerned, there was no doubt that a police constable had committed the crime.<sup>356</sup> From 1853 onwards, discipline gradually improved, but the problem of police violence was not quickly solved; in 1854 even the lighter stick was withdrawn from daytime patrols.<sup>357</sup> It was claimed that the courts would offer protection to the police by increasing sentences for attacks on the police, but there is no evidence that this had any long-term effect on sentences.<sup>358</sup> There were also improvements in the training of recruits, who now spent two weeks in observing police court procedure and patrolling in the company of an experienced officer.<sup>359</sup>

By the time of the first visit of inspection in 1857, the force, now numbering just under 1000, had apparently been restored to something like its former condition. The Inspector's reports were uniformly favourable; the force's expertise at military-style drill was singled out for praise more than once;<sup>360</sup> in 1860, it was stated that the force had a "knowledge of military

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<sup>356</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 21 Aug 1852; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 640, 17 Jul 1852.

<sup>357</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 298, 21 Jan 1854, p. 301, 28 Jan 1854, p. 305, 4 Feb 1854, p. 308, 11 Feb 1854, p. 311, 18 Feb 1854.

<sup>358</sup> All sentences for assault for the year 1857 reported in one newspaper, the Liverpool Journal, were collected. The mean for 237 assaults was 69.14; for the 104 of these which were assaults on the police the mean was 68.89.

<sup>359</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5 p. 331, 1 Apr 1854.

<sup>360</sup> PP 1857-8 XLVII.657, Reports of the Inspectors of Constabulary for the year ended 29 Sep 1857, p. 54 (712); PP 1859 XXII.399, Reports ..... 29 Sep 1858, p. 65 (436); PP 1860 LVII.527, Reports

movements sufficient to admit of their being brought to bear with precision and decisive effect upon disturbers of the public peace, howsoever numerous..."

Yet occasions for the display of such expertise were rare. Under Whitty, military-style action was relatively common. Under Dowling, police discipline was ragged; the usual response to riot tended to become a random attack with bludgeons on nearby heads. Under Greig there were fewer occasions when the police acted in bodies, but there is no reason to think his methods very different from Whitty's; his plan for the election of 1852, one of the few recorded, shows a very similar disposition of men, with the same use of mounted police. The only major alteration brought in by Greig was the institution of a section house for unmarried men, which made a reserve of 90 men available for fire or riot.<sup>361</sup> This was not used in anger during the period under consideration.

In general, then, the handling of riots was as good as the overall efficiency of the force permitted. There were, however, differences in the tactics used in different types of riot, as will appear in the next chapter.

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..... 29 Sep 1859, p. 61 (587); PP 1861 LII.641, Reports ..... 29 Sep 1860, p. 61 (701); PP 1862 XLV.433, Reports ..... 29 Sep 1861, p. 58 (490).

<sup>361</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/7, pp. 267-9, 7 Feb 1857, pp. 282-4, 30 May 1857.





## Chapter Five: Riots, 1836 to 1860

Although the essential nature of Liverpool as a commercial town remained unchanged, in these years alterations affected both living conditions and the nature of disturbances. Firstly, the town continued to grow both in area and in population. By 1860 the built-up area extended beyond the borough boundary. Collaboration with the county force became more necessary, particularly when preventive measures were taken inside the borough but could not be enforced beyond the boundary. Some trades with requirements for extensive space now had to move outside the borough, with important consequences not only for trade disputes but also for the coherence of bodies of artisans. The shipwrights (as usual) show in the greatest degree the changes affecting artisans. Their shipyards were replaced by docks, and shipbuilding was dispersed to neighbouring townships; they were threatened by the change to iron ships, as other trades were affected by technological change; and their political influence was eroded by the steady decline in the number of freemen. Growth of population was a further problem, particularly during the years after 1846 when the Irish famine brought large numbers of immigrants. Living conditions were for many at their worst then; competition for housing forced them into wretched courts and cellars, and cholera and typhus were rampant.<sup>362</sup>

Nevertheless, protest against these conditions or against the system which gave rise to them was less frequent in Liverpool than in many other areas. Chartist and anti-corn-law activity was relatively muted here. Protest against the new poor-law was shared by all classes, and

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<sup>362</sup> I. C. Taylor, Black Spot on the Mersey; a Study of Environment and Society in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Liverpool, Unpublished PhD thesis, Liverpool 1976.

eventually a local act of parliament exempted the town, allowing outdoor relief.<sup>363</sup> Food riots were rare. Yet there was no shortage of collective violence among Liverpool men, and for that matter women; Irish women in particular were noted for their participation in rows, often providing aprons-full of stones for their menfolk to throw.<sup>364</sup> Whitty remarked that he "never knew an Irish row in which women were not concerned".<sup>365</sup> One such was Anne O'Hara, whose arrest needed four policemen.<sup>366</sup> Irishwomen had no monopoly, however; it was a Liverpool woman who used a large rasp or file to knock down seven men in a fight in 1848.<sup>367</sup>

### *Sectarian Riot*

Both for men and women, the typically Liverpudlian form of riot in these years was sectarian. Sectarian violence occurred on at least 41 occasions; it was feared on at least 18 more. Neal's account of this type of violence gives much relevant detail, and rightly points out the association with working-class Toryism,<sup>368</sup> and the role of the Orange order in compensating for the lack of a close-knit community in the lives of Liverpool workers. However, he does not fully explore the relationship between these factors and the exercise of violence. He claims that Orangeism gave an excuse for 'gratuitous violence'; this explains very little.<sup>369</sup> He also overestimates the importance of politically motivated instigation in the growth of the movement in these early years. When (by his own words) only six out of 38 conservative

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<sup>363</sup> E. C. Midwinter, Social Administration in Lancashire, 1830-1860, Manchester, 1969, pp. 17 ff.

<sup>364</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 26 May 1852.

<sup>365</sup> Poor Inquiry (Ireland), Appendix G, p. xxi.

<sup>366</sup> Liverpool Journal, 25 Apr 1857.

<sup>367</sup> Liverpool Albion, 3 Jan 1848.

<sup>368</sup> F. Neal, Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience, 1819 to 1914, Manchester, 1988.

<sup>369</sup> F. Neal, Sectarian Violence....., p. 37.

councillors claimed Orange connections, their encouragement can scarcely account for the expansion of the order to the extent which he implies.<sup>370</sup> Nor does he recognise the mechanism by which the Shipwrights Club provided a foundation for an Orange organisation. These men had lost more than most from parliamentary and municipal reform, and their special relationship with the Tory faction, built up over many elections, made them ready for conversion. Their procession in 1839 was in effect the first Orange procession with local (rather than Lancashire Irish) support.<sup>371</sup>

Nevertheless, the fact that Orangeism became a serious force in the town about the middle of the 1830s seems to indicate that the movement responded to a crisis in the political life of local Tories as much as to the threat of Irish immigrants. Certainly the Tories were quick to use the weapon of sectarianism; although they cannot be said to have forged it themselves, they would use whatever came to hand. Feeling was roused against the Reformers by two issues, corporation schools and the endowment of the clergy. Conservative rhetoric relied much upon the necessity to protect the Protestant constitution, the safeguard of free Britons. The Reformers drew support from both Catholics and dissenters, and from the more tolerant members of the Church of England. Where the Conservatives claimed protection for both commerce and the established church, the Reformers advocated freedom of trade and of conscience. After a brief skirmish about a Catholic orphan society's use of the town hall for a fundraising event,<sup>372</sup> more lasting indignation was provoked by alteration to the nature of religious teaching in the two corporation schools so that Catholics could also attend. Meetings of protest were held in July 1836; in August it was reported that some of the ex-constables were spreading the tale that "the Radicals have kicked the Bible out of the schools and are going to introduce Tom Paine's 'Rights of Man'".<sup>373</sup> The shipwrights, leaders of the town's

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<sup>370</sup> Neal, Sectarian Violence....., p. 53.

<sup>371</sup> See below, page 114,

<sup>372</sup> Liverpool Courier, 20 Jan 1836.

<sup>373</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 15 Jul 1836; Liverpool Chronicle 2 Aug 1836.

artisans, offered the use of their rooms as a temporary school for children withdrawn for conscientious reasons.<sup>374</sup> The education committee affirmed that Protestant and Catholic religious teaching was entirely separate.<sup>375</sup> Nevertheless, the schools question caused excessive resentment as long as the Reformers were in office.

The problem of church endowment similarly divided the parties, although it suffered as an issue since parsons who preached on the subject could be accused of protecting their own incomes, which were threatened by national proposals for changes in church rates and tithes. After the failure of the Parson-Police Bill in 1835, the old corporation had spent most of its last months in attempting to provide for the clergy.<sup>376</sup> The Reformists succeeded in having these measures overthrown. In October 1837, there were complaints that clergymen had been "robbed" of their incomes.<sup>377</sup> A solution was found in 1838 only after the Home Office had asked the Stipendiary Magistrate to arbitrate.<sup>378</sup>

The theme of "the Church in danger" seems to have worked well in gaining support for the Conservatives; it was probably instrumental in their recovery of power. The issue was repeatedly raised at municipal elections. This stress on religion helped justify expressions of concern at the increasing proportion of Irish in Liverpool. The very numerous Lancashire Catholics, however, were rarely mentioned. In 1844, a Tory newspaper<sup>379</sup> estimated the Irish population at over 49,000; magistrates guessed that 25% of the 1841 population of 290,000

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<sup>374</sup> Liverpool Mail, 22 Jul 1837.

<sup>375</sup> Liverpool Journal, 2 Oct 1837.

<sup>376</sup> Town Books, Vol. 16, pp. 480-598, 7 Oct to 2 Dec 1835.

<sup>377</sup> Liverpool Journal, 21 Oct 1837; HO52.37 fo43-46, Mayor to Lord John Russell, 21 May 1838.

<sup>378</sup> Correspondence in HO52.37 fo32-71, May 1838.

<sup>379</sup> Liverpool Mail, 14 Sep 1844.

had been Catholics.<sup>380</sup> Presentiments of trouble led to exaggeration; even in 1851, after the famine immigration, the census showed only 22.3% of the town's population to be Irish-born, a figure which dropped to 18.9% ten years later.<sup>381</sup> Nevertheless, the numbers were quite high enough to account for local fears. These became most acute in 1847-8, when the influx of starving and diseased famine victims overwhelmed relief agencies. The local press made capital out of the numbers of Irish appearing in the police-courts,<sup>382</sup> and in the Council Mr. Parker, a known Orange-supporter, was quick to complain of fever being spread by famine refugees.<sup>383</sup>

Anti-Catholic rhetoric in the press responded to national events, being shriller during the debate over the Maynooth Grant in 1841-2, during the Repealers' "monster meetings" in 1842-3, and during the agitation over "papal aggression" in 1855. There were also quiet periods; in 1850, the Mercury prematurely welcomed "new tolerance between Roman Catholic and Protestant".<sup>384</sup>

Throughout all these ups and downs, the most prominent Protestant agitator was the Rev. Hugh McNeile, an Ulsterman, noted for his oratory and manly good looks,<sup>385</sup> who never hesitated to involve himself in party politics,<sup>386</sup> or to associate himself with the Orange

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<sup>380</sup> HO45.2410B fo 639, Report of Committee of Magistrates, 8 Jul 1848.

<sup>381</sup> W. J. Lowe, The Irish in Lancashire 1846-1871, a Social History, Unpublished PhD thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 1974, p. 56.

<sup>382</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 5 Feb 1848; Liverpool Mail, 5 Feb 1848.

<sup>383</sup> Liverpool Mail, 8 May 1847.

<sup>384</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 19 Mar 1850.

<sup>385</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 25 Nov 1836.

<sup>386</sup> Liverpool Journal, 6 Aug 1836; Liverpool Courier, 3 May 1837; Liverpool Chronicle, 12 Dec 1842.

Order.<sup>387</sup> His language was extreme, as when he asked his audience rhetorically "....are you to be deposed and murdered as heretics?"<sup>388</sup> The clergy who supported him were known as "McNeile's thirty-nine articles," although their number declined when the settlement of the church endowment question removed their financial motives.<sup>389</sup> He was a prime mover in the Operative Protestant Association, whose membership included many shipwrights.<sup>390</sup> This was succeeded by the Liverpool Working Men's Protestant Reformation Society. These relatively respectable, non-secret organisations were recognisable as close relatives of the Orange Order by their use of orange banners and of "Kentish Fire", a method of applauding speakers using hands and feet.<sup>391</sup>

During these years, support for the Orange Order grew, as more local men joined the largely Irish membership of earlier years. The dissolution of the Grand Lodge of Ireland in 1836 left the order without a head. Local Orangeism continued and in 1841 a new Grand Lodge met in Liverpool;<sup>392</sup> by 1844, there were two rival organisations, the Loyal Orange Institution and the Grand Protestant Confederation of Loyal Orangemen, which amalgamated under the title of The Grand Protestant Association of Loyal Orangemen.<sup>393</sup> In 1846, links were re-formed with

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<sup>387</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 29 Jul 1842.

<sup>388</sup> Liverpool Mail, 26 Nov 1839.

<sup>389</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 23 Dec 1843, 29 Mar 1845.

<sup>390</sup> Liverpool Mail, 26 Sep 1840.

<sup>391</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 17 Oct 1854; cf Liverpool Chronicle, 16 Sep 1843, Liverpool Mercury, 10 Jan 1860.

<sup>392</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 8 Jan 1841.

<sup>393</sup> Liverpool Mail, 13 Jul 1844.

the Irish Grand Lodge.<sup>394</sup> It was claimed that in 1849 there were at least 40 lodges meeting in the town, while by 1860 a figure of 100 was given.<sup>395</sup> The order maintained friendly relations with respectable Tories,<sup>396</sup> while drawing the bulk of its support from the poorer workers, particularly dock-porters.<sup>397</sup>

Ribbonism also persisted throughout these years, with lodges masquerading or doubling as friendly societies.<sup>398</sup> Police estimations of their danger differed, Whitty regarding them as troublesome but needing serious consideration "only as they refer to Ireland", whereas Dowling took great interest in their activities.<sup>399</sup> The Catholic clergy were generally opposed to them, and would refuse communion to known members.<sup>400</sup> Processions were a common occasion for trouble; there was opposition even to peaceful pageantry, as interfering with business.<sup>401</sup> It was

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<sup>394</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 22 May 1846.

<sup>395</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Oct 1849; Liverpool Courier, 6 Mar 1860.

<sup>396</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 16 Jul 1841.

<sup>397</sup> E.g. Liverpool Journal, 28 May 1842; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/6, pp. 479-80, 16 Jul 1842.

<sup>398</sup> CO904.7 fo 148, documents of Liverpool Hibernian Benevolent Burial Society; fo 149, documents of St Patrick's Hibernian Benevolent Soc., fo 163-9, Rules of Provident Friendly Society of Liverpool, founded Jan 7th 1839; CO904.8 fo 209, Rushton to Phillipps, 2 Apr 1842; fo 210-5, Whitty to Rushton, 2 Apr 1842; fo 203-6, Dowling to Phillipps, 18 Mar 1842; Liverpool Mail, 22 Dec 1854.

<sup>399</sup> CO904.8 fo 210-5, Whitty to Rushton, 2 Apr 1842; fo 203-6, Dowling to Phillipps, 18 Mar 1842.

<sup>400</sup> HO100.263 fo 42, Wilson to Jones, 4 May 1838.

<sup>401</sup> E.g. Liverpool Journal, 5 Jun 1841; Liverpool Mercury, 2 Jul 1852; HO45.128 fo 560, Mayor to Palmerston, 26 Aug 1853.

still claimed that St Patrick's Day processions led to sectarian fighting,<sup>402</sup> this was untrue, although drunken disorderly behaviour was frequent. The notions of legitimacy inherent in Orangeism demanded that its members should not be the first to attack, however much they might use insults to provoke attack by others. Nor did Irish nationalist processions use the provocative banners and symbols seen on Orange Day. Protestants could and did join in at least until about 1840, both in Liverpool and in Ireland.<sup>403</sup> Only once is there any suggestion of Protestant attack; in 1845 the route was changed to avoid an Orange ambush.<sup>404</sup> Nevertheless, priests came to oppose such parades, both because they occasioned drunkenness, and because co-operation with magistrates in this matter was essential to Catholic claims to respectability.<sup>405</sup> November 5th, another date which elsewhere was marked by disorder, caused no more trouble than it had before 1836.

During the time of the Reformist council, no Orange procession was attempted. The magistrates were firmly opposed to all such parades, and even prevailed upon the Welsh to give up their public celebrations of St. David's Day (never an occasion for trouble) to avoid giving an excuse to others.<sup>406</sup> However, the procession and church service of the shipwrights, which had been allowed to lapse some 8 years earlier,<sup>407</sup> was revived. The text for the Anglican

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<sup>402</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 1 Apr 1835; Liverpool Mail, 24 Mar 1849; Liverpool Chronicle, 22 Mar 1856.

<sup>403</sup> Liverpool Journal, 19 Mar 1836; Jacqueline R Hill, "National Festivals, the State, and "Protestant Ascendancy" in Ireland, 1790-1829" in Irish Historical Studies, vol XXIV, no 93, May 1984, pp. 30-51.

<sup>404</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Mar 1845.

<sup>405</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 3 Apr 1835; Liverpool Journal, 12 Mar 1836; Liverpool Mercury, 17 Mar 1843.

<sup>406</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 12 Mar 1836.

<sup>407</sup> Liverpool Mail, 30 May 1839.



sermon was "My son, fear thou the Lord, and meddle not with those that are given to change." Although some Catholics also took part, attending separate services, many of the banners bore provocative orange-bordered Protestant slogans.<sup>408</sup> The procession was peaceful despite this, but later that day coach-loads of apprentices (who had been drinking) drove through streets well-known as Irish enclaves, and serious riots followed. The following two years saw similar processions, but these were strongly policed and disorder was kept to a minimum.<sup>409</sup> In 1841, it was feared that a teetotallers' procession to be held on 12th July would be similarly used for the display of Orange banners, and Whitty took the precaution of ascertaining his legal powers. The town clerk's opinion was that the police could only act if there was an observable tendency to a breach of the peace.<sup>410</sup> This legal opinion formed the basis of police activity for some years, limiting magistrates to advising (rather than ordering) that no procession should be held, while the police were held to be unable to threaten arrest until breach of the peace was imminent.

Within months of the Tories regaining control of the council, the first Orange procession for many years was held. This was a funeral, where no breach of the peace occurred, and about which the police took no action.<sup>411</sup> Following this, the Orange order attempted to get mayoral permission for a procession. The Mayor wrote to the Home Office, regretting that he did not have the power to prevent the parade but saying that the Orangemen had agreed not to march. It was nevertheless arranged that troops should be available.<sup>412</sup> In the event, however, the procession which was held was claimed to be the shipwrights procession, "postponed" from

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<sup>408</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 31 May 1839.

<sup>409</sup> Liverpool Mail, 30 May 1840; Liverpool Journal, 30 May 1840; Liverpool Mercury, 5 Jun 1840; 4 Jun 1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 5 Jun 1841.

<sup>410</sup> HO45.249D fo 7, headed "Queries put by Mr. Whitty, 10th July 1841."

<sup>411</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/6, p. 254, 7 Mar 1842.

<sup>412</sup> HO45.249D fo 2, Mayor to Graham, 28 Jun 1842; HO45.269 fo 117, Wemyss to Phillipps, 14 Jul 1842; *ibid* fo 119, Town Clerk to Falconer, 12 Jul 1842.

Royal Oak Day to July 12th. This was essentially an Orange procession, with Orange flags, although some who were not Orangemen took part.<sup>413</sup> For the next eight years, major disorder was prevented by a variety of means. Prohibition was successful only when the Orange order agreed, as they did in 1848 in view of the major unrest of that year.<sup>414</sup> In general, their co-operation was conditional upon there being no St. Patrick's procession;<sup>415</sup> nor was their agreement altogether reliable, either because their control over the order's young men was incomplete, or because they observed the letter of the agreement only, permitting large-scale funeral processions to be held.<sup>416</sup> In 1844, requests for legal powers against such processions were renewed with no effect, the Home Office advice being that the current law was sufficient to allow the prosecution of those taking part in processions which broke the peace. This did not satisfy the magistrates, who wanted the power to stop a parade before that stage had been reached.<sup>417</sup> No major disorder arose until 1850, but in that year a relatively small disturbance had serious consequences. A mob surrounded a public house, where an Orange lodge met. They returned on the following day to continue their siege, despite the publicans appeals for police protection. The police response was casual; no constable was present when one of the crowd was injured by pistol-shot. He later died.<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>413</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 3 Jun 1842; Liverpool Chronicle, 30 Jul 1842.

<sup>414</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 18 Jul 1848.

<sup>415</sup> Liverpool Times, 14 Mar 1843; HO45.670 Minutes of Magistrates Meeting, 11 Apr 1844; *ibid*, Mayor to Graham, 16 Apr 1844.

<sup>416</sup> HO45.670, Mayor to Graham, 16 Apr 1844; Liverpool Journal, 14 Jun 1845; Liverpool Chronicle, 19 Jul 1845.

<sup>417</sup> HO45.670, Resolution of Liverpool Magistrates, 15 Apr 1844; HO43.66 fo 354, Phillipps to Mayor, 19 Apr 1844.

<sup>418</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 16 Jul 1850; Liverpool Mail, 20 Jul 1850; Liverpool Chronicle, 17 Jul 1850; 3 Aug 1850; Liverpool Courier, 17 Jul 1850, 31 Jul 1850, 24 Jul 1850.

Requests for legal powers to ban processions were renewed, but rejected. In 1851 a procession was again permitted. A warning had been received that lives would thereby be endangered. Dowling, already a sick man, reported unjustifiably that he had no reason to fear riot.<sup>419</sup> He held police in reserve, rather than deploying them to accompany the marchers, and was proved wrong when serious disorder broke out.<sup>420</sup> This prompted Home Office accusations of inefficiency to which the Mayor replied by again quoting the need for greater legal powers.<sup>421</sup> An anonymous letter put forward the alternative view that Dowling's reluctance to act was a result of Orange influences in the police force and among the magistrates.<sup>422</sup> Such rumours were extremely persistent. Since the attempt in 1844 to prevent police belonging to Orange lodges had been defeated, the matter had been ignored, and known Orangemen had been allowed to become watch committee members. Relations between the police and the Irish left much to be desired; the annual report for 1849 had stressed the frequency of injuries to police in Irish areas,<sup>423</sup> and recent events when Liverpool police became involved in a riot with Catholic Irish in Birkenhead showed that they were quite ready to meet violence with violence.<sup>424</sup> Significantly, it was immediately after Dowling's resignation and the scandal

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<sup>419</sup> HO45.3472M fo26, Petition of Arthur McEvoy, 2 Jul 1851; *ibid*, fo 10, Dowling to Mayor, 7 Jul 1851.

<sup>420</sup> HO45.3472M fo 18, Dowling's report of 14 Jul 1851.

<sup>421</sup> HO43.79 fo 292, Waddington to Mayor, 14 Jul 1851; HO45.3472M fo 22, Mayor to Home Secretary, 19 Jul 1851.

<sup>422</sup> HO45.3472M fo 16, Anon to Home Secretary, 19 Jul 1851.

<sup>423</sup> LRO MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 5, 28 Jul 1849.

<sup>424</sup> HO45.3140, Statements of complainants re police actions at riot of November 1850.

relating to it that the magistrates renewed their attempts to outlaw Orangeism from the force, the decision being agreed this time by the Watch Committee.<sup>425</sup>

The following year the magistrates again attempted to prevent a procession, and several lodges agreed to substitute a railway excursion. However, others persisted; the procession was held in August after a July election.<sup>426</sup> Although the magistrates had not acquired any more legal power than they had had in 1842, they now apparently felt that they could act. They were encouraged in this by the Home Office, who recommended the use of special constables.<sup>427</sup> The regular police were sufficient, however. Greig had now taken over as Head Constable, and under his firm leadership the police were out in force to meet prospective marchers. Several exemplary arrests were made,<sup>428</sup> and serious trouble was averted. After this date, the procession was consistently banned within the borough. Attempts to substitute a funeral or a total abstinence demonstration with full Orange regalia were met with similar firmness<sup>429</sup> and thereafter processions were held outside the borough, the police protecting the borough limits from Orange incursions.<sup>430</sup> For the time being at least, these riots were reasonably successfully contained.

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<sup>425</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 382, 9 Aug 1851; Liverpool Chronicle, 6 Sep 1851; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 516, 27 Mar 1852.

<sup>426</sup> HO45.4085 fo 85, poster; *ibid*, fo 86, Mayor to Walpole.

<sup>427</sup> HO41.20, fo 22, Jolliffe to Mayor, 11 Aug 1852.

<sup>428</sup> HO45.4085F fo 88, extract from N & S Division Report Books, 10 Aug 1852; *ibid*, fo 93, Town Clerk to Walpole, 12 Aug 1852. PL 27.13/2 Liverpool Albion, 16 Aug 1852; Liverpool Mercury, 13 Aug 1852; Liverpool Chronicle, 28 Aug 1852.

<sup>429</sup> LRO 253 MIN/WAT 1/6, p. 46, 27 Nov 1852; HO45.5128 fo 552, police report of the events of 28 Jun 1853.

<sup>430</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Jul 1854; Liverpool Courier, 18 Jul 1855; Liverpool Mercury, 13 Jul 1858, 13 Jul 1859; Liverpool Chronicle, 14 Jul 1860.

## *Political Protest*

As in the first half of the period, violent political protest was often anticipated but rarely amounted to much. Disorder occurred on eleven occasions; precautions were taken on a further nine. Disorder at protest meetings was largely caused by attacks by Conservative working-men on Radicals. Popular politics in Liverpool for many meant membership of the Operative Conservative Association, whose address to the working classes of Great Britain and Ireland in 1837 (referring to its members as "the humbler classes of the Empire") objected to the prospect of government by "papists, infidels, socinians....."<sup>431</sup> To these men, legitimate political power derived from true religion, as it had done for 17th century theorists. At election time, "the pulpit beat its "drum ecclesiastick"". "Popery and democracy have both had ample concessions", claimed the conservative press,<sup>432</sup> and nobody thought the conjunction of ideas strange. It was not surprising, then, that sectarian violence should spill over into meetings whose objective was democratic.

One of the first occasions was at a meeting of the Working Men's Association in 1839 in favour of universal suffrage. The old freemen were still at this date threatened by disfranchisement. Recognisable numbers of them were observed "linking themselves together, and pushing, swaying the crowd in different directions."<sup>433</sup> This tendency was observed also at anti-corn law meetings. The Anti-Corn-Law League never won much support from local working men, and attempts to found operatives' anti-corn-law or free trade associations had little success.<sup>434</sup> In part this was related to the supposed sympathy between supporters of reform, of whatever kind, and the Irish Catholics. A meeting in June 1841 was broken up by a body of young men, identified by some sources as apprentice shipwrights, led by two or three carrying

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<sup>431</sup> Liverpool Mail, 25 Jul 1837.

<sup>432</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 4 Apr 1837.

<sup>433</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 24 May 1839.

<sup>434</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 28 Feb 1840, 25 Sep 1840, 10 Dec 1841, 26 Jan 1844, 16 Jan 1846, 23 Jan 1846.

makeshift orange flags.<sup>435</sup> This produced a revenge attack on a pub known as an Orange meeting-place, and on the windows of two Anglican churches. The police eventually restored order, and when soon after the sectarian demagogue McNeile spoke publicly about the corn-laws, the police stood by and Catholic priests issued handbills urging restraint.<sup>436</sup>

Major public meetings were of course routinely given a police presence, even where nothing controversial was anticipated. There was also a move towards meetings being held within doors. Where the meetings of working men in the 1820s had been held in Mosslake Fields, by the mid 1840s they were held at assembly rooms such as The Portico.<sup>437</sup> For the most part, admission was by ticket only, the price in itself acting as a restraint.<sup>438</sup>

Two groups were responsible for most of the anxiety over possible political riot, Chartists and Irish nationalists. The former were not noticeably numerous or active in Liverpool. Prominent speakers sometimes drew good crowds, but this did not produce any lasting interest; the next meeting would be as small as ever.<sup>439</sup> During the Plug Plot crisis in 1842, the Commander-in-Chief for the North noted that Liverpool was the only town from which he

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<sup>435</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 18 Jun 1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 12 Jun 1841; Liverpool Mail, 12 Jun 1841; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 408-412, 12 Jun 1841.

<sup>436</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 18 June 1841.

<sup>437</sup> E.g. Liverpool Chronicle, 8 May 1847.

<sup>438</sup> E.g. Liverpool Times, 2 Apr 1844; Liverpool Mercury, 23 Jan 1852.

<sup>439</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 26 Aug 1842, 2 Sep 1842.

could safely remove troops,<sup>440</sup> and trials of Chartists were held at Liverpool Assizes for safety.<sup>441</sup> Chartist speakers themselves scolded the town for its apathy.<sup>442</sup>

The Irish were a different matter; Daniel O'Connell's following in the town considerably outnumbered Feargus O'Connor's. His public appearances drew large audiences, and demanded a large number of police.<sup>443</sup> He first suggested a Liverpool branch of his Repeal movement in August 1840,<sup>444</sup> and it was in existence by January 1841.<sup>445</sup> Estimates of membership vary, but the Repeal Rent suggests a figure of about 5,000.<sup>446</sup> The Repealers were always regarded with suspicion. When supporters gathered to say goodbye to O'Connell's son John at the end of a visit to the town, and were, on the spur of the moment, given the use of a theatre, the Head Constable was called to account by the Mayor for not giving warning of a political meeting.<sup>447</sup> In 1846, the Repeal movement divided, unable to agree on the use of violence. Those who seceded from the main body became known both as "Young Ireland" and as "Confederates". This division also split the Liverpool movement.<sup>448</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> HO45.268 fo 66, Warre to Phillipps, 10 Aug 1842.

<sup>441</sup> HO43.63 fo 50, Home Secretary to Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, 23 Sep 1842.

<sup>442</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 22 Nov 1844.

<sup>443</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 29 Jan 1836, 12 Aug 1842;

<sup>444</sup> K B Nowlan, The Politics of Repeal....., London, 1965, p. 22; Liverpool Journal, 29 Aug 1840.

<sup>445</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 1 Jan 1841.

<sup>446</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 16 Sep 1843; Liverpool Journal, 24 Oct 1846; 1 May 1847.

<sup>447</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, p. 340, 6 Feb 1841.

<sup>448</sup> Liverpool Journal, 3 Oct 1846.

In 1848, fears of collaboration between Chartists and Confederates produced alarm on a vastly more serious scale than ever before. The link between the two was not entirely new. In 1843, the Chartists had attempted to link the ideas of Irish Home Rule and self-rule via the Charter, at a meeting which was in the event disrupted by attack by a gang of young men said to be 'carpenters'.<sup>449</sup> Feargus O'Connor when visiting the town in 1844 had spoken mainly about Irish issues, clearly expecting a better response from Repealers than from Chartists.<sup>450</sup> In 1848, Manchester Chartists had held a combined meeting with the Irish on St. Patrick's Day,<sup>451</sup> and there were moves towards joint action.<sup>452</sup> Similar moves were made in Liverpool; a joint meeting was held in April, and another in June,<sup>453</sup> but here (although the authorities and the press referred to fears of Chartists) the events of 1848 were almost entirely Irish in inspiration. The link between the two movements was Lawrence Reynolds, the most prominent of the Irish activists, and also a Chartist.

The first sign of trouble came at the end of a series of protest meetings by dock-labourers against changes in employment practices. This coincided with the presentation of the Chartists' monster petition, and with riots in London, Glasgow and Edinburgh.<sup>454</sup> Whilst earlier meetings had been orderly and even deferential, towards the end of the week placards were displayed which called for a more general protest among the town's working population, and the dockers' numbers were swelled by others who the police found more difficult to deal

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<sup>449</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 9 Jun 1843.

<sup>450</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 12 Jul 1844.

<sup>451</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 21 Mar 1848.

<sup>452</sup> HO45.2410B.932 Mayor to Home Secretary, 10 Apr 1848; HO45.2410B 928, Press cutting enclosed with above.

<sup>453</sup> Liverpool Journal, 15 Apr 1848; Liverpool Mercury, 13 Jun 1848.

<sup>454</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 11 Mar 1848.



with, although there was no actual disorder. Troops were called for, but were not required.<sup>455</sup> At about the same time, Liverpool's Confederates voted to join the Chartists in their petition to the Commons. Two prominent Confederates, Meagher and Doheny, also visited Liverpool from Ireland, apparently intent on forming revolutionary clubs on the lines of those already in existence in Ireland.<sup>456</sup> These men were soon under surveillance.<sup>457</sup> These combined events caused such alarm that 500 special constables were sworn in, "gentlemen" having been specifically chosen; the information that this had been done was the first item in a long correspondence with the Home Office.<sup>458</sup> Soon afterwards, the enrolled pensioners were alerted.<sup>459</sup> Fears were particularly enflamed by rumours passed from Dublin Castle to Head Constable Dowling that the Chartists and Young Irelanders intended to set fire to Liverpool and Manchester on St. Patrick's Day.<sup>460</sup> As usual, the main fear of the merchants was for their goods. The Irish readily gave up the St. Patrick's parade in the interests of public safety,<sup>461</sup> but panic was unabated. Guns were removed from gunsmiths' shops, more special constables were sworn in, there were rumours of an influx of strangers "of that class generally seen at meetings

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<sup>455</sup> HO45.2410B fo 1116, Mayor to Home Secretary, 8 Mar 1848; *ibid*, fo 889, Poster; *ibid*, fo 891, Mayor to Home Secretary, 9 Mar 1848. *ibid*, fo 1108, Rushton to Home Office, 7 Mar 1848.

<sup>456</sup> C. Gavan Duffy, Four Years of Irish History, London, 1883, pp. 618-640; L. Bisceglia "The Threat of Violence: Irish Confederates and Chartists in Liverpool in 1848" in The Irish Sword, Vol XIV no 56, Summer 1981, pp. 207-216, gives an account of the events of 1848, but gives too much credence to exaggerated estimates of violence current at the height of the panic, rather than the more sober picture which emerged after the arrest and trial of some of the participants.

<sup>457</sup> HO45.2410B fo 854, Mayor to Home Secretary, 17 Mar 1848.

<sup>458</sup> HO45.2410B fo 891, Mayor to Home Secretary, 9 Mar 1848.

<sup>459</sup> HO41.19 fo 42, Phillipps to Mayor, 14 Mar 1848.

<sup>460</sup> HO45.2410B fo 1170, McGregor (Constabulary Office, Dublin Castle) to Dowling, 15 Mar 1848.

<sup>461</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 17 Mar 1848; Liverpool Journal, 18 Mar 1848.

of the Chartists".<sup>462</sup> Troops were called in.<sup>463</sup> With little justification, the Tory press claimed after the event that only "a large military force" had prevented serious disturbances on the 17th.<sup>464</sup>

Throughout the next five months the local authorities continued to be on the alert. Arrangements were made for telegraphic communication, an important technological advance which allowed the immediate involvement of central government.<sup>465</sup> When Chartists and Repealers met in a public place, the police were standing by in large numbers, in hiding; they were not required. At other meetings (held indoors), notes were taken of the contents of speeches, which were reported to the Home Office.<sup>466</sup> The Confederates were watched closely; on one occasion, their meeting was prevented, using legislation more often used against pubs which harboured prostitutes.<sup>467</sup> Reynolds set up a shop selling pikes for sixpence-halfpenny; these were knives sold by ships' chandlers as a common item of trade, and gave little justification for police action.<sup>468</sup> The police also had at least one informer, motivated by fear

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<sup>462</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 18 Mar 1848.

<sup>463</sup> HO45.2410B fo 1166, Mayor to Home Secretary, 16 Mar 1848.

<sup>464</sup> Liverpool Courier, 22 Mar 1848.

<sup>465</sup> HO45.2410 fo 898, fo 895, give details of national telegraphic network at this date. For Liverpool arrangements, see HO45.2410B fo 905, Rushton to Home Office, 6 Apr 1848.

<sup>466</sup> HO45 2410B fos 498-507, Abstract of Speeches at a Public Meeting, held at the Music Hall in Bold Street, ... 31 Mar 1848; HO45.2410B fo 1054, Mayor to Home Secretary, 10 Jun 1848; HO45.2410B fo 619, Report of T. A. Redin, 29 Jun 1848; HO45.2410B fo 639, Report of Committee of Magistrates, 8 Jul 1848.

<sup>467</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Apr 1848.

<sup>468</sup> Liverpool Mercury 2 May 1848.

of the scale of the movement he had involved himself in.<sup>469</sup> The information was alarming enough; the clubs, which had taken names such as "The Sarsfield", "The '82", and "The Robert Emmett", were engaged in collecting money to buy pikes and guns, and it was estimated that they might have as many as 4,000 armed members. Their role was to be to rise at the same time as the Irish, to create a diversion and to prevent troops from being sent to Ireland. The Liverpool authorities had by July no fear of Chartist involvement; this was "comparatively extinct" in Liverpool,<sup>470</sup> but they did fear greatly the prospect of a an armed uprising. As events in Ireland became more threatening, more extreme measures were taken in Liverpool. 1,500 muskets and 2,000 cutlasses were made available and the police were trained in their use. Police numbers were increased from 830 in July to 1,090 by September 16th.<sup>471</sup> As many troops were sent as could be accommodated; and a house was rented for use as a barracks.<sup>472</sup> The Duke of Wellington, scenting battle, drew up plans for the defence of Liverpool, while regretting the restraint placed on magistrates by the need to read the Riot Act.<sup>473</sup> Alarm quickly reached such a level that there was even a petition, signed by many, to extend the suspension of Habeas Corpus from Ireland to Liverpool.<sup>474</sup> Fortunately these plans were not needed. Although there were a couple of tense days, when rumour could have triggered fighting, the

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<sup>469</sup> HO45.410B fo 680, Report of Head Constable, 19 Jul 1848.

<sup>470</sup> HO45.2410B fo 626, Mayor to Home Secretary, 8 Jul 1848.

<sup>471</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/4 pp. 518-9, Report of Sub-committee on Increase in Police Force, 16th Sep 1848.

<sup>472</sup> HO41.19 fo 242, Waddington to Mayor, 13 Jul 1848; HO45.2410B fo 668, Dowling to Mayor, 15 Jul 1848; HO45.2372 Trevelyan to Ordnance Department, 20 July 1848; HO45.2410B fo 695, Mayor to Home Secretary, 20 Jul 1848; HO41.19 fo 252, Cornwall Lewis to Arbuthnot, 21 Jul 1848.

<sup>473</sup> HO45.2369, Duke of Wellington to Marquis of Anglesey, 17 Jun 1848.

<sup>474</sup> Liverpool Journal, 29th July 1848; J. Saville, 1848: The British State and the Chartist Movement, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 154-5.

outcome was an anticlimax. On 23rd July, an employee of Reynolds was arrested carrying pike-heads in a sack; there was some doubt about the legal position, but the Home Office sent by telegraph the instruction to detain him until further orders.<sup>475</sup> Troops ensured that the town remained calm.<sup>476</sup> Many more special constables were enrolled; 500 Irish dock-workers who refused to serve as specials lost their jobs.<sup>477</sup>

The arrest led to a handful of others; evidence at the trials soon showed how exaggerated local fears had been as the number of potential revolutionaries fell from thousands to scores.<sup>478</sup> For a time, the Liverpool authorities were reluctant to believe that all was over. The Home Office soon insisted that the police should be disarmed, and later had to request that marines provided for the protection of the docks should be released.<sup>479</sup> Even so, large numbers of troops were retained.<sup>480</sup> The Mayor wrote plaintively " ....I understand that we have the character of being unnecessarily alarmed here....."<sup>481</sup> This was by far the most dramatic case of protest-directed activity during the first half of the century in Liverpool; it exhibits in full measure the excessive alarm and easy recourse to troops which characterised the treatment of political disorders.

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<sup>475</sup> HO41.19 fo 256, Home Office to Mayor of Liverpool "By Electric Telegraph", 24 Jul 1848.

<sup>476</sup> HO45.2410B fo 721, Mayor to Home Secretary, 23 July 1848.

<sup>477</sup> HO45.2410D fo 621, Warre to Asst. Adjutant General, 1 Aug 1848.

<sup>478</sup> PL26.176 Indictments, Liverpool Assizes, Summer 1848; PL27.12/1 Depositions, ditto.

<sup>479</sup> HO41.19 fo 276, Waddington to Mayor,, 4 Aug 1848; *ibid* fo 304, same to same, 31 Aug 1848.

<sup>480</sup> HO45.3131 fo 54, Cathcart to Waddington, 27 Nov 1850.

<sup>481</sup> HO45.2410B fo 811, Mayor to Home Secretary, 5 Aug 1848.

## *Elections*

Of ten parliamentary elections between 1836 and 1860, one was not contested and two were apparently completely orderly. The freemen now shared their privilege with the ten-pound householders, and there was a certain amount of tension between the two groups. Although the disfranchisement question was still an issue as late as 1855,<sup>482</sup> no violence is reported as arising from this source. Yet the freemen must still be regarded as the trustees of the old heritage of election violence, and their increasing dilution by householders as one of the changes tending to decrease riot. There is no record of disturbance at municipal elections, at which only householders voted. In 1835, freemen formed just over one-third of the electorate; by 1841, although they had increased in numbers, they were only a quarter. Their proportion continued to fall thereafter. In 1837, only 600 voters had both qualifications.<sup>483</sup>

Most important in producing violence, however, was sectarianism. The election of 1841 was one of the first major trials of the new police, and this year the Tories' campaign was based on a two issues; Protestantism, and the Reformists' attempt to disfranchise the freemen.<sup>484</sup>

Some changes tending towards more orderly elections had already been achieved, with the legal curtailment of the period available for voting and the use of booths. Police precautions were extensive.<sup>485</sup> The police were permitted to vote if qualified, but were cautioned strongly against political comment.<sup>486</sup>

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<sup>482</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 27 Mar 1855.

<sup>483</sup> Liverpool Times, 29 Jun 1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 19 Aug 1837.

<sup>484</sup> Liverpool Courier, 30 Jun 1841.

<sup>485</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 350-1, Head Constable's Report following election, 29 Jul 1837; *ibid* pp. 417-8, Report prior to election, 26 Jun 1841.

<sup>486</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, pp. 421-7, 5 Jul 1841.

Despite all precautions, there were outbreaks of severe rioting. In 1837 sectarian propaganda beforehand gave reason to fear trouble, and troops were brought to the boundary of the borough in readiness.<sup>487</sup> They were only to be used if the new police failed, however, and despite some errors (such as allowing the Tory and Liberal processions to meet) they coped. There were outbreaks of fighting in many areas, and rumours that the Liberals had imported 1500 Irishmen from Dublin to intimidate the Tories.<sup>488</sup> Many injuries occurred, but on the whole the police succeeded in dispersing rioters and preventing looting and widespread disorder.<sup>489</sup> The maintenance of order without the use of troops was not quite so revolutionary as it might appear, mounted police armed with cutlasses being used.<sup>490</sup> The 1841 election showed this similarity even more strongly, when mounted police with drawn cutlasses were formed into a square at the junction of four streets; they then divided into four squads which charged simultaneously along the four streets.<sup>491</sup> In both these years, many rioters were arrested. Sentences in 1837 were relatively light. In 1841, two deaths resulted, and while those accused of manslaughter were acquitted this probably helped to produce rather heavier sentences in general.

In 1847, the election was relatively peaceful, much of the credit being given to the decision not to use party colours.<sup>492</sup> 1852 was also a troubled election. Stockport had recently suffered severe

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<sup>487</sup> HO52.34 fo210, Mayor to Ld J Russell, 28 Jul 1837; HO40.35 fo 135, Wemyss to Phillipps, 26 Jul 1837; HO40.35 fo 137, Campbell to OC 7th Fusiliers, 25 Jul 1837; HO40.35 fo 142, Wemyss to Phillipps, 29 Jul 1837.

<sup>488</sup> Liverpool Mail, 27 Jul 1837.

<sup>489</sup> Liverpool Mail, 25 Jul 1837; Liverpool Mercury, 26 Jul 1837; Liverpool Journal, 29 Jul 1837; Liverpool Courier, 24 Jul 1837; Liverpool Chronicle, 29 Jul 1837.

<sup>490</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 350-1, 29 Jul 1837.

<sup>491</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 3 Jul 1841.

<sup>492</sup> Liverpool Journal, 24 Jul 1847, 31 Jul 1847.

anti-Irish rioting,<sup>493</sup> and the Orange order in Liverpool were deeply involved in the election: the conservative candidates had specifically addressed the order. The police had even made a seizure of weapons which were claimed to have been prepared for use in sectarian riots.<sup>494</sup> Despite the good results achieved in 1847 by giving up party colours, the Tories this year had insisted on their use,<sup>495</sup> and the Conservative procession contained a number of men in orange colours, some of whom carried pistols.<sup>496</sup> The Liberals also held a procession, and engaged M. J. Whitty to take charge of the maintenance of order.<sup>497</sup> Trouble started when the procession was attacked on its way past Jordan Street, an Irish enclave, but the police acted quickly and no very serious rioting ensued,<sup>498</sup> although the day was marred by two injuries which later resulted in death; there was some question of police involvement in one case, but the evidence was unclear and the inquest verdict exonerated them.<sup>499</sup> Both occurred outside the town centre, in areas where police precautions were less effective. Drink was also a factor; an election enquiry later established that several public houses had been "open" in the conservative interest.<sup>500</sup>

The years 1853 and 1857 saw noisy but non-violent elections. Despite the deaths which occurred in 1852, it is clear that police precautions were effective in preventing widespread

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<sup>493</sup> Liverpool Journal, 3 July 1852.

<sup>494</sup> Liverpool Albion, 5 Jul 1852.

<sup>495</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 26 Jun 1852.

<sup>496</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 9 Jul 1852.

<sup>497</sup> Liverpool Journal, 3 Jul 1852.

<sup>498</sup> Liverpool Times, 8 Jul 1852; Liverpool Chronicle, 10 Jul 1852.

<sup>499</sup> Liverpool Mail, 24 Jul 1852.

<sup>500</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 31 May 1853, 7 Jun 1853, 27 Jun 1853.

disorder, even though they could not prevent localised outbreaks in peripheral areas. As with sectarian disturbances, the police were successful also in controlling or containing election disturbances from a relatively early date.

### *Trade Disputes*

Collective violence was recorded in the course of trade disputes on 26 occasions during these years, and police precautions at three other times. Most were related to strikes; the only exception was an attack on a wages-clerk in reaction to stoppages from wages.<sup>501</sup>

As in the earlier part of the period, disputes were mostly resolved peacefully and without a strike. This might be because the workers had not the power to resist a reduction of wages or an increase in hours,<sup>502</sup> or because their request was granted.<sup>503</sup> The movement for reduction of working hours in the 1840s saw an innovation in the formation of associations to appeal to public opinion, which were not necessarily restricted to a single trade.<sup>504</sup> Petitions were now less frequent, but the dock-porters still used this method as late as 1857.<sup>505</sup> The personal element in employer-employee relationships remained: for example the coachmakers showed their gratitude for a shortening of hours by inviting their employers to a dinner,<sup>506</sup> while the sawyers of Gregson's mill accepted the gift of free "sittings" in St Matthew's church.<sup>507</sup>

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<sup>501</sup> Liverpool Courier, 26 Jan 1853.

<sup>502</sup> E.g. Saltheavers: Liverpool Courier, 26 Jun 1839; Plasterers: Liverpool Mercury, 17 Mar 1848.

<sup>503</sup> E.g. Coopers: Liverpool Mercury, 5 May 1854; Coachmakers: ibid, 20 Jul 1860.

<sup>504</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 27 Jul 1847, 19 Nov 1847, 22 Sep 1848.

<sup>505</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 31 Jul 1857.

<sup>506</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Jul 1860.

<sup>507</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 16 May 1854.



Traditional trade societies remained usual for the trades of the port, while the builders made at least one further attempt at national unionisation in 1846.<sup>508</sup> Associations were also from time to time formed in response to a particular need, for example to make effective a reduction in hours nominally granted to stonemasons.<sup>509</sup> Less powerful workers often relied on burial societies, which maintained a flimsy covering of respectability. The Dock Labourers' Christian Burial Society included among its functions negotiation with employers;<sup>510</sup> the Cotton Porters' Burial Club ran into trouble by spending its funds during a strike in 1853.<sup>511</sup> A sign of the developing profession of trade-union organiser was seen when the brickmakers' union employed a "gentlemanlike" secretary in 1840.<sup>512</sup>

The relative scarcity of industrial violence during this period is remarkable in view of the many influences affecting workers at this time. Mechanisation and other technical changes, attempts to impose London standards for working hours, the cancellation of agreements about numbers of apprentices, and legal changes such as the registration of merchant seamen, all produced their problems.<sup>513</sup> Other changes tended to reduce the chance of conflict, such as the

<sup>508</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 24 Apr 1846; 15 May 1846; Liverpool Courier, 13 May 1846.

<sup>509</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 27 Jun 1845.

<sup>510</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 26 May 1854.

<sup>511</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 12 Aug 1853.

<sup>512</sup> Liverpool Courier, 15 Jul 1840.

<sup>513</sup> E.g., Liverpool Chronicle, 3 Sep 1842, increase in apprentice shipwrights; Liverpool Mercury, 3 Oct 1845, growth of iron shipbuilding; *ibid*, 4 Dec 1849, joiners reject London hours; *ibid*, 16 Nov 1849, effects of repeal of navigation acts; Liverpool Mail, 12 Oct 1850, proposal to 'privatise' the graving dock; Liverpool Mercury, 25 Feb 1851, & Liverpool Mail, 22 Feb 1851, sailors resist registration under new Act of Parliament; Liverpool Chronicle, 5 Nov 1853, acceptance of incomplete apprenticeships; Liverpool Mercury, 18 Jul 1854, increase in no of apprentice sailmakers; *ibid*, 19 Jan 1855, resistance to use of steam in unloading ships.

displacement of shipyards by docks and the removal of trades requiring large amounts of space, notably roperies, beyond the borough boundary.<sup>514</sup> Both these trades had been notable for the use of collective violence.

The approach of trade organisations to violence continued to be very disparate, as before 1835. It is perhaps significant that the same trades on the whole continued to be responsible for the majority of violent incidents, with less of either individual or collective violence from growing trades such as engineering. There were some exceptions, such as allegations of intimidation during a strike of railway-porters.<sup>515</sup> Sawyers continued to be notable for the use of extreme violence by individuals, with reports of vitriol-throwing<sup>516</sup> and incendiarism.<sup>517</sup> With other trades, "intimidation" might be no more than verbal.<sup>518</sup>

The shipwrights' continued to use collective violence as their typical weapon. Their involvement with Protestantism in the first years of this period coincided with a period of apparent industrial peace in that trade, when the local Reformist regime was repugnant to men and masters alike. This came to an end in 1842, when a new association was formed in response to depression in their trade.<sup>519</sup> This body publicly disowned religious and party allegiance, and accused the masters of circulating lies about the men. It claimed the traditional right of Liverpool men to preferential employment. According to evidence given to the Council in 1850, a new shipwrights' association was formed again in 1844, which claimed to

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<sup>514</sup> Comparison of Thomas Kaye's plan of Liverpool, 1810, with SDUK map of 1836; Liverpool Times, 12 Sep 1850; Liverpool Mercury, 28 Jul 1852.

<sup>515</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 4 Aug 1856.

<sup>516</sup> Liverpool Courier, 12 Dec 1838.

<sup>517</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Jan 1851.

<sup>518</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 24 Apr 1846; striker bound over for crying "Baa-ah" at "black sheep".

<sup>519</sup> Liverpool Journal, 12 Nov 1842; Liverpool Times, 15 Nov 1842; Liverpool Mercury, 18 Nov 1842.

have had 1,500 to 1,700 members throughout its life and took pride in the protecting former members from the workhouse.<sup>520</sup> Tory candidates continued to be honoured guests at election times; their welcome was certain; as one anonymous shipwright claimed: "We have always been a Tory town, and always will be."<sup>521</sup> This society too claimed preference for local men,<sup>522</sup> and assaults on outsiders were not infrequent;<sup>523</sup> However, the numbers involved in these attacks were lower than they had been in 1815-35. Only once was a crowd over 50 reported, when 70 men threw stones at outsiders. Otherwise, the number was usually about 25. Serious injury was confined to one man thrown into the hold of a ship.

The shipwrights' forceful tactics contrast sharply with the restraint of an even more numerous body, the dock porters. Their conditions of work were seriously threatened by organisational changes; in 1846, when these were first proposed, the porters met to discuss resistance to measures intended speed the handling of cargoes, and free dock-berths more rapidly, by insisting that a single master-porter take charge of each ship. It was argued that this would result in lower wages, and lower standards of work, since these middle-men would intervene between merchants and porters, maximising their profits by employing the cheapest and least skilful men. Discussions dragged on; in 1848, a series of meetings were held which caused disproportionate alarm by coinciding in time with fears of Chartist and Irish disturbances.<sup>524</sup> Troops were made available, and special constables sworn in,<sup>525</sup> because of more general fears.

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<sup>520</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 10 Sep 1850.

<sup>521</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 27 Mar 1855.

<sup>522</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 21 Oct 1853, 28 Oct 1853.

<sup>523</sup> E.g. Liverpool Times, 15 Dec 1842, 8 Sep 1846; Liverpool Courier, 7 Jul 1852; Liverpool Chronicle, 29 Jul 1854.

<sup>524</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 10 Mar 1848; Liverpool Mail, 11 Mar 1848; HO45.2410B fo 979, Rushton to Home Office, 6 Mar 1848; HO45.2410B fo 859, Mayor to Home Office, 7 Mar 1848.

<sup>525</sup> HO41.19 fo 22, Phillipps to Mayor, 9 Mar 1848 Liverpool Mail, 11 Mar 1848.

and because of the proximity of St Patrick's Day. The dock committee agreed to negotiate, as the merchants supported the dockers,<sup>526</sup> although agreement was not reached until 1850.<sup>527</sup>

A further dock-strike in 1853, in support of demands for 4/- per day and a limit on the employment of new workers, was similarly peaceful. Nevertheless, the authorities were conscious of the potential for disorder of so many thousands of men; the Head Constable cancelled his leave-of-absence, and the Home Office was informed.<sup>528</sup> The police claimed in their annual report to have maintained order; the credit is probably due rather to the strikers' moderation.<sup>529</sup>

The degree of police involvement in strike prevention is not easy to estimate, since requests for their services are rarely recorded in the Watch Committee minutes, unlike requests for police to attend theatres or public meetings. One of the few such items found suggests that attendance at strikes was free, whereas in other cases a charge was made.<sup>530</sup> In some instances the request may have been made direct to the Head Constable, but it is improbable that this was usual. The most likely explanation is that the magistrates (whose papers have not survived) acted as intermediaries between employers and police for these requests.

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<sup>526</sup> Liverpool Mail, 6 May 1848.

<sup>527</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 22 Mar 1850.

<sup>528</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 169, 11 Jun 1853; HO45.5128 fo 543, Mayor to Home Secretary, 13 Jun 1853; HO43.83, fo 29, Waddington to Mayor, 22 Jun 1853.

<sup>529</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 331, 1 Apr 1854.

<sup>530</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/1, pp. 389-90, 14 Oct 1837.

Police protection was frequently given to strike-breakers,<sup>531</sup> at least once, plain-clothes police crossed a picket-line, apparently as provocateurs.<sup>532</sup> It appears that during Whitty's period of office the police were more neutral than they became later. When asked to protect dock-workers from assault by trade-society members, Whitty's investigation found no evidence of such attacks, the dock police reporting that members conduct had improved since the formation of the society.<sup>533</sup> This may be contrasted with Dowling's intervention in a dispute of ship-joiners where he attempted to exceed his legal power in applying for legal redress on behalf of men dismissed for not joining the Union.<sup>534</sup> Prosecutions for assault or intimidation relating to strikes were normally brought by the employer, and the police would intervene usually at an employer's request; they readily supported the employers in all such cases despite the often minimal levels of violence.

### *Private Battles*

32 incidents of this type were found, all involving actual violence. Those involved included, as before, schoolboys, Irish regionalist groups, and navvies; there were also territorial disputes between the residents of adjoining areas, and fights involving groups of soldiers. At least one fight took place by appointment; a barrel of beer was set up, and an estimated 300 men joined in "what the Americans call a free fight."<sup>535</sup>

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<sup>531</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 5 Feb 1841, 28 Apr 1853.

<sup>532</sup> Liverpool Courier, 4 May 1853.

<sup>533</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/2, p. 65, 12 Oct 1839.

<sup>534</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 1 May 1849, 4 May 1849.

<sup>535</sup> Liverpool Daily Post, 10 May 1859; Liverpool Albion, 16 May 1859.

Schoolboys were not taken very seriously; their stone-throwing was sometimes brought to the attention of the police,<sup>536</sup> and a batch of 2s6d fines might be imposed.<sup>537</sup> There was similar tolerance for the snowball fights which on three occasions broke out among merchants (grave and serious businessmen, as a rule) on Exchange Flags. Twice, windows were broken, and the Head Constable himself was struck by snowballs; a number of gentlemen were even taken into custody, but were released almost immediately.<sup>538</sup> On the third occasion, five young clerks were each fined 2s6d.<sup>539</sup> Soldiers were a more difficult proposition; they generally saw the police as their natural enemies, so that these cases are classed as "Anti-police"; although there were clear parallels with private battles, in that both sides were apparently keen to engage the enemy, the perceived need to protect the police produced different treatment for these cases.

The Irish were pre-eminent, but not alone, among those forming fighting alliances. Apart from the regional loyalties, and the anti-protestant Ribbon clubs, already mentioned,<sup>540</sup> there were family groups such as the "Kellys, Fitzpatricks and Murphys", or "Sweeneys, Cusacks and Barretts".<sup>541</sup> A further faction was the mysterious "Molly Maguires", first mentioned in 1853.<sup>542</sup> The name was believed to relate to an organisation of peasants who wore women's dress and other disguises for the purpose of attacking rent collectors in rural Ireland; it was to surface

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<sup>536</sup> LRO 352 POL 1/1, p. 63, 30 Apr 1836; Liverpool Mail, 3 Feb 1849.

<sup>537</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 2 Jun 1849.

<sup>538</sup> Liverpool Mail, 7 Jan 1854; Liverpool Albion, 9 Jan 1854; Liverpool Mercury, 6 Jan 1854; Liverpool Chronicle, 7 and 14 Jan 1854; Liverpool Mail, 3 Feb 1855; Liverpool Times, 1 Feb 1855; Liverpool Courier, 31 Jan 1855; Liverpool Chronicle, 3 Feb 1855; Liverpool Mercury, 30 Jan 1855.

<sup>539</sup> Liverpool Daily Post, 13 Feb 1860, 20 Feb 1860.

<sup>540</sup> See pp. 68 and 64.

<sup>541</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 10 May 1853; Liverpool Albion, 27 Mar 1854.

<sup>542</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 10 May 1853.

again in the USA in the 1860s.<sup>543</sup> They met in an alehouse in Sawney Pope Street, being reputedly sworn to give mutual help, "an insult..... to one being taken as an insult to all, for which is sought satisfaction". Members also benefited if prosecuted for assault.<sup>544</sup> A prisoner accused of an individual assault who unwisely boasted that the "Mollies" would pay any fine imposed upon him was given a sentence of two months without the option.<sup>545</sup>

Resulting prosecutions, unless brought by the police, got little attention from magistrates, who might decline to act saying there were faults on both sides.<sup>546</sup> They often failed to establish the facts of the case, complaining of the "desperate swearing (ie perjury) of you Irish when you begin to fight".<sup>547</sup> Sometimes, too, they were confused by Irish idiom, such as the use of "dead" to mean "unconscious".<sup>548</sup>

There were probably many more riots of this type than have come to light. Constables were content to stop disorder, without necessarily making arrests. For example, police had dealt with a series of riots which had been "agait [sic] for a fortnight" before making the first arrest.<sup>549</sup> Some cases were recorded only because of private prosecutions, when there is doubt

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<sup>543</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary traces the name to 1843, giving as source W. S. Trench, The Realities of Irish Life, 1858.

<sup>544</sup> Liverpool Journal, 17 Apr 1858.

<sup>545</sup> Liverpool Courier, 12 Jun 1858.

<sup>546</sup> E.g. Liverpool Journal, 24 Aug 1844, where prosecutors were said to have started the battle and then come off worst; Liverpool Times, 17 Nov 1840, when verdict was that all those involved were drunk.

<sup>547</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 1 Dec 1848.

<sup>548</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 2 May 1849.

<sup>549</sup> E.g. Liverpool Journal, 16 Jul 1853.

as to whether the assault was individual or collective.<sup>550</sup> Many disturbances were private also, in a sense, in their location. The poorer areas of town were warrens of courts and alleys; half an acre could contain as many as 130 houses.<sup>551</sup> The courts, which could be entered only via a narrow tunnel, were not part of the official police beat. This in itself supports the conclusion that this type of riot was of little importance in the minds of police and authorities alike.

### *Direct Action Riots*

There were 34 recorded cases which were more or less violent, and fears of direct action led to precautions being taken three times, twice during Crimean War celebrations and once when the police arrested unemployed men who were begging in large groups.<sup>552</sup> There were varying degrees of spontaneity; some might even engage in minor riot for payment; 50 men were hired to prevent the USS "Victoria" from leaving port before legal proceedings could be taken against her;<sup>553</sup> a bankrupt still could command the price of a mob prepared to throw the bailiffs out of his house;<sup>554</sup> and 40 "roughs" were engaged to recapture the valuable showpiece and souvenir of the Crimean war, Prince Menshikoff's carriage.<sup>555</sup> On the other hand, there were occasions when resentments against "the gentry" could be unexpectedly vented, as when a mob of up to

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<sup>550</sup> E.g. Liverpool Chronicle, 15 Jun 1839, 24 Sep 1836, 22 Feb 1840; Liverpool Times, 4 Jan 1842.

<sup>551</sup> I. C. Taylor, "The Court and Cellar Dwelling; the Eighteenth Century Origin of the Liverpool Slum" in THSLC, Vol. 122, p. 82.

<sup>552</sup> Liverpool Courier, 10 Oct 1855; Liverpool Mercury, 30 May 1856; Liverpool Daily Post, 4 Dec 1857.

<sup>553</sup> Liverpool Journal, 23 May 1840.

<sup>554</sup> Liverpool Times, 18 Apr 1850.

<sup>555</sup> Liverpool Courier, 15 Aug 1855.



300 took to knocking off gentlemen's hats while the police were occupied at a major fire.<sup>556</sup> The use of effigies to express public feelings was usually associated with elections. Rough music was only recorded once, among Irish women who crossed town to shame the supposed mistress of a well-known Irish publican.<sup>557</sup> A similar imposition of group norms can be seen in the case of a shipwright, subjected to a punishment known as "dozening" by his workmates for failing to pay his shilling towards the shipwrights' procession.<sup>558</sup> He was told that "we must serve thee as any other person for the violation of rule. Thou'lt have little to complain of, for thou'st been the first dozener in the yard." In this case, the magistrate declared that he "must" impose a fine, but made it small.

Illuminations had not given cause for serious concern for some time, being now too well organised and policed for trouble. The entire police force was available for the victory illumination in 1855, which was described as "orderly"; the Head Constable's house displayed a particularly tasteful illuminated transparency.<sup>559</sup>

There were, however, new causes of disturbance to worry about. As the Evangelical movement gained pace, there were often riotous reactions to missionaries preaching in public places, sometimes but not always sectarian. Some of the clergy expected a degree of quiet attention which the magistrates were unwilling to enforce,<sup>560</sup> although evangelists not in Holy

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<sup>556</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 16 Sep 1859.

<sup>557</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 12 Nov 1855.

<sup>558</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 25 Jun 1841; Liverpool Journal 19 Jun 1841.

<sup>559</sup> Liverpool Courier, 10 Oct 1855.

<sup>560</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 1 Jul 1857; Liverpool Courier, 14 Apr 1858.

Orders might find that they, rather than their audience, were arrested.<sup>561</sup> Anyone who shouted slogans likely to rouse sectarian feeling would be subject to the same reaction.<sup>562</sup>

A new type of conflict which made its first appearance in the press during this period was that between black and white. There were signs of racial prejudice among the police: one constable was fined for "insulting a man of colour" in 1836,<sup>563</sup> and in 1840 evidence that a tavern had black men among its customers was offered as demonstrating its disorderly character.<sup>564</sup> As yet, however, there was little cause for tension, black people being regarded mostly with mild curiosity. Racial assaults were a monopoly of American sailors; a number were brought into the police-court, where they were assured that "the aristocracy of the skin" would not be accepted in England.<sup>565</sup>

The traditional cause of direct-action riots was lack of food. There were many years where suffering was widespread; in 1838, 1841 and 1842 most trades were affected by severe unemployment, and soup-kitchens were the only resource of many.<sup>566</sup> In 1847-48, the influx of famine-stricken Irish meant widespread misery. There were also crises in individual trades in other years. Yet there was no disturbance during these years, the only police measure

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<sup>561</sup> E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 16 Mar 1857; Liverpool Courier, 15 Apr 1857.

<sup>562</sup> E.g. Liverpool Daily Post, 1 Nov 1855.

<sup>563</sup> LRO 253 MIN/WAT 21/1 p. 127, 7 Sep 1836.

<sup>564</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 1 May 1840.

<sup>565</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 21 Aug 1847; Liverpool Mail, 17 Jul 1847; Liverpool Courier, 23 Jan 1850, 30 Jan 1850.

<sup>566</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 20 Jan 1838; Liverpool Mercury, Jan & Feb 1838, throughout; 8 Jan 1841; Liverpool Courier, 27 Jan 1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 6 Mar 1841; Liverpool Journal, us off; 16 Jan 1841; Liverpool Times, 11 Jan 1842, 25 Jan 1842; Liverpool Journal, 22 Jan 1842.

against disorder being a constable or two to control queues at the soup-kitchens.<sup>567</sup> This complacency was shaken in 1855. Bread had already been dear the previous summer; the problem grew worse throughout the winter, with the corn-porters ominously complaining that they had worked only two-and-a-half days per month since April.<sup>568</sup> The winter was extremely severe, with navigation in the Mersey impeded by ice-floes.<sup>569</sup> The usual minimal charitable provisions were completely inadequate. In February, crowds collecting in the hope of receiving food were dispersed by the police.<sup>570</sup> The next day, crowds milling about in the streets coalesced into a formidable mass. Bread-shops were attacked, loaves and money being demanded and taken by force.<sup>571</sup> Very few other targets suffered, with the exception of spirit-vaults where only money was taken; significantly, the rioters refused drink when it was offered.<sup>572</sup> The police were unable to make much impression on the rioters, who dispersed in front of them only to re-form elsewhere. 200 "respectable" porters were sworn in as special constables; mounted police and enrolled pensioners were called out;<sup>573</sup> order was restored by

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<sup>567</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/6, p154, 7 Jan 1842.

<sup>568</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 21 Jul 1854, 9 Feb 1855.

<sup>569</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Feb 1855.

<sup>570</sup> Liverpool Journal, 24 Feb 1855.

<sup>571</sup> Liverpool Courier, 21 Feb, 28 Feb, 4 Apr 1855; Liverpool Times, 22 Feb 1855; Liverpool Journal, 24 Feb, 3 Mar, 31 Mar, 7 Apr 1855; Liverpool Mercury, 20 Feb 1855; Liverpool Chronicle, 24 Feb 1855; Liverpool Mail, 17 Feb, 24 Feb 1855; HO41.20 fo92, Waddington to Mayor, 19 Feb 1855; *ibid* fo 93, Fitzroy to Mayor, 22 Feb 1855; PL27 13/1 & PL27.13/2, Depositions; PL26.204 Indictments, Liverpool Assizes, Spring 1855; LRO 347 QUA, Quarter Sessions Indictments, Mar 1855.

<sup>572</sup> Liverpool Journal, 24 Feb 1855.

<sup>573</sup> HO41.20 fo 92, Waddington to Mayor, 19 Feb 1855; *ibid* fo 93, Fitzroy to Mayor, 22 Feb 1855; *ibid*, fo 95, same to same, 24 Feb 1855.

the end of the day, although people continued to stand around in little knots, giving grounds for continuing anxiety during the next day.

Over 100 were arrested, the vast majority being Irish in origin.<sup>574</sup> Sentences were harsh, with many prisoners being committed to the Assizes, a measure rarely used against rioters in Liverpool. The press justified such severity against starving people by proclaiming that "This was not a riot of the working men";<sup>575</sup> despite their moderation in attacking primarily bread-shops, those taking part were, the Press insisted, known criminals, "Manchester desperadoes", "pickpockets and prostitutes".<sup>576</sup> Yet one of the most vociferous papers itself stated that out of 65 tried in one day in the police-court, only two were known to the police, and these merely for drunkenness.<sup>577</sup> Only Whitty's Journal took a more sympathetic line, explaining the genesis of the riot in some detail without condemnation, and noting in passing the apparent exhilaration of the rioters: "the people nowhere seemed low-spirited, in consequence of the excitement."<sup>578</sup>

Following this riot, the authorities became more sensitive for a time to the threat of hungry men, and a group were arrested in 1857 for going about in gangs and begging. The Stipendiary Magistrate in sentencing them to 30 days imprisonment remarked that "It must be known that, whether people were suffering or not, ..... order should be maintained in this town."<sup>579</sup> On the whole, however, direct action riots were left to the police to deal with as they saw fit, and police priorities were decisive.

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<sup>574</sup> PP 1854-5 XIII.313, Report of Select Committee on Poor Removal, p. 297.

<sup>575</sup> Liverpool Courier, 21 Feb 1855.

<sup>576</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 24 Feb 1855.

<sup>577</sup> Liverpool Courier, 21 Feb 1855.

<sup>578</sup> Liverpool Journal, 24 Feb 1855.

<sup>579</sup> Liverpool Daily Post, 4 Dec 1857.

## *Anti-Police Riots*

These were by far the most numerous, no less than 90 being found. The vast majority were rescues of prisoners: the problem, according to the Stipendiary Magistrate, "is not the finding of the prisoners, but the taking of them into custody, arising from the impertinent interference of other parties."<sup>580</sup> Some constables traded on the magistrates' concern about rescues to prevent even peaceful intervention. A bystander who offered to pay for damage in a shop was arrested for interference in the arrest of the person responsible,<sup>581</sup> and two respectable citizens were fined 10/- for expostulating with the police for excessive use of force. The magistrate added that "persons ought rather to assist than interfere with the police."<sup>582</sup>

There were occasional attacks which did not result from police actions: one case suggests that a constable entering a court might be resented as a trespasser.<sup>583</sup> The police also risked assault when they interfered in popular pastimes like prize-fighting or dog-fighting. An inspector was killed, and a constable later lost his sight from wounds received, when attempting to stop a fight in 1838.<sup>584</sup> Despite police efforts, prize-fights remained frequent; in 1860, a letter to a newspaper complained of seeing a crowd of 2-300 watching a fight with "no fear of the authorities."<sup>585</sup> Bear-baiting, dog-fighting, pitch and toss, and Sunday cricket all received

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<sup>580</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 3 July 1840.

<sup>581</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 9 May 1848.

<sup>582</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 17 Apr 1855.

<sup>583</sup> Liverpool Courier, 25 Feb 1857.

<sup>584</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 15 Jun 1838; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/3, p. 82, 15 Jun 1838; *ibid*, 1/2, pp. 152-3, 15 Feb 1840; Liverpool Journal, 4 Jun 1838; PL 26.130.

<sup>585</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 12 Jul 1860.

attention,<sup>586</sup> "Lifting" at Hocktide was a tradition whereby young men lifted women off the ground until they bought their freedom with a penny or a kiss. Women reciprocated the next day. This also led to scuffles with the police<sup>587</sup> yet survived their attentions by several years.<sup>588</sup> Beside acts of resistance, there were also revenge attacks,<sup>589</sup> and one account of an unpopular police inspector's effigy having been burned just outside the borough.<sup>590</sup>

The frequency of recorded attacks on the police, rescues or not, rose at the time when force discipline degenerated seriously.<sup>591</sup> As would be expected, there is little direct evidence of police aggression in normal cases, but the incident which brought about Dowling's dismissal shows the police attacking indiscriminately an Irish crowd. The Watch Committee thereafter tacitly admitted that they understood sectarian prejudice to have been involved when they renewed measures to exclude Orangemen from the force.<sup>592</sup> Greig's curative measures also were designed to reduce police aggression, clearly identified as a serious problem.<sup>593</sup> The police were deprived

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<sup>586</sup> E.g. LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/1, p. 52, 27 May 1836; Liverpool Journal, 15 Jun 1839; Liverpool Albion, 12 Sep 1836; Liverpool Mercury, 18 Jul 1854, 22 Jun 1858.

<sup>587</sup> Liverpool Journal, 13 Apr 1844; Liverpool Mercury, 28 Mar 1845.

<sup>588</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 16 Apr 1852.

<sup>589</sup> E.g. Liverpool Courier, 28 Apr 1852.

<sup>590</sup> Liverpool Albion, 30 May 1859.

<sup>591</sup> 1836-44: 16 cases, 20.8% of known riots; 1844-52: 40 cases, 37.4%.

<sup>592</sup> Liverpool Journal, 28 Feb 1852; Liverpool Mail, 28 Feb 1852; LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 486, 28 Feb 1852; *ibid*, p. 516, 27 Mar 1852.

<sup>593</sup> See above, p. 103.

of their sticks; they were promised instead the protection of heavy sentences for offenders,<sup>594</sup> but the statistics do not show that this had any real effect. Taking as sample all reports given in a single newspaper for a year, the mean sentence for assaults on the police was only insignificantly and marginally higher than the mean for all assaults.<sup>595</sup>

No significant reduction in attacks was achieved under Greig's regime. Rescues continued to be frequent, and there were a number of battles between the police and troops stationed in the town which began with insults and escalated into brawling.<sup>596</sup>

Whether the police exceeded their duties or not, however, the vast majority of incidents were still reactions to specific police actions. The generalised resistance to the imposition of the rule of law which Storch claimed is not apparent.<sup>597</sup> The police reaction was equally ad-hoc; wherever sufficient force was available they persisted in their intentions, and arrests for assaults on the police were very frequent. It was difficult to guard against these sporadic incidents, beyond increasing patrols in troublesome areas, and the individual constable's response and the availability of men nearby were of major importance in deciding the outcome.

### *Riot of Unknown Origin*

43 incidents have no known cause. Many of them occurred in areas recognised as disorderly, such as Vauxhall Road, Scotland Road, or St James Street. Ben Jonson Street, near Vauxhall

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<sup>594</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 29 Jul 1854.

<sup>595</sup> Liverpool Daily Post, 1857, passim. Mean for assaults on police, 69.1 days; mean for all assaults, 68.9 days.

<sup>596</sup> Liverpool Chronicle, 23 Dec 1848; Liverpool Mercury, 12 Jan 1849; Liverpool Chronicle, 5 Jul 1851; Liverpool Albion, 7 Jul 1851; Liverpool Mercury, 8 Jul 1851; Liverpool Daily Post, 14 Sep 1858; Liverpool Courier, 15 Sep 1858; Liverpool Journal, 18 Sep 1858.

<sup>597</sup> R. D. Storch, "The Plague of the Blue Locusts" in International Journal of Social History, 20, pp. 61-90.

Road, was a notable trouble-spot; it contained 19 "mendicant lodging houses" and 8 brothels within a length of 200 yards, and was normally given three extra constables, with a further one during the services in a nearby chapel.<sup>598</sup> Another problem was Brook Street, where fights and riots were said to occur daily.<sup>599</sup> Vauxhall Road was so notorious that to be detained there by a disturbance was a classic excuse for late arrival by a police officer.<sup>600</sup> Here, and probably elsewhere, the character of the public houses was probably a factor in the equation. The publican of one, shown to have harboured prostitutes and pickpockets, kept his licence because it was claimed that every house in the road was as bad.<sup>601</sup> By 1856 Lime Street alone had six constables to deal with drink-related problems; this street contained the main railway station, which probably explains why so many men were provided.<sup>602</sup> It is often recorded that those charged with riot or assault were drunk, but no systematic data is available. Although the connection was taken for granted, the likelihood of riot was given little prominence by temperance campaigners. Poverty and sexual immorality were both more frequently cited in cautionary tales than the possibility of injury in brawls. Drunken men, and women, might fight in the street; the event was of no great interest.

All eight types of riot having been considered, comparison of the precautions, policing and punishment between types, and between the first and second halves of the period, is the subject of the next and last chapter.

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<sup>598</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/4, p. 515, 25 May 1841.

<sup>599</sup> Liverpool Journal, 13 Jul 1844.

<sup>600</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 21/9, p. 284, 21 Jun 1845.

<sup>601</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 546, 1 May 1852.

<sup>602</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 17 Nov 1856.



## Chapter Six: Conclusions

The most obvious difference between the periods 1815-1835 and 1836-1860 is that many more cases of riot were found in the later period in almost every category. Figure 3 shows the annual mean number of riots for each period. It can be seen that the only type to become less frequent was election disorder, where the number of opportunities is limited by number of contests. This was also one of the types where there was most scope for riot prevention both in organisational changes and in policing.

It has already been argued that the relative frequency of different types of riot cannot be used to draw conclusions about popular behaviour, since the probability of a riot's being reported cannot be established. The increase in recorded cases probably also is a function of better recording. It might be argued that the true frequency of collective violence decreased, but that the increasing distaste of Victorian society for violence led to a greater interest in it, and a greater likelihood of its being reported. This argument suffers from the fact that press reports are still brief and unexcited, which suggests that this interest was limited, so that any such effect can have been only small. The amount of collective violence might have increased somewhat, it might have decreased somewhat, or it might have remained about the same. There is no support, however, for the idea that this period saw any general 'transition to order', unless 'order' means only the absence of protest-related, rather than casual or personal, riotous behaviour. On a national scale, political protest probably did decline; locally it is clear that crowds continued to be ready to use collective violence for a wide range of other purposes. Whatever the true level of violence may have been, there was still a steady supply of incidents. Nor is there evidence of any appreciable decline over the years 1836-1860. Figure 4 shows that, if the second half of the period is divided into three, there is little sign of a reduction in the number of disturbances even as late as 1852-60.




Figure 3. Annual Mean Number of Riots

There were some small signs of reductions in estimates both of the numbers involved and of severity, but neither were statistically significant. Table 7 in Appendix 3 gives the results. It would appear that riots in the period 1836-1860 were broadly comparable with those of 1815-1835. There were also sufficient incidents in each category to make comparisons meaningful.

How, then does the differentiation in handling compare? The main alteration is that differentiation was much reduced. Preventive measures are summarised in Table 8 in Appendix 3. The most extreme measure was the provision of military force in advance of need. Before 1835 this was restricted to trade disputes and political protest. After 1836 it was found in six out of the eight categories. The same table shows that the level of preventive measures was higher for all types of anticipated riot. This is not unexpected; there was more manpower available for policing. Political protest still attracted the most extreme measures, but now election and sectarian disorders were taken more seriously, while on the other hand the approach to trade disputes was rather more tolerant. This evening-out of differences in

### Violent Incidents by Type, 1836 - 1860




Figure 4. Mean number of riots, 1836-60, Subdivided into Three Periods

preventive measures must be taken to reflect an underlying belief in the equal illegality of riot of all kinds, whether directed against employers or against neighbours. Where previously disorder and even violence had been apparently taken less seriously than interference with trade, for example, or with peace officers, now it is clear that violence and disorder themselves were coming to be considered as worthy of attention.

Table 9 shows the relative measures taken to police riots which had actually started. Between 1836 and 1860, troops were never used against rioters; they had been used in nearly 10% of cases in the earlier period. The trend towards greater uniformity of response here reflects the increased strength of the police, which rendered military force unnecessary. In other words, in speaking of 'normal policing' after the reforms of 1836 we are talking about something very different from earlier 'normal policing.' These reforms had made stronger measures available which were now used against most types of disorder.

The most discriminating measure of differentiation for the first period, however, was punishment. This can, of course, only take effect when there are prisoners available to be tried and sentenced. Table 10 shows the numbers of known arrests and prosecutions for the second period arranged according to the type of riot. As for the first period, the results reflect not only policy but also factors (such as advance warning of a potential riot) which determined the possibility of making arrests. The very large numbers of arrests in the 1855 bread riots account for the high figure for direct action riots. Only in this category and in election riots were the mean numbers of arrests per incident higher than they had been in the first period. The reduction in this average probably relates to an increase in the reporting of smaller incidents where few arrests were made, rather than to a change in policy.

The distribution of trials between police courts, quarter sessions, and assizes is given in Table 11. With many more reports of summary trials, these figures are more helpful than the corresponding figures for the earlier half of the period. With only twelve trials resulting from political protest incidents, the high proportion of trials at assizes for this category cannot be taken too seriously. For all other categories, however, the probability of being sent for trial at quarter sessions or assizes is now much more uniform. In comparison with the first part of the period, the chance of summary trial was a little higher for those arrested for taking part in private battles; in the case of sectarian riots, they were a little lower. Figures for trials at the Assizes are likewise broadly similar, with the highest value being for sectarian riots. This reflects the events of 1852, when 15 prisoners were sent to the Assizes to mark the new policy of preventing Orange processions; all were discharged with a warning. The use of this method of demonstrating official disapproval was clearly still considered valuable. The figure for Direct Action rioters tried at the Assizes likewise comes from a single case, the 1855 bread riots; in this case the court took full advantage of its ability to pass longer sentences.

The results of these trials, wherever they were held, is of interest. Sentences from the second period were converted into numeric data in the same way as those from the first period. Detailed figures are given in Table 12 in Appendix 3. Figure 5 shows the mean relative ranking of sentences for each type of riot for the two periods in graphical terms, and compares it with that found in the earlier period.




Figure 5. Relative Severity of Sentence, 1815-1835 vs 1836-1860

The tendency to closer grouping is very clear. Political riot is obviously a case apart; otherwise, sentences are applied more evenly across all types of riot. Such differentiation as there is is still statistically significant, but is very much smaller.

Correlation between sentence and the size and severity of incident was not found in the earlier period. The results of similar tests on the data for the second period are given in Table 13; they show that again these factors did not affect sentences. No measurable relationship is found. The conclusion that emerges from the data on sentences, then, is that punishment for riot of any type except political protest was very much more uniform. Those arrested while taking part in collective violence were to be punished, it would seem, purely for having rioted. Neither their motive, nor the outcome of the riot, was likely to affect their sentence. When seen in conjunction with the greater uniformity in precautionary and policing measures, an overall picture can be seen of a new and more consistent approach to the control of collective violence, political protest always excepted. Riot was ceasing to be interpreted according to its motives; the fact of having engaged in violence was increasingly seen as cause for punishment, whatever

the objective. The private nature of a quarrel was no longer seen as making public interference unnecessary. Here is another sign of the growing interest of the authorities in the life of the streets which Storch and Swift have noted.<sup>603</sup>

The varied sentences and precautionary measures of 1815-35 had been decided by magistrates who owed their legal function to their position as mayor or alderman. They were amateurs in law enforcement. Although amateur magistrates continued to be appointed, their influence was reduced greatly by the appointment in 1836 of a stipendiary magistrate who presided over the vast majority of trials for riot or assault. He also advised the mayor and the committee of magistrates when they considered questions of public order; this body benefited too from the advice of the Head Constable. In less serious cases, the police acted without magisterial advice. The keynote for this period was professionalism. The statistical evidence shows the result. To the professional law enforcer, a riot was a riot; it was a disturbance of the peace which he was to maintain. In writing of the whole range of crime during this period, Emsley has identified a tendency for it to be perceived as "a national and impersonal problem", "perpetrated .... against respectable people..."<sup>604</sup> The result found in the case of riot in Liverpool supports this. Increasingly, the policing of public disorder could be seen as the protection of the right of 'respectable people' to live in a peaceful setting. While the range of preventive and policing measures was as wide as ever, they were now applied more evenly. Small riots in courts and backstreets might be ignored; any riot which came to the notice of the police force by disturbing public thoroughfares or interrupting the smooth running of the town must be prevented or put a stop to, whatever its origin.

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<sup>603</sup> R. D. Storch, "The Plague of the Blue Locusts" in International Journal of Social History, 20, pp. 61-90, and "The Policeman as Domestic Missionary" in Journal of Social History, Summer 1976, pp. 481-509; R. Swift, "Another Stafford Street Row" : Law, Order and the Irish Presence in mid-Victorian Wolverhampton", in R. Swift and S. Gilley (eds.), The Irish in the Victorian City, London, 1985.

<sup>604</sup> C. Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750-1900, London, 1987, p. 42.

Similarly, sentences were no longer much influenced by the category of riot, nor even by its size or severity. This is not to say that individual sentences were more uniform. The range was as wide as ever, but now the individual's actions seem to have been the most important determinant. Inciting others would attract a heavier sentence than following a ringleader. Assaults on bystanders or police outweighed fighting between supposedly willing participants. Anything like theft would increase the sentence. The following examples are drawn from a single incident, the Orange procession of 1851.

|              |                                     |                   |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Josh. Athern | Stonethrowing                       | 10/- or 7 days    |
| Wm. Bates    | Leading mob, being armed            | 10/- or 7 days    |
| Martin Quinn | Stoning police                      | 20/- or 1 month   |
| John Kelly   | Assaulting a woman                  | 40/- or 3 months  |
| Wm Graham    | Being drunk, armed                  | 5/- fine          |
| John Lloyd   | Breaking windows                    | 2/6d fine         |
| Mrs. Collins | Assault on PC and wife              | 100/- or 2 months |
| Mrs. Eslip   | Assault on man carrying orange lily | 2/6d fine         |

The legal notion of the collective guilt of rioters was in practice replaced by a rough -- extremely rough -- approximation to a measurement of individual guilt.

Nor did the uniformity of handling mean that any new theory of riot took over from the ideas of brutish, rational, or criminal motivation of earlier years. The Irish in particular were, as the Stipendiary Magistrate put it, apparently "activated by a spirit as ungovernable and reckless as .... savages."<sup>605</sup> According to Head Constable Dowling, Irish districts "but for the presence of the police would be a scene of constant uproar and bloodshed."<sup>606</sup> It was not the Irish alone,

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<sup>605</sup> Liverpool Mail, 13 July 1844.

<sup>606</sup> LRO 352 MIN/WAT 1/5, p. 5, 28 Jul 1849.

however, who were held to be so wild. Increasing references to "roughs" occur. Pearson<sup>607</sup> points out that fears of "roughs" were to increase over the next twenty or thirty years, culminating in the 1880s, the decade when Stedman Jones<sup>608</sup> has identified a crisis in public confidence caused by fears of "the residuum". Stevenson<sup>609</sup> notes that after 1848 the Irish and the "roughs" between them increasingly took the blame for the persistence of disorder. Storch has claimed that as early as the 1830s and 1840s the lower orders were feared because they "aimed somehow at the utter unravelling of society."<sup>610</sup> This is rather too dramatic to be accepted unqualified as a description of the position in Liverpool, but faint echoes of such ideas are discernible. Emsley's picture of more rational fears of the residual 'dangerous classes', which he identifies as a major influence on perceptions of crime in the mid nineteenth century, fits the case much better.<sup>611</sup> "Instead of respectable workingmen," the Head Constable was on one occasions confronted with "the blackguards from Vauxhall Road and Toxteth Park."<sup>612</sup> And there were frequent cases where "brutish" and "criminal" ideas are linked. The element of criminality came to be mentioned more frequently in reports of riot, in combination with brutal love of disorder; large numbers of men were, it was claimed, "suffered to live by thieving and disorderly conduct."<sup>613</sup> The Bread Riots of 1855 were in this way blamed on "... the lowest

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<sup>607</sup> Geoffrey Pearson, Hooligan: a History of Respectable Fears, London, 1983.

<sup>608</sup> G Stedman Jones, Outcast London, Harmondsworth, 1984, Chapter 16, pp. 281-314.

<sup>609</sup> John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England, 1700-1870, London & New York, 1979, p. 300.

<sup>610</sup> R D Storch, "The Plague of the Blue Locusts: Police Reform and Popular Resistance in Northern England. 1840-1857" in Fitzgerald et al (eds), Crime and Society, London and Henley, p. 87.

<sup>611</sup> C. Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750 to 1900, London, 1987, chapter 3, pages 48-77.

<sup>612</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 14 Mar 1848.

<sup>613</sup> Liverpool Courier, 16 Mar 1836.



and vilest .... those who are not in the habit of working honestly for a livelihood .. <sup>614</sup> In this case, the constant harping on the criminal nature of the crowd is so laboured that it displays an insistent anxiety to deny that the rioters had any reason to steal bread. Thefts of roast meat were put forward as "proof" that these rioters were mere criminals whom it was right to punish savagely. The constant hammering at this point suggests that there was a need to answer an argument which nobody in fact put forward: that starving people might be justified in stealing bread. Between the lines, the theory of rational riot peeps through, only to be forcibly obscured by a concentrated insistence on the brutality and criminality of the rioters which justified heavy punishment.

The ghost of rational riot was also seen at a trial for assault on the police originating in police attempts to protect an open-air preacher. The Recorder argued that the police were wrong to arrest those disturbing so misplaced a sermon; despite the presence of a clergyman, the accused had "every right" to protest verbally.<sup>615</sup> The use of violence in trade disputes was also commonly seen as understandable although misguided, as the frequent explications of magistrates show. Yet such cases were relatively infrequent. In the main, although all three theories of motivation -- brutal, criminal, and rational -- were still recognisable, they were discernibly merging into one idea of a "brutish and criminal" section of society which could take the blame for the majority of cases of disorder, even if evidence had to be ignored as in 1855. This had the advantage that the measures of punishment seen as necessary to the maintenance of order could also be seen to be deserved.

There was still one great exception to this approach. Political protest still had the power to create panic among the magistrates. The events of 1848 were the most notable example; demands for troops, and even for a gunboat; constant communication with the Home Office; a petition for the suspension of Habeas Corpus; rumours of a conspiracy to destroy shipping; the draconian dismissals of hundreds of workmen who refused to enrol as special constables. The 'Plug Plot' problems of 1842 had provoked similar although more muted reaction. It

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<sup>614</sup> Liverpool Mercury, 20 Feb 1855.

<sup>615</sup> Liverpool Courier, 19 May 1852.

might be argued that the sentences for the 1848 conspirators should not be compared with those for other forms of riot, as they were after all pronounced by the courts which were dealing with the Chartist "rising" of that year, and thus under the influence of national rather than local events. The attempted Irish revolution also affected the issue. Too much should not be made of twelve sentences among so many, and this data would in any case be unnecessary as the attention paid to precautions speaks for itself. Nevertheless, the sentences were well outside the normal range.

Subversive riot, then, was still feared in 1848 as it had been earlier. Nor did the idea of its dangers die quickly. In 1853, the Mayor still argued for the maintenance of a military force in the town because troops "would if an emergency should arise have a powerful effect in overawing the disaffected and designing."<sup>616</sup> Nevertheless, other types of riot were being taken more seriously than previously, and it is uncertain which type of riot, criminal or subversive, was in the mind of the Inspector of Constabulary Forces in 1859 when he remarked that the military skills of the Liverpool Police Force were proof against "disturbers of the public peace, however numerous .... "<sup>617</sup>

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<sup>616</sup> HO45.5128 fo 540, Mayor to General Viscount Hardinge, 21 Feb 1853.

<sup>617</sup> 1860 LVII.527 Reports of Inspector of Constabulary .... 1859, p. 61 (587).

## Appendix 1: Statistics and Coding of Data

The choice of statistical test is dependent on the information available. The most accurate require data expressed as numbers whose value is directly related to the variable being measured; an example might be income expressed in pounds, where ten thousand is exactly twice as large as twenty thousand. In this study, this quality is not available. For example, the size of an incident (the number of people involved) is never accurately known. The numbers 1 to 5 are used, in ascending order of size; each corresponds to a range of values. An incident of size 4 is larger than one of size 2, but it is not twice as large. This means that the tests used must be based on the principal of arranging items in order of size and using their rank rather than their numeric values. Such tests are referred to as 'non-parametric'.

Other variables cannot be measured in any numeric fashion; they can merely be labelled. The type of riot is such a variable. A type 2 riot, a "private battle", is neither larger nor smaller than a type 4 riot, "direct action"; it is merely different.

Where two codes can both be taken to show order of magnitude, a nonparametric correlation coefficient can be calculated. This shows the degree to which an increase in the first variable is associated with an increase or decrease in the second, expressed as a number between +1 and -1. The test used is the Spearman coefficient of correlation. Where one of the codes can only be regarded as a label, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance has been used. This sorts items into order according to variable A (for example, length of sentence) and calculates the mean ranks of groups selected according to variable B (for example, type of riot), then answers the question "how likely is it that this difference is the result of chance?" For example, when sentences are grouped according to the type of riot to which they relate, it appears that some types were more severely punished than others, and are thus consistently ranked higher when sorted. This might result from a real difference, or it might be that random

accidents have affected the chances of survival of data to produce a misleading sample. The test provides a numerical value of one or less which measures the probability that the difference found came about by chance, the true distribution of sentences being the same for riots of all types. The lower this value, the less probable it is that chance alone could have produced the apparent difference. A similar 'significance level' is calculated for the non-parametric correlation coefficient, similarly giving the probability that the result could be produced by chance.

These calculations were performed using SPSS-X (the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, extended version) on Liverpool University's IBM 3081 computer. My thanks are due to the Director of the Computer Laboratory, Dr. J. L. Schonfelder, for allowing me to use these facilities, and for the use of the SCRIPT wordprocessing package and the 7171 laser printer. I must also thank the many members of the Laboratory's staff who gave me the benefit of their computing expertise.

The following pages give a key to the interpretation of the codes and abbreviations used, followed by listings of the data and then by the results of calculations done using SPSS-X.

## *Interpretation of Data*

### First Line for Each Incident:

No: Incident number, arbitrarily allocated in approximate date order, with gaps to allow for amendments.

|               |                 |
|---------------|-----------------|
| 1st Character | 0 for 1815-1835 |
|               | 1 for 1836-1844 |
|               | 2 for 1844-1852 |
|               | 3 for 1852-1860 |

Date: Date; 00 means exact date uncertain;  
R = date of report, rather than incident.

Description: Highly abbreviated account of events.

RUO = Riot of unknown origin

NV = no violence

|       |                    |                       |
|-------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Type: | 1 = Unknown        | 5 = Election          |
|       | 2 = Private Battle | 6 = Anti-Police       |
|       | 3 = Sectarian      | 7 = Trade Dispute     |
|       | 4 = Direct Action  | 8 = Political Protest |

|       |             |                    |
|-------|-------------|--------------------|
| Size: | 1 = 10-24   | 4 = 500-1999       |
|       | 2 = 25-99   | 5 = 2000 +         |
|       | 3 = 100-499 | 9 = No Information |

Sevy: Severity:-

0 = No violence

1 = Jostling, verbal threats

2 = Minor injury, persons or property, or arms (inc stones)  
carried

3 = Major injury, 5 or less persons, major damage, or use of  
arms.

4 = As 3, 6 -10 victims, or life in danger, 5 or less victims.

5 = Death, or otherwise greater than (4).

9 = No information

Dum:           Duration:-

1 = 30 Min or less

2 = 30-90 Min

3 = 90 Min-3 Hrs.

4 = 3-12 Hrs.

5 = 12 Hrs or more

9 = No information

Locn:           Location:-

1 = Court or backstreet, poor district

2 = Street, poor district

3 = Workplace, field, etc.

4 = Street, well-to-do area (usually city centre)

5 = Widespread, more than one of above

9 = No information

Prec:           Precautions:-

0 = None, or not applicable

1 = Collection of information

2 = Attempt to prevent meeting etc.

3 = Police in place prior to meeting

4 = 3 & 2

5 = Use of special constables

6 = Armed or mounted police

7 = Troops standing by

9 = No information

Pol:           Policing:-

0 = None, or not applicable

1 = Normal policing (inc ad-hoc reinforcements)

2 = Minor rearrangement, e.g. reinforcements sent from station

3 = Major rearrangement, e.g. whole force mobilised, specials

4 = Armed or mounted police

5 = Troops

9 = No information

Arres:            Number of arrests;

-1 = no information

FOLLOWING LINE(S)

Sentences in days:-

-2 = prisoner acquitted

-1 = sentence unknown

Both above values treated as "missing values" in statistical tests.

0 = no custodial sentence (e.g. prisoner cautioned)

9998 = life imprisonment, life transportation

Note that since non-parametric tests are used this need not be numerically equivalent to the severity of the sentence, so long as it is higher than any lesser sentence.





## **Appendix 2: Riot Data**

# Details of Incidents, data coded as described in Appendix 1

| No. Date         | Description  | Type | Size | Sevy | Durn | Loen | Prec | Pol | Arns |
|------------------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| 0010 25-Jan-16 R | SENTENCE ONLY RUO<br>90 0 0 0 0 0  | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9   | 1    |
| 0020 02-May-16R  | SENTENCE ONLY RUO<br>540   | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9   | 7    |
| 0030 09-Jun-16   | RIOTOUS ELECTION<br>180 180 180 180 180 180  | 5    | 4    | 9    | 3    | 5    | 5    | 3   | 0    |
| 0040 04-Jul-17   | ILLEGAL POLIT MEETING, NV  | 8    | 4    | 0    | 3    | 4    | 9    | 0   | -1   |
| 0050 22-Jun-19   | RESCUE OF THIEF, DOCKLAND  | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 12   |
| 0060 22-Jun-19   | RESCUE OF 2 WOMEN, DOCKLAND<br>540 540 540 540 -2 540 540 540 540  | 6    | 5    | 3    | 3    | 3    | 0    | 5   | 1    |
| 0060 540 540     |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 0070 23-Jun-19   | POLICE SEEKING RIOTERS ATTACKED<br>7   | 6    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 12   |
| 0080 12-Jul-19   | ATTACK ON ORANGE PROCESSION<br>90 90 90 90 90 90 180 90 90<br>-1 90 90                                   | 3    | 3    | 4    | 3    | 4    | 0    | 5   | 0    |
| 0090 30-Aug-19   | ILLEGAL POLIT MEETING, NV  | 8    | 5    | 0    | 3    | 4    | 7    | 9   | 0    |
| 0100 29-Nov-19R  | COBBETT'S MEETING  | 8    | 5    | 1    | 3    | 4    | 3    | 9   | -1   |
| 0110 01-Mar-20   | RIOTOUS ELECTION   | 5    | 5    | 9    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 3   | 8    |
| 0120 12-Jul-20   | ATTACK ON ORANGE PROCESSION<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1   | 3    | 3    | 9    | 9    | 4    | 2    | 9   | 0    |
| 0130 20-Nov-20   | QUEEN'S ACQUITTAL PROCN., NV   | 8    | 5    | 0    | 4    | 5    | 2    | 9   | 0    |
| 0150 29-Mar-22R  | SHIPWRIGHTS ATTACK BLACKLEGS   | 7    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 3    | 0    | 9   | 7    |
| 0160 21-Mar-23R  | ROPER'S ATTACK BLACKLEGS<br>30 30 30 60 60 60  | 7    | 2    | 2    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 9   | 2    |
| 0165 07-Jun-22 R | THEATRE RIOT<br>-1 -1  | 4    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 9    | 9   | 5    |
| 0170 12-Jul-23   | ATTACK ON ORANGEMEN<br>180 180 180 180 180   | 3    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 0180 17-Dec-23   | ATTACK ON BLACKLEG SHIPSAWYER<br>0 360 -2 360  | 7    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 9   | 0    |
| 0190 28-May-24   | ATTACK ON WATCHMEN   | 6    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 0200 13-Dec-24   | THEATRE RIOT   | 4    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 2   | 5    |
| 0205 15-Dec-24   | REPETITION OF 0200<br>-2 0 0 90 -2   | 4    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 3    | 2   | 18   |
| 0210 08-Nov-25   | ROPER'S CHARIVARI<br>120 120 120 120 -2 180 -2 120 120<br>-2 120 120 -2 120 -1 180 180 180               | 7    | 3    | 3    | 3    | 5    | 0    | 2   | 5    |
| 0220 16-Nov-25   | ROSANNAH GANG RESCUE<br>360 360 360 -1 -1  | 6    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 4    | 0    | 2   | 6    |
| 0230 15-Dec-25 R | ATTACK ON WATCHMEN<br>90 180 90 -1 90 90   | 6    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 9   | 9    |
| 0250 23-Jan-26 R | RUO, LOVE LANE<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1   | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 9   | 3    |
| 0260 25-Jan-26 R | RESCUE & ATTACK ON TIDEWAITER<br>720 720 720   | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 9   | -1   |
| 0270 17-Mar-26   | ST. PATRICK'S DAY BATTLE   | 2    | 4    | 4    | 9    | 5    | 9    | 9   | -1   |
| 0280 17-Jun-26   | RIOTOUS ELECTION   | 5    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 4    | 9    | 9   | 0    |
| 0290 19-Aug-26   | CHILD RESCUED FROM DRUNK   | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 0300 23-Sep-26 R | BOYS' BATTLE<br>-1 -1  | 2    | 3    | 2    | 5    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 9    |
| 0310 23-Sep-26 R | FACTION FIGHT & RESCUE<br>0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  | 2    | 9    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | -1   |
| 0320 13-Nov-26   | BUILDERS THREATEN BLACKLEGS  | 7    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 5    | 9    | 9   | 0    |
| 0330 19-Apr-27 R | SHIPWRIGHTS ATTACK APPRENTICES   | 7    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 7    | 9   | 0    |
| 0340 19-Apr-27 R | SHIPWRIGHTS BURN EFFIGY  | 7    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 7    | 9   | 0    |
| 0350 21-May-27   | SP. CONS. DISPERSE SHIPWRIGHTS   | 7    | 4    | 0    | 2    | 3    | 7    | 3   | 7    |
| 0360 05-Jun-27   | TROOPS GUARD BLACKLEG SHIPWRTS<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1  | 7    | 3    | 1    | 5    | 3    | 7    | 5   | 4    |
| 0370 01-Oct-27   | ATTACK ON WATCHMEN & RUO<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1  | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9   | 8    |
| 0380 15-Dec-27   | ATTACK ON WATCHMEN & RUO<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1   | 6    | 2    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 2    |
| 0390 07-Jul-29   | NAVIES ATTACK HOUSEHOLDER<br>-1 -1   | 1    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 2   | 10   |
| 0400 01-Apr-30   | ATTACK ON WATCHMEN<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1   | 6    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 5    |
| 0405 01-Aug-30   | RIOT AT SEIZURE OF STILL<br>-2 360 270 360 360   | 6    | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9   | 0    |
| 0410 10-Aug-30   | NAVIES ATTACK PASSERS-BY   | 2    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 0   | -1   |
| 0420 25-Nov-30   | ELECTION PRECAUTIONS   | 5    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 5    | 5    | 9   | 3    |
| 0425 24-Dec-30 R | PRIZEFIGHT RIOT, TOXTETH PARK<br>-1 -1 -1  | 6    | 4    | 4    | 2    | 9    | 0    | 2   | -1   |
| 0430 05-Apr-31 R | POLITICAL WINDOW-BREAKING  | 8    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 4    | 9    | 9   | 2    |
| 0440 21-Apr-31 R | SENTENCE ONLY, RUO<br>90 90  | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9   | -1   |
| 0450 02-May-31   | ELECTION CANDIDATE INSULTED  | 5    | 4    | 1    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 3   | 0    |
| 0460 26-Jun-31   | LOUNGERS ATTACK HOUSEHOLDER  | 1    | 1    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 1   | 5    |
| 0470 02-Oct-31   | RIOT AT SEIZURE OF STILL<br>-1 120 240 120 210   | 6    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 2   | 0    |
| 0480 18-Oct-31   | POLIT. EFFIGY BURNT  | 5    | 4    | 1    | 4    | 5    | 9    | 9   | -1   |
| 0490 21-Oct-31   | RIOTOUS ELECTION   | 5    | 5    | 2    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 3   | 0    |
| 0500 01-Nov-31   | REFORM MEETINGS, NV  | 8    | 5    | 0    | 3    | 4    | 7    | 9   | 0    |
| 0520 29-May-32   | CHOLERA, T.P.K., DOCTORS STONED  | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 3   | 1    |
| 0530 01-Jun-32   | CHOLERA, VAUXHALL RD.<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1  | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 2   | 0    |
| 0540 02-Jun-32   | CHOLERA HOSPITAL SURROUNDED  | 4    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 0    |
| 0550 02-Jun-32   | CHOLERA: WOMAN ATTACKED  | 4    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 9   | 4    |
| 0560 02-Jun-32   | CHOLERA: PALANQUIN ATTACKED  | 4    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 2   | -1   |
| 0570 03-Jun-32   | CHOLERA: DOCTOR ATTACKED   | 4    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 0580 09-Jun-32   | CHOLERA, CHISEHALE ST.   | 4    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 2   | 0    |
| 0590 10-Jun-32   | CHOLERA: POLICE THREATENED   | 4    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 2   | 1    |
| 0600 10-Jun-32   | CHOLERA, GT. HOWARD ST.<br>-1  | 4    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 0610 19-Sep-32   | SHOEMAKERS ATTACK BLACKLEG<br>-1 -1  | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 3    | 2   | -1   |
| 0620 01-Dec-32   | RIOTOUS ELECTION   | 5    | 5    | 1    | 5    | 4    | 3    | 3   | 0    |
| 0630 01-Sep-33   | BLACKLEG BRICKLAYERS ATTACKED  | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 3    | 2   | 4    |
| 0640 23-Nov-33   | RUO 1 1 4 9 2 0 2 2<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1  | 1    | 9    | 5    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9   | 23   |
| 0650 27-Dec-33   | MURDER CHARGE ARISING FROM RUO<br>-1 -1  | 1    | 9    | 5    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9   | 23   |
| 0660 02-Mar-34   | CHESHIRE FACTION FIGHT<br>270 30 270 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2<br>-2 -1 -1 -2 30 270 270 90 90<br>-2 -2 -2 -2 30 | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 1    |

| No. Date         | Description                               | Type | Size | Sevy | Durn | Loen | Prec | Pol | Arss |
|------------------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| 0670 01-Nov-34   | SCHOOLBOY BATTLES, HOPE ST.               | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
| 0680 02-Jan-35   | RIOTOUS ELECTION                          | 5    | 4    | 3    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 3   | 2    |
| 0685 26-Jan-35   | ATTACK ON BLACKLEG SHOEMAKER              | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 9    | 9   | 0    |
| 0690 01-Feb-35   | 360 360 SCHOOLBOY BATTLES, DUKE ST.       | 2    | 2    | 2    | 9    | 4    | 0    | 2   | 15   |
| 0700 01-Feb-35   | IRISH ROW, STOCKDALE ST.                  | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 2   | -1   |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1                   |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 0710 17-Mar-35   | ST. PATRICK'S DAY FIGHTS                  | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 5    | 9    | 9   | 5    |
| 0720 17-May-35   | PRESTON ST. VS NORTH ST.                  | 2    | 3    | 2    | 3    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 52   |
| 0730 12-Jul-35   | 0 0 0 0 0 ORANGE DAY, AND ATTACK ON WATCH | 3    | 5    | 4    | 5    | 2    | 0    | 5   | 1    |
|                  | 120 60 60 60 60 60 180 60 60              |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 60 60 60 60 90 60 120 90 180              |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 60 60 60 60 120 60 120 60 60              |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 60 120              |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 60 90 60 60 60 120 60 60 60               |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 30 60 60 60 60 120 90                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 0740 07-Aug-35R  | ATTACK ON ORANGEMAN                       | 3    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 0750 02-Oct-35 R | 30 ROPERS ATTACK EMPLOYERS                | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 9   | 2    |
| 0760 09-Oct-35 R | ATTACK ON TEMPERANCE MEETING              | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
|                  | 60 60                                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 0770 13-Nov-35R  | ATTACK ON BLACKLEG IRONFOUNDER            | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 9   | 0    |
| 1010 29-Jan-36 R | NV O'CONNELL MEETING, POLICED             | 8    | 4    | 0    | 2    | 4    | 3    | 3   | 2    |
| 1020 10-Mar-36   | PUB FIGHT ENDS IN GENERAL BATTLE          | 1    | 1    | 4    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
|                  | -1 -1                                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1030 17-Mar-36   | NV ST. PAT'S PROCESSION                   | 3    | 5    | 0    | 4    | 5    | 2    | 9   | 1    |
| 1040 25-Mar-36R  | RESCUE ATTEMPT, DRUNKEN WOMAN             | 6    | 2    | 9    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 9   | 14   |
|                  | 10  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1050 17-Apr-36   | RESCUE, 2 MEN, ASSAULT                    | 6    | 2    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 4    |
|                  | 90 60 90 60 90 90 30 180                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 30                            |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1055 19-Jun-36   | GANG EXPEL TENANT FROM HOUSE              | 4    | 1    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 14   |
|                  | 0 0 0 0                                   |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1060 27-Jun-36   | RESCUE, MAN, FIGHTING                     | 6    | 3    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 16   |
|                  | 21 7 -2 18 -2 21 -2 -2 -2                 |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 21 21 21 -2 21                            |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1070 01-Jul-36 R | RESCUE AND BATTLE WITH POLICE             | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
|                  | 35 35 35 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 35                |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -2 -2 0 35 -1 -1 35                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1080 05-Jul-36   | ATTACK ON POLICE IN PUB                   | 6    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
|                  | 14 18                                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1090 15-Jul-36 R | ATTACKS ON CORPORATION SCHOLARS           | 3    | 1    | 2    | 5    | 5    | 9    | 9   | 0    |
| 1100 22-Sep-36 R | STONES THROWN AT CORP. SCHOLARS           | 3    | 1    | 2    | 5    | 2    | 9    | 9   | 1    |
| 1110 08-Dec-36   | ATTACK ON TEMPERANCE MEETING              | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 6    |
|                  | 0   |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1120 11-Mar-37   | US MATES ENFORCE THEIR AUTHORITY          | 4    | 2    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 1    |
|                  | 60 60 60 60 60 60                         |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1130 04-Apr-37   | COOPERS' STRIKE, THREATS                  | 7    | 1    | 1    | 5    | 5    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
|                  | 0   |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1135 11-May-37R  | COOPERS' STRIKE, ASSAULT                  | 7    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 3    | 2   | 6    |
|                  | 30  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1140 04-Jun-37   | POLICE STOP 'ROW' AND ARE ATTACKED        | 6    | 2    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 26   |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1                         |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1150 23-Jul-37   | RIOTOUS ELECTION                          | 5    | 4    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 7    | 4   | 2    |
|                  | 21 0 5 0 21 0 8 16 30                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 0 0 -2 30 0 -1 0 30 10                    |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0                           |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1160 09-Aug-37R  | IRISH HARVESTERS ATTACK GENTLEMAN         | 1    | 1    | 9    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 15   |
|                  | 60 60                                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1170 07-May-38   | POLICE STOP FIGHT & ARE ATTACKED          | 6    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 10   |
|                  | -2 60 -2 60 60 -2 -2 -2 60                |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 60                         |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1180 20-May-38   | INSPECTOR KILLED STOPPING PRIZEFIGHT      | 6    | 4    | 5    | 2    | 3    | 0    | 2   | 7    |
|                  | 9998 9998 9998 -2 -2 9998 9998 -2 9998    |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1190 28-Jun-38   | RUO & ATTACK ON POLICE                    | 6    | 3    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
|                  | 30 30 30 30 360 360 30                    |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1200 25-Sep-38   | DISRUPTION OF CHARTIST MEETING            | 8    | 4    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 9    | 9   | 2    |
| 1210 29-Sep-38 R | SAILORS ATTACK POLICE                     | 6    | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 1   | 3    |
|                  | 16 16                                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1220 02-Oct-38 R | RESCUE, ATTACKER OF POLICE INFORMANTS     | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1    | 2   |      |
|                  | 30 30 60                                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1230 06-Oct-38 R | POLICE ATTACKED BY BOATMEN                | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 2   | 2    |
|                  | 60 60                                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1240 17-Mar-39   | STABBING DURING ST. PAT'S                 | 1    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 5    | 9    | 9   | 0    |
|                  | -2 60                                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1250 20-Apr-39   | IRISH ROW                                 | 1    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 1   | 0    |
| 1255 20-Apr-39   | IRISH ROW                                 | 1    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 1   | 0    |
| 1260 20-May-39   | FREEMEN DISRUPT RADICAL MEETING           | 8    | 5    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 3    | 3   | 5    |
| 1270 25-May-39R  | IRISH ROW RE. HOUSE TENANCY               | 4    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 16   |
|                  | 60 -2 60 -2 60                            |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1280 30-May-39R  | CARPENTERS' DAY ATTACK ON IRISH           | 3    | 4    | 4    | 5    | 2    | 2    | 4   | 0    |
|                  | 11 0 0 0 -2 -1 -1 -1 -2                   |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -2 -2 -1 11 -2 -1 0                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1290 11-Jun-39 R | ATTACK ON PC STOPPING FIGHT               | 6    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 11   |
| 1300 01-Jul-39   | CARTERS' STRIKE, MINOR DISORDER           | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 1   | 33   |
|                  | 30 2 2 30 30 30 30 30 30                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 2 30                                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1310 12-Dec-39 R | BEARBAITING; AUDIENCE ATTACK POLICE       | 6    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 2   | -1   |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1                |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1                |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1                |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1320 18-May-40   | 'RENTAMOB' SEIZURE OF SHIP                | 4    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 3    | 0    | 2   | 0    |
| 1330 29-May-40   | CARPENTERS' DAY, MINOR DISORDER           | 3    | 3    | 1    | 4    | 5    | 3    | 3   | 8    |
| 1340 15-Jul-40 R | BRICKMAKERS ATTACK BLACKLEGS              | 7    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 9   | 15   |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 90 90 90                   |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1350 08-Nov-40   | IRISH BATTLE, NORTH VS SOUTH              | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
|                  | -1 90 90 -1 -1 -1 90 -1 120               |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -2 -2 -2 90 -1                         |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1360 28-Jan-41   | WOMEN ATTACK BLACKLEG'S WIFE              | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 1   | 0    |
|                  | -2 -2 -2 0                                |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 1370 05-Feb-41 R | POLICE PROTECT PRINTER VS STRIKERS        | 7    | 1    | 1    | 5    | 3    | 3    | 2   | 0    |
| 1380 19-Feb-41 R | O'CONNELL; MJW'S DEFENCE                  | 8    | 3    | 0    | 0    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 1390 17-Mar-41   | ST. PAT'S PROCESSION, NV                  | 1    | 9    | 1    | 4    | 9    | 9    | 9   | 1    |
|                  | 0   |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |

| No. Date         | Description                          | Type | Size | Sevy | Durn | Loen | Prece | Pol | Arre |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-----|------|
| 1400 19-Apr-41   | WINDOW BROKEN ON 'LIFTING MONDAY'    | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1410 27-Apr-41   | TORIES AT REFORM MEETING ATTACKED    | 8    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 9     | 9   | 0    |
| 1420 31-May-41   | CARPENTERS' DAY, MINOR DISORDER      | 3    | 3    | 0    | 0    | 5    | 3     | 3   | 0    |
| 1430 09-Jun-41   | ATTACK ON CORN-LAW MEETING           | 8    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 3     | 3   | 0    |
| 1440 11-Jun-41   | REVENGE FOR INCIDENT 1430            | 8    | 4    | 3    | 3    | 5    | 9     | 4   | 2    |
| 1450 25-Jun-41 R | SHIPWRIGHTS DISCIPLINE YOUTH         | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0     | 1   | 59   |
| 1460 30-Jun-41   | RIOTOUS ELECTION                     | 5    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 7     | 4   | 0    |
| 1470 12-Jul-41   | SECTARIAN TEMPERANCE PROCESSION      | 3    | 9    | 0    | 0    | 5    | 3     | 3   | 19   |
| 1480 27-Jan-42 R | PROTEST WITHIN WORKHOUSE             | 4    | 1    | 3    | 9    | 3    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1490 17-Mar-42   | PRECAUTIONS FOR ST. PAT'S            | 3    | 3    | 0    | 9    | 5    | 3     | 2   | 0    |
| 1500 18-Mar-42   | RESCUE OF BOYS FROM SHIP'S CAPTAIN   | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0     | 1   | 4    |
| 1510 20-Jun-42 R | RUO, SCOTLAND RD.                    | 1    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1520 24-Jun-42 R | FALSE REPORT OF SECTARIAN RIOT       | 3    | 9    | 0    | 0    | 9    | 0     | 2   | 3    |
| 1530 24-Jun-42 R | RESCUE OF 'VAGABONDS' FROM POLICE    | 6    | 1    | 9    | 1    | 9    | 0     | 1   | 19   |
| 1540 12-Jul-42   | ORANGE DAY DISORDER                  | 3    | 5    | 2    | 5    | 5    | 7     | 4   | 1    |
| 1550 28-Jul-42   | RUO, ORANGE ST.                      | 1    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1560 16-Aug-42   | PLUG PLOT FEARS                      | 8    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 9    | 5     | 3   | 6    |
| 1570 03-Nov-42   | SHIPWRIGHTS ATTACK 'FOREIGNERS'      | 7    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 9     | 9   | 4    |
| 1580 08-Nov-42   | SHIPWRIGHTS ATTACK BLACKLEG          | 7    | 1    | 9    | 1    | 3    | 0     | 1   | 4    |
| 1590 24-Dec-42   | IRISH ROW, LACE ST.                  | 1    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 4    |
| 1590 60 60       | AFFRAY BETWEEN POLICE & SOLDIERS     | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1600 07-Jan-43 R | ST. PAT'S PROCESSION OUTSIDE BOROUGH | 3    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 5    | 2     | 9   | 0    |
| 1610 17-Mar-43   | ORANGE FUNERAL, NV                   | 9    | 0    | 2    | 9    | 0    | 2     | 1   |      |
| 1620 07-Apr-43 R | AFFRAY BETWEEN POLICE & SOLDIERS     | 6    | 2    | 9    | 1    | 4    | 0     | 1   | 3    |
| 1630 21-Apr-43 R | SENTENCES ONLY, RUO                  | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9     | 9   | 0    |
| 1640 22-Apr-43 R | DOCK STRIKE, NV                      | 7    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 3    | 3     | 2   | -1   |
| 1650 28-Apr-43 R | CORN-LAW MEETING DISTURBED           | 8    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1660 12-May-43R  | CHARTIST/REPEAL MEETING DISTURBED    | 8    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 9    | 0     | 2   | 1    |
| 1670 09-Jun-43 R | POLICE STONED WHILE ARRESTING THIEF  | 6    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1680 12-Jul-43   | POLICE STONED, DISPERSING YOUTHS     | 6    | 2    | 3    | 1    | 4    | 0     | 1   | 1    |
| 1690 04-Aug-43   | ATTACK ON REPEAL MEETING             | 3    | 3    | 4    | 2    | 4    | 3     | 3   | 1    |
| 1700 12-Sep-43   | RESCUE BY IRONFOUNDERS               | 6    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1710 19-Jan-44 R | O'CONNELL MEETING, NV                | 8    | 9    | 0    | 0    | 4    | 3     | 3   | 0    |
| 1720 28-Mar-44   | PEACEFUL ORANGE PROCESSION           | 3    | 2    | 0    | 2    | 5    | 9     | 3   | 2    |
| 1730 08-Apr-44   | RUO, MARYBONE                        | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 1740 17-Apr-44 R | RESCUE OF DRUNKEN SOLDIERS           | 6    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 4    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 2010 24-Apr-44 R | LIFTING MONDAY, RESISTANCE TO POLICE | 6    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0     | 1   | 2    |
| 2020 08-Apr-44   | RESCUE; NO DETAILS                   | 6    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | -1   |
| 2030 08-Apr-44   | ORANGE DEMONSTRATION, TOXTETH        | 3    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 5    | 0     | 2   | 4    |
| 2040 08-Apr-44   | RESCUE OF DRUNK                      | 6    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 1    |
| 2050 22-Jun-44 R | FIGHT BETWEEN 2 IRISH COUNTIES       | 2    | 3    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 0     | 1   | -1   |
| 2060 30-Jun-44   | SKIRMISHES AT LARGE ORANGE PROCN     | 3    | 5    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 3     | 3   | -1   |
| 2070 12-Jul-44   | BATTLE, MACDONALDS AND KELLYS        | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 0     | 2   | 0    |
| 2080 24-Aug-44R  | RESCUE, PRISONER MUCH INJURED        | 6    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 9    | 0     | 1   | -1   |
| 2090 14-Sep-44 R | DISTURBANCE DURING ST PAT'S PROCN    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 5    | 4     | 3   | 10   |
| 2100 17-Mar-45   | LIFTING MONDAY, RESIST. TO POLICE    | 6    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | -1   |
| 2110 17-Mar-45   | RESCUE OF DRUNK                      | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 4    |
| 2120 28-Mar-45R  | VIOLENT PICKETING, DOCK-BUILDERS     | 7    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 3    | 0     | 1   | 4    |
| 2130 16-May-45R  | RESCUE                               | 6    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 12   |
| 2140 30-May-45   | ORANGE FUNERAL                       | 3    | 4    | 3    | 3    | 5    | 0     | 3   | 0    |
| 2150 27-May-45   | AFTERMATH OF 2160                    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 2    | 3     | 3   | 14   |
| 2160 06-Jul-45   | MINOR SKIRMISHES ON ORANGE DAY       | 3    | 5    | 3    | 3    | 5    | 3     | 3   | -1   |
| 2170 14-Jul-45   | ATTACK ON PC WHO STRUCK A WOMAN      | 6    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 1    |
| 2180 25-Jul-45 R | POLICE INTERVENE IN RUO              | 1    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 2190 29-Nov-45   | NOISY NV MTG OF WORKING CLASSES      | 8    | 4    | 0    | 2    | 4    | 9     | 9   | 0    |
| 2200 31-Jan-46 R | DRUNKEN BUT NV ST PAT'S PROCN        | 3    | 4    | 0    | 3    | 5    | 4     | 3   | -1   |
| 2210 17-Mar-46   | BATTLE AMONGST URCHINS, WINDSOR      | 2    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 5    |
| 2215 28-Mar-46   | POLICE INTERVENE IN RUO              | 1    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 0     | 1   | -1   |
| 2220 08-May-46R  | SCUFFLES DURING ORANGE PROCN         | 3    | 3    | 1    | 3    | 5    | 4     | 3   | -1   |
| 2225 13-Jul-46   | ROW, POLICE VS COALHEAVERS           | 1    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | -1   |
| 2230 07-Aug-46   | DISTURBANCE AT SAILORS' HOME         | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 0     | 2   | 8    |
| 2235 11-Aug-46R  | RESCUE                               | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0     | 1   | 3    |
| 2240 14-Aug-46R  | SHIPWRIGHTS ASSAULT NON-L'POOL MEN   | 7    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 3    | 0     | 1   | 1    |
| 2245 19-Aug-46   | POLICE VS CLUBMEMBERS OUTSIDE PUB    | 6    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 1    |
| 2250 22-Sep-46 R | RESCUE                               | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 2    | 0     | 1   | 0    |
| 2255 17-Oct-46 R | SMALL AND NV ST PAT'S PROCN          | 3    | 3    | 0    | 3    | 5    | 9     | 9   | 2    |
| 2260 17-Mar-47   |                                      |      |      |      |      |      |       |     |      |

| No. Date         | Description  | Type | Size | Sevy | Durn | Loen | Prec | Pol | Arss |
|------------------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| 2255 22-May-47   | RESCUE OF MAN ARRESTED ON WARRANT<br>60 60                           | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 3    |
| 2270 30-Mar-47   | ATTACK BY ROPERS ON WOMEN WORKERS<br>240 180 180                     | 7    | 1    | 9    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 6    |
| 2275 30-May-47   | POLICE ATTACKED PARTING 2 FIGHTERS<br>-1 120 120 120 150 14 -1       | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 2280 25-Jun-47 R | POLICE ATTACKED BREAKING UP ROW<br>60 42 42 30                       | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2285 31-Jul-47 R | ELECTION, NV   | 5    | 9    | 0    | 9    | 5    | 3    | 3   | 8    |
| 2290 31-Jul-47   | RESCUE<br>-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 60                                       | 6    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2295 23-Aug-47 R | ATTACK(S) ON NON-STRIKING ROPER<br>0 60                              | 7    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
| 2300 27-Oct-47 R | BATTLE, STONES BET. 2 SCHOOLS  | 2    | 2    | 3    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2305 23-Oct-47 R | ASSAULTS ON STRIKE-BREAKING ROPERS<br>60 -1                          | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2310 07-Jan-48 R | RUMOURS OF ROW AMONGST NAVVIES?                                      | 1    | 9    | 0    | 9    | 5    | 6    | 0   | 0    |
| 2315 07-Mar-48 F | DOCKERS' MEETINGS VS NEW SYSTEM                                      | 7    | 3    | 0    | 5    | 4    | 7    | 3   | 0    |
| 2320 12-Mar-48   | DOCKERS' MEETINGS NOW 'POLITICAL'                                    | 8    | 3    | 0    | 3    | 4    | 7    | 3   | 0    |
| 2325 13-Mar-48   | POLICE USE STAVES VS DOCKERS & C                                     | 8    | 5    | 1    | 3    | 4    | 7    | 4   | 0    |
| 2330 17-Mar-48   | ST. PAT'S; FEARS OF ARSON  | 8    | 9    | 0    | 9    | 9    | 7    | 3   | 0    |
| 2335 31-Mar-48   | CHARTIST MEETING, NV   | 8    | 9    | 9    | 4    | 4    | 7    | 3   | 0    |
| 2340 10-Apr-48   | MAJOR CHARTIST MTG, QUEEN SQ., NV                                    | 8    | 5    | 1    | 3    | 4    | 7    | 3   | 2    |
| 2345 29-Apr-48   | PC ASSAULTED AT REYNOLDS' SHOP<br>60 60                              | 8    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2350 29-Apr-48   | SERIOUS AFFRAY VS POLICE   | 6    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2355 20-May-48   | RESCUE OF ARRESTED NAVVY<br>0 240                                    | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 2360 20-May-48   | RESCUE, WARWICK ST.<br>0 0 0 0                                       | 6    | 1    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 2365 10-Jun-48 R | ATTACK ON ORANGE PUB<br>-1   | 3    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2370 14-Jun-48 R | YOUTHS DISTURBING REPEAL MTG   | 3    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 5    |
| 2375 16-Jul-48   | RUE, MAN STABBED<br>540 540 540 180 180                              | 1    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 10   |
| 2380 20-Jun-48   | DIMINISHING FEARS IRISH REBELS<br>360 360 -2 720 90 90 180 720 720   | 8    | 4    | 0    | 5    | 5    | 7    | 3   | 5    |
| 2385 06-Sep-48   | ATTEMPTED RESCUE<br>360 120 360 -2 210                               | 6    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
| 2390 26-Oct-48 R | RUE  | 1    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
| 2395 23-Dec-48 R | SOLDIERS ATTACK PUBLIC THEN POLICE                                   | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 3    |
| 2400 16-Mar-49 R | ENGLISH VS PORTUGUESE SAILORS<br>-1 -1 -1                            | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2405 17-Mar-49   | NOISY BUT NV ST PAT'S PROCN  | 3    | 3    | 0    | 2    | 5    | 0    | 9   | 4    |
| 2410 29-Apr-49   | ATTACK ON POLICE BY 'DUFFERS'<br>-2 -2 -2 -2                         | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2415 13-May-49   | RESCUE; POLICE STONED FROM ROOFS<br>180 180                          | 6    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 8    |
| 2420 25-May-49 R | FIGHT, MAYO AND SLIGO FACTIONS<br>60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60            | 2    | 9    | 3    | 5    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 4    |
| 2425 10-Jun-49   | POLICE DISPERSING CROWD<br>30 30 30 30                               | 6    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2430 11-Jul-49 R | RESCUE<br>0 0  | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2435 09-Aug-49   | RESCUE DURING 'FANCY FAIR'<br>60 21                                  | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 3    |
| 2440 19-Oct-49   | ATTACK ON POLICE SUPPRESSING FIGHT<br>180 180 -2                     | 6    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 5    |
| 2445 15-Nov-49   | WOMEN ATTACK WORKHOUSE OVERSEER<br>21 21 21 21 21                    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 2450 20-Nov-49 R | FIGHT BETWEEN TWO FEMALE FACTIONS<br>1                               | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2455 23-Jan-50 R | ATTACK ON RACIST US SHIPS' OFFICERS<br>1 42                          | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 15   |
| 2460 30-Jan-50 R | OFFICERS ATTEMPT REVENGE FOR 2455<br>60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60         | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 11   |
| 2465 06-Feb-50 R | ATTEMPTED RESCUE, CLAYTON SQUARE<br>-1 30 30 30 30 30 30 30          | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
| 2470 17-Mar-50   | SMALL AND NV ST PAT'S PROCN.   | 3    | 9    | 0    | 3    | 5    | 4    | 0   | 4    |
| 2475 30-Mar-50   | RESCUE OF PICKPOCKET IN PUB<br>180 0 42 240                          | 6    | 2    | 3    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 13   |
| 2480 06-Apr-50 R | GIRLS DEMAND ENTRY TO WORKHOUSE<br>21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21           | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2485 18-Apr-50   | BAILIFFS AT HOUSE OF BANKRUPT  | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 0   | 10   |
| 2490 21-May-50 R | BATTLE BETWEEN NAVVIES<br>30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30                    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 0    |
| 2495 12-Jul-50   | ORANGEDAY SIEGE OF WRIGHT'S PUB                                      | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 3   | 1    |
| 2500 13-Jul-50   | 4 SHOT AS CROWD ATTACKS ORANGE PUB<br>-2                             | 3    | 3    | 5    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 2   | -1   |
| 2505 17-Jul-50 R | RESCUE ATTEMPT BY SAILORS  | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 2510 07-Sep-50 R | RETURNING ORANGEMEN ATTACK POLICE<br>-2 -2 -2 14                     | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 3    |
| 2515 15-Sep-50   | ORANGE FUNERAL; POLICE RESISTED<br>-2 0 0                            | 3    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 0   | 2    |
| 2520 26-Oct-50 R | SALT-HEAVERS ATTACK CHEAP WORKER<br>30 30                            | 7    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 7    |
| 2525 28-Dec-50   | ATTEMPTED RESCUE<br>120 150 180 120 -2 120 -1                        | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2530 10-Jan-51 R | REPORT OF MOB ATTACK ON BLACK MAN                                    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 0   | -1   |
| 2535 21-Jan-51 R | BRAWL AT TEETOTAL MEETING  | 1    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 0   | 4    |
| 2540 25-Jan-51 R | RESCUE ATTEMPT<br>0 0 0  | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 2545 22-Jan-51 R | SAILORS ATTACK ONE WITH A 'TICKET'<br>60                             | 7    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 2550 05-Feb-51 R | SOLDIERS INSULT PUBLIC THEN POLICE<br>60 0 60 30                     | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 10   |
| 2555 15-Feb-51   | AFFRAY BETWEEN POLICE AND NAVVIES<br>240 360 210 150 -2 -1 -2 270 -2 | 6    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 9    |
| 2560 17-Mar-51   | AFFRAYS DURING DRUNKEN ST PAT'S<br>240 270 240 42 28 270 360 180     | 6    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 5    | 3    | 3   | 2    |
| 2565 03-May-51 R | ATTACK ON C OF E PREACHER<br>-1 -1                                   | 3    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 2   | 1    |

| No. Date         | Description                          | Type | Size | Sevy | Durn | Loen | Prec | Pol | Arre |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| 2570 01-Jun-51   | RIOT, OVERFLOW CROWD AT CHURCH       | 3    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2575 28-Jun-51 R | RESCUE                               | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 2580 28-Jun-51 R | POLICE STOP A PRIZEFIGHT             | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 2585 28-Jun-51 R | ATTACK ON C OF E PREACHER            | 3    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 27   |
| 2590 28-Jun-51 F | AFFRAYS BETWEEN POLICE AND SOLDIERS  | 6    | 2    | 2    | 5    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2595 12-Jul-51 R | CROWD VS MAN LEAVING WIFE; NV        | 4    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 5    |
| 2600 14-Jul-51   | TROUBLE ON ORANGE DAY, INC SHOOTING  | 3    | 5    | 5    | 3    | 5    | 3    | 3   | 0    |
| 2605 21-Aug-51 R | ROW AFTER TALE OF ATTACK ON PRIEST   | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 2610 06-Sep-51 R | 'IRISH ROW'                          | 1    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
| 2615 14-Sep-51   | POLICE CLEAR ROUTE TO CHURCH         | 6    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 3    |
| 2620 12-Oct-51   | FACTION FIGHT                        | 2    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2625 17-Dec-51   | 30 'DISORDERLY' AFTER PUBLIC MEETING | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 2630 07-Feb-52 R | US SAILORS; ARREST FOR USE OF KNIFE  | 1    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 2635 09-Feb-52   | ATTEMPTED RESCUE                     | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 2640 13-Feb-52 R | DISPUTE OVER OWNERSHIP OF LAND       | 4    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 2645 28-Feb-52 R | POLICE ATTACK CATH CONGREGATION      | 3    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 4    | 0    | 2   | 7    |
| 3005 25-Apr-52   | REVENGE ATTACK ON PC, THEN RESCUE    | 6    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 4    |
| 3010 06-May-52   | OPENAIR PREACHING LEADS TO RIOT      | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 1    |
| 3015 26-May-52R  | FACTION FIGHT, ADISON STREET         | 2    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3020 08-Jun-52   | IRISH VS BOILERMAKERS                | 2    | 2    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3025 13-Jun-52   | ATTACK ON ORANGE FUNERAL             | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 1    |
| 3030 13-Jun-52   | SHIPWRIGHTS STONE 'FOREIGN' WORKERS  | 7    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 3   | 7    |
| 3035 07-Jul-52   | ELECTION DISORDERS, ORANGE TINGED    | 5    | 4    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 6    | 4   | 0    |
| 3039 07-Jul-52   | TORY VOTER'S PUBLIC HOUSE IS DAMAGED | 5    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3040 13-Jul-52 R | TORY VOTER'S PUB AGAIN DAMAGED       | 5    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 15   |
| 3045 12-Aug-52   | ORANGE PROCESSION IS SUPPRESSED      | 3    | 4    | 2    | 2    | 5    | 6    | 4   | 0    |
| 3050 31-Aug-52R  | NV: ORANGE PROC.BANNED, ALSO IN IOM  | 3    | 3    | 0    | 9    | 5    | 4    | 2   | 4    |
| 3055 05-Sep-52   | FACTION FIGHT                        | 2    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 3    |
| 3060 17-Nov-52R  | INTIMIDATION DURING DOCK STRIKE      | 7    | 3    | 4    | 2    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 7    |
| 3065 23-Nov-52   | RESCUE, KITCHEN STREET               | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3070 26-Dec-52   | 2 MOBS FIGHT, THEN UNITE VS POLICE   | 2    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 2    |
| 3075 22-Jan-53   | ANCHORSMITHS ATTTACK WAGES CLERK     | 7    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3077 17-Apr-53   | ATTEMPTED RESCUE, ASSAILANT OF PC    | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3080 04-May-53R  | NV: PICKETING BY CABINETMAKERS       | 7    | 1    | 0    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 0   | 3    |
| 3085 08-May-53   | MOLLY MAGUIRES VS OTHER FACTIONS     | 2    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 5    |
| 3090 21-May-53   | RESCUE, ISLAY STREET                 | 6    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3095 01-Jun-53   | DOCK STRIKE                          | 7    | 9    | 1    | 5    | 3    | 3    | 0   | 0    |
| 3100 12-Jul-53   | TEETOTAL PROCESSION SUPPRESSED       | 3    | 3    | 2    | 3    | 5    | 4    | 3   | 0    |
| 3105 07-Jul-53   | NV: NOISY ELECTION                   | 5    | 5    | 0    | 5    | 5    | 3    | 0   | 1    |
| 3110 11-Jul-53   | POST-ELECTION ROW                    | 5    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 7    |
| 3115 12-Jul-53 R | IRISH VS ORANGEMEN, ALBERT STREET    | 3    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 1    |
| 3117 16-Jul-53 R | ELECTION; RIOT AVERTED BY SHOPKEEPER | 5    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 3    | 3   | 5    |
| 3120 14-Jul-53   | HOUSES DAMAGED BY STONES             | 3    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3125 22-Jul-53   | RESCUE, SMITHFIELD STREET            | 6    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3127 06-Aug-53R  | CRICKETER DIES CHASING ROUGHS        | 2    | 1    | 5    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 8    |
| 3130 14-Aug-53   | FIGHT BET 2 GIRLS LEADS TO MELEE     | 2    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3135 05-Jan-54   | SNOWBALL FIGHT ON EXCHANGE           | 2    | 3    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 0    | 2   | 2    |
| 3136 15-Jan-54   | RESCUE OF FEMALE WINDOWBREAKER       | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3138 25-Feb-54 R | NV BUT ROWDY MEETING RE CATH. EMANC  | 3    | 0    | 2    | 4    | 0    | 1    | 10  |      |
| 3139 28-Feb-54   | TWO GANGS FIGHT IN WRIGHT STREET     | 2    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3140 25-Mar-54R  | IRISH ROW; COBBLER STABBED           | 2    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3145 16-May-54R  | INTIMIDATION DURING DOCK STRIKE      | 7    | 9    | 1    | 5    | 3    | 3    | 3   | 0    |
| 3150 14-May-54   | COLLISION BETWEEN TWO IRISH FUNERALS | 2    | 3    | 3    | 9    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 3155 28-May-54   | PRIZEFIGHT AUDIENCE ATTACKS POLICE   | 6    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3157 06-Jun-54   | ATTACK ON WOMAN WITH ORANGE RIBBON   | 3    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1    | 1   |      |
| 3165 14-Jun-54 R | MOB ATTACKS ORANGEMAN                | 3    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3170 20-Jun-54 R | RIOTOUS AFFRAY, CONWAY STREET        | 1    | 3    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 9   | 1    |
| 3175 01-Jul-54   | RESCUE, GT HOWARD STREET             | 6    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3180 12-Jul-54   | NV: ORANGE DAY                       | 3    | 4    | 0    | 3    | 5    | 4    | 3   | 1    |
| 3185 31-Jul-54   | SHIPWRIGHTS ATTACK FOREIGNERS        | 7    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 0    | 9   | 1    |
| 3190 17-Aug-54R  | RESCUE, BEDFORD STREET               | 6    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |

| No. Date         | Description                          | Type | Size | Sevy | Durn | Locn | Prec | Pol | Arss |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| 3195 05-Sep-54 R | CROWD WATCHING FIGHT ATTACKS POLICES | 6    | 3    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 0    |
| 3200 03-Dec-54 R | RUO, CHADWICK STREET                 | 1    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3205 19-Jan-55 R | DOCKERS PROTEST VS STEAM-CRANE       | 7    | 1    | 1    | 9    | 3    | 3    | 2   | 1    |
| 3210 31-Jan-55   | SECOND EXCHANGE SNOWBALL FIGHT       | 2    | 5    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 0    | 3   | 109  |
| 3215 19-Feb-55 R | SERIOUS BREAD RIOTS                  | 4    | 4    | 3    | 5    | 5    | 0    | 3   | 2    |
|                  | 180 -1 -1 -1 90 -1 -1 -1 90          |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 120 -1 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 60 -1           |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 90 -2 -1 -1 -1 0 90 90 -1            |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 240 300 450 90 -2 -2 7 7          |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 7 7 7 7 7 7 -1 -1                 |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 60 90 120 120 -1 90         |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -2 90 90 14 -1 -2 -1 60           |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 30 90 90 -1 -1 -1           |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 90 -1 90           |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 540 90 90 -1          |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -2 90 90 -1 -1 -1 90 -1 -1           |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | -2 180 90 -1 -1 180 -1 -1 -1         |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
|                  | 60 7 -1 -1 -1 30 -1 -1               |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 3216 03-Mar-55   | RUO, THOMAS STREET                   | 1    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3217 05-Mar-55   | THEATRE: ROW OVER HECKLER            | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3220 09-Mar-55 R | INTIMIDATION DURING DOCK STRIKE      | 7    | 1    | 1    | 9    | 3    | 0    | 9   | 1    |
| 3221 10-Mar-55   | SNOWBALLS & ATTACK ON PROTESTOR      | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 5    |
| 3223 23-Apr-55   | RESCUE, VAUXHALL ROAD                | 6    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3224 02-Jun-55 R | BOYS STONETHROWING NR COLLEGE        | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3225 05-Jun-55   | RESCUE OF BOY ARR. FOR VANDALISM     | 6    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3230 12-Jun-55 R | FIGHT AT LODGINGS OF BLACK SEAMEN    | 1    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3235 11-Jul-55 R | NV: O'NEILE BANNED FROM PREACHING    | 3    | 9    | 0    | 9    | 4    | 4    | 2   | 2    |
| 3240 12-Jul-55   | NV ORANGE PROCESSION                 | 3    | 4    | 0    | 3    | 9    | 4    | 3   | 4    |
| 3245 11-Aug-55 R | FIGHT FOR PR. MENSCHIKOFF'S CARRIAGE | 4    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 10   |
| 3250 14-Aug-55 R | IRISH ROW AND ATTACK ON PUB          | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 3    |
|                  | 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60           |      |      |      |      |      |      |     |      |
| 3251 06-Oct-55   | RESCUE, MIDGHALL STREET              | 6    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3255 10-Oct-55 R | NV: PRECAUTIONS, VICTORY ILLUMINATIO | 4    | 9    | 0    | 3    | 5    | 3    | 3   | 1    |
| 3260 11-Nov-55   | ROUGH MUSIC VS ADULTRESS             | 4    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3265 09-Dec-55   | POLICE ATTACKED OUTSIDE PUB          | 6    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3270 29-Dec-55 R | MAN REFUSES TO JOIN HIBERNIAN ASSOC. | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3271 26-Jan-56 R | CROWD MAKES ARMED MAN GO HOME        | 4    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3272 31-Jan-56   | CROWD TRIES TO PREVENT DISTRANT      | 4    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3273 01-Mar-56 R | BOYS OF 3/4 SCHOOLS THROWING STONES  | 2    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3274 15-Mar-56 R | MOB RESIST CLEARANCE OF BEERHOUSES   | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 5    |
| 3275 19-Apr-56 R | POLICE ATTACKED WHILE QUELLING RUO   | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3280 19-Apr-56 R | FIGHT AUDIENCE ATTACKS POLICE        | 6    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 3282 24-May-56 R | ATTACK ON FOREIGN SEAMAN, VAUX RD    | 4    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4    |
| 3283 31-May-56 R | RESCUE; PC SERIOUSLY WOUNDED         | 6    | 9    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3285 30-May-56 R | NV: PEACE CELEBRATIONS               | 4    | 5    | 0    | 3    | 5    | 3    | 4   | 0    |
| 3287 14-Jun-56 R | POLICE STONED, RESCUE, ATHOL STREET  | 6    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3290 14-Jul-56   | NV ORANGE PROCESSION                 | 3    | 4    | 1    | 3    | 5    | 4    | 0   | 0    |
| 3295 04-Aug-56 R | RAILWAY STRIKE                       | 7    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 9   | -1   |
| 3300 05-Jan-57 R | RUO, NEW BIRD STREET                 | 1    | 2    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 7    |
| 3305 22-Feb-57   | PC DRAGGED INTO COURT AND ASSAULTED  | 6    | 5    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 1   | -1   |
| 3310 28-Mar-57 R | NV: NOISY ELECTION                   | 5    | 5    | 0    | 5    | 5    | 3    | 3   | 4    |
| 3315 13-Apr-57   | POLICE DISPERSING YOUTHS ARE STONED  | 6    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3320 15-Apr-57 R | NV: PREVENTIVE ARREST OF 2 PREACHERS | 3    | 9    | 0    | 1    | 4    | 2    | 1   | 5    |
| 3323 18-Apr-57   | CATHOLIC VS ORANGE, CHADWICK STREET  | 3    | 9    | 2    | 4    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3325 25-Apr-57   | FACTION FIGHT, NORTH STREET          | 2    | 2    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3330 31-May-57   | RUO, BRICK STREET                    | 1    | 9    | 2    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 9   | -1   |
| 3335 03-Jul-57 R | FACTION FIGHT, NORTH STREET          | 2    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 9   | 1    |
| 3337 18-Jul-57 R | FIGHT AMONG SEAMEN                   | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3338 27-May-57 R | RESCUE, ST JAMES STREET              | 6    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 11   |
| 3339 04-Dec-57 R | POLICE FEARS OF BEGGING GANGS        | 4    | 1    | 0    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 0    |
| 3340 13-Feb-58 R | ORANGE PROCESSION OUTSIDE BOROUGH    | 6    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3345 14-Apr-58 R | FEMALE REVENGE ATTACK ON INFORMER    | 4    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2    |
| 3350 01-May-58   | RUO, ADISON STREET                   | 1    | 9    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3355 05-May-58 R | RESCUE BY WOMEN                      | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1    |
| 3357 09-May-58   | SIEGE OF RC HOME FOR FALLEN WOMEN    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 3    | 2    | 0    | 3   | 1    |

| No. Date         | Description  | Type | Size | Sevy | Durn | Loen | Prec | Pol | Arres |
|------------------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-------|
| 3360 22-May-58R  | FIGHT BET GANGS OF COTTONPICKERS<br>-2                   | 4    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 3     |
| 3365 05-Jun-58 R | NAVVIES BARRED FROM STATION PROTEST<br>120 120 120       | 4    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 1   | 3     |
| 3370 10-Jul-58   | STABBINGS DURING FACTION FIGHT<br>-1 360 -2              | 2    | 2    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 1   | 2     |
| 3375 12-Jul-58   | ATTACK ON ORANGE TEA-PARTY<br>60 60                      | 3    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2   | 1     |
| 3380 15-Jul-58   | CROWD PREVENTS DRUNK PAWNING BED<br>-1                   | 4    | 1    | 5    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4     |
| 3385 25-Aug-58R  | RENTACROWD IN REAL ESTATE DISPUTE<br>-1 -1 -1            | 4    | 1    | 4    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2     |
| 3390 11-Sep-58 R | PRIEST HIT BY FISH, MOB AID ARREST<br>60 60              | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 4     |
| 3395 12-Sep-58   | MILITIA VS POLICE<br>90 30 30 0                          | 6    | 9    | 9    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 2   | 6     |
| 3400 29-Sep-58 R | POLICE VS SOLDIERS<br>90 90 90 90 90 90                  | 6    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 0    | 2   | 3     |
| 3405 23-Nov-58R  | POLICE STONED BY CROWD<br>360 120 360                    | 6    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 2     |
| 3410 29-Jan-59 R | ATTACK ON CARD. WISEMAN'S CARRIAGE<br>60 60              | 3    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 3    | 2   | 1     |
| 3415 09-Apr-59 R | BRUSHMAKERS VS SPANISH SAILORS<br>-1                     | 2    | 2    | 5    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 2     |
| 3420 24-Apr-59   | RUO, WESTMORELAND STREET<br>0 0                          | 1    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 5     |
| 3425 16-May-59R  | BEER AND FIGHTING FIESTA<br>0 0 90 90 90                 | 2    | 3    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 0    | 2   | 3     |
| 3426 18-Jun-59 R | SECTARIAN DISCUSSION IS DISPERSED<br>-2 60 60            | 6    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 1     |
| 3427 26-Jan-59   | ATTACK ON OPENAIR PREACHING<br>60                        | 4    | 1    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1     |
| 3428 12-Jul-59   | NV? ORANGE PROCESSION<br>-1                              | 3    | 5    | 2    | 3    | 5    | 4    | 3   | 3     |
| 3429 14-Jul-59   | RUO, MILTON STREET<br>0 0 0                              | 1    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1     |
| 3430 02-Aug-59R  | INTIMIDATION IN COALHEAVERS STRIKE<br>0                  | 7    | 9    | 1    | 9    | 9    | 3    | 2   | -1    |
| 3435 05-Aug-59R  | SOLDIERS VS POLICE<br>-1                                 | 6    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 0    | 9   | 1     |
| 3445 16-Aug-59R  | CLEARANCE OF PREACHING GROUND                            | 3    | 4    | 2    | 3    | 5    | 4    | 3   | -1    |
| 3450 13-Sep-59 R | FAMILY QUARREL SPREADS                                   | 6    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | -1    |
| 3455 16-Sep-59 R | MOB KNOCKING GENTS' HATS OFF                             | 2    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 9    | 0    | 1   | -1    |
| 3457 30-Jan-60   | RESCUE, CHRISTIAN STREET<br>0                            | 4    | 3    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 0    | 1   | 1     |
| 3458 12-Feb-60   | SNOWBALLS ON EXCHANGE FLAGS AGAIN<br>0 0 0 0 0           | 6    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 5     |
| 3459 01-May-60   | IRISH ROW, PORTER STREET<br>60 60 60 60 60 60            | 2    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 4     |
| 3460 03-May-60   | ATTACK ON POLICE<br>0 0 0 0 0 0                          | 1    | 9    | 9    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1     |
| 3465 05-May-60R  | MINOR TROUBLE AT PREACHING GROUND<br>0                   | 3    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 4    | 0    | 1   | 3     |
| 3466 01-May-60   | RUO, GROSVENOR STREET<br>60 60 60                        | 1    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 3     |
| 3470 12-Jun-60 R | RUO, SAWNEY POPE STREET<br>0 0 0                         | 1    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 1     |
| 3475 05-Jul-60   | WOMEN RESCUE THEIR 'BULLY'<br>-1                         | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0     |
| 3480 10-Jul-60 R | NV RADICAL MEETING                                       | 8    | 4    | 0    | 2    | 4    | 3    | 2   | 10    |
| 3485 12-Jul-60   | ORANGE PROCESSION OUTSIDE BOROUGH<br>0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 5    | 4    | 2   | 4     |
| 3490 16-Jul-60 R | SHIPS AWYERS ATTACK CHEAP WORKERS<br>60 -2 -2 60 90      | 7    | 1    | 2    | 9    | 3    | 0    | 9   | 1     |
| 3495 08-Sep-60 R | STABBING IN FEMALE RUO<br>90                             | 1    | 9    | 3    | 9    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 3     |
| 3500 01-Oct-60   | POPE'S SUPPORTERS VS GARIBALDI'S<br>60 -1 60             | 3    | 3    | 4    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 1   | 4     |
| 3505 15-Oct-60   | POLICE ATTACKED DISPERSING YOUTHS                        | 6    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 1   | 0     |







## Appendix 3: Tables

### *Summaries and Results of Statistical Tests*

**Table 1: 1815-1835, Precautions by Type of Incident**

| <u>Type of Incident</u> | <u>Level of Precautions; see App 1 for meaning</u> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|-------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|                         | 0  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Private Battles         | 7  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sectarian               | 4  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Direct Action           | 9  | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Election                | 0  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Anti-Police             | 8  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Political               | 0  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |

Number of Missing Observations: 24

**Table 2: 1815-1835, Policing by Type of Incident**

| <u>Type of Incident</u> | <u>Level of Policing; see Appendix 1 for meaning</u> |   |   |   |   |   |
|-------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|---|
|                         | 0  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Private Battles         | 1  | 2 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sectarian               | 0  | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Direct Action           | 0  | 4 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Election                | 0  | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Anti-Police             | 0  | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Political               | 1  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Number of Missing Observations: 34

**Table 3; 1815-1835, Numbers of Arrests by Type of Incident.**

| <u>Type of Incident</u> | <u>Number of Incidents</u> | <u>Number of Arrests</u> | <u>Mean no of Arrests/Incident</u> |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Private Battle          | 10                         | 55                       | 5.5                                |
| Sectarian               | 5                          | 68                       | 13.6                               |
| Direct Action           | 14                         | 15                       | 1.0                                |
| Election Riot           | 9                          | 7                        | 0.8                                |
| Anti-Police             | 14                         | 71                       | 5.1                                |
| Trade Dispute           | 14                         | 40                       | 2.8                                |
| Political Protest       | 6                          | 10                       | 1.7                                |

Table 4: 1815-1835, Sentence by Size and Severity of Incident.

SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

|                  |  |                      |  |
|------------------|--|----------------------|--|
| Size of Incident | Sentence<br>.0326<br>N( 161)<br>SIG .341 | Severity of Incident | Sentence<br>.0476<br>N( 163)<br>SIG .273 |
|------------------|--|----------------------|--|

Table 5: 1815-1835, Type of Trial by Type of Incident

| Type of Incident | Summary | Percentage<br>Quart Sess | Assizes | Total Number |
|------------------|---------|--------------------------|---------|--------------|
| RUO              | 0       | 84.6                     | 15.4    | 13           |
| Private Battle   | 69.4    | 30.6                     | 0       | 49           |
| Sectarian        | 1.4     | 98.6                     | 0       | 69           |
| Direct Action    | 16.7    | 83.3                     | 0       | 12           |
| Election         | 0       | 0                        | 100     | 7            |
| Anti-Police      | 0       | 86.8                     | 13.2    | 68           |
| Trade Dispute    | 0       | 25.0                     | 75.0    | 32           |
| Political        | 0       | 0                        | 0       | 0            |

Table 6: 1815-1835, Sentence by Type of Incident

Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova

|       | Mean       | Rank         | Cases      |                          |
|-------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------------------|
|       | 40.98      |              | 32         | TYPE = 2, Private Battle |
|       | 85.67      |              | 69         | TYPE = 3, Sectarian      |
|       | 43.14      |              | 7          | TYPE = 4, Direct Action  |
|       | 135.76     |              | 33         | TYPE = 6, Anti-Police    |
|       | 90.05      |              | 30         | TYPE = 7, Trade          |
|       | ---        |              |            |                          |
|       |            | 171          |            | Total                    |
|       |            |              |            | Corrected for ties       |
| Cases | Chi-Square | Significance | Chi-Square | Significance             |
| 171   | 65.2402    | .0000        | 67.1682    | .0000                    |

Table 7: Comparison of Size and Severity, 1815-1835 with 1836-1860.

i. Comparison of Size of Incidents, before 1836 and after.

Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova

|       | Mean       | Rank         | Cases      |                           |
|-------|------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|
|       | 163.16     |              | 63         | INCNO = 1; Before 1836    |
|       | 145.84     |              | 235        | INCNO = 2; 1836 and after |
|       | ---        |              |            |                           |
|       |            | 298          |            | Total                     |
|       |            |              |            | Corrected for ties        |
| Cases | Chi-Square | Significance | Chi-Square | Significance              |
| 298   | 2.0073     | .1565        | 2.1542     | .1422                     |

*ii Comparison of Severity of Incidents, before 1835 and after.*

Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova

| Mean Rank | Cases |                           |
|-----------|-------|---------------------------|
| 180.80    | 66    | INCNO = 1, Before 1836    |
| 165.49    | 270   | INCNO = 2, 1836 and after |
| ---       |       |                           |
| 336       | Total |                           |

| Cases | Chi-Square | Significance | Corrected for ties | Chi-Square | Significance |
|-------|------------|--------------|--------------------|------------|--------------|
| 336   | 1.3159     | .2513        |                    | 1.4592     | .2270        |

**Table 8: 1836-1860, Precautions by Type of Incident**

| Type of Incident | Level of Precautions; see App 1 for meaning |   |   |    |    |   |   |   |
|------------------|---|---|---|----|----|---|---|---|
|                  | 0   | 1 | 2 | 3  | 4  | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Private Battles  | 32  | 0 | 0 | 0  | 0  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sectarian        | 22  | 1 | 4 | 13 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Direct Action    | 35  | 0 | 0 | 2  | 0  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Election         | 3   | 0 | 0 | 4  | 0  | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Anti-Police      | 91  | 0 | 0 | 1  | 0  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Political        | 4   | 0 | 0 | 5  | 0  | 1 | 0 | 6 |

Number of Missing Observations: 51

**Table 9: 1836-1860, Policing by Type of Incident**

| Type of Incident | Level of Policing; see App 1 for meaning |    |    |    |   |   |
|------------------|--|----|----|----|---|---|
|                  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4 | 5 |
| Private Battles  | 0  | 21 | 9  | 1  | 0 | 0 |
| Sectarian        | 3  | 12 | 15 | 20 | 3 | 0 |
| Direct Action    | 1  | 31 | 2  | 2  | 1 | 0 |
| Election         | 1  | 3  | 0  | 3  | 3 | 0 |
| Anti-Police      | 0  | 82 | 9  | 1  | 0 | 0 |
| Political        | 0  | 3  | 2  | 10 | 2 | 0 |

Number of Missing Observations: 55

**Table 10: 1815-1835 and 1836-1860, Arrests by Type of Incident**

| Type          | 1815-1835 |     |      | 1836-1860 |     |      |
|---------------|-----------|-----|------|-----------|-----|------|
|               | No        | Arr | Mean | No        | Arr | Mean |
| Private       | 10        | 55  | 5.5  | 32        | 98  | 3.1  |
| Sectarian     | 5         | 68  | 13.6 | 59        | 144 | 2.4  |
| Direct Action | 14        | 15  | 1.0  | 37        | 214 | 5.5  |
| Election      | 9         | 7   | 0.8  | 10        | 94  | 9.4  |
| Anti-Police   | 14        | 71  | 5.1  | 94        | 389 | 4.0  |
| Trade         | 14        | 40  | 2.8  | 29        | 59  | 2.0  |
| Political     | 6         | 10  | 1.7  | 20        | 12  | 0.6  |

**Table 11: 1836-1860, Type of Trial by Type of Incident.**

| Type           | %<br>Summary | %<br>Quart Sess | %<br>Assizes | Total<br>Number |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| RUO            | 62.1         | 24.2            | 13.6         | 66              |
| Private Battle | 88.1         | 10.7            | 1.2          | 84              |
| Sectarian      | 66.8         | 21.2            | 12.0         | 184             |
| Direct Action  | 70.6         | 20.1            | 9.3          | 194             |
| Election       | 66.7         | 29.3            | 4.0          | 99              |
| Anti-Police    | 79.8         | 16.1            | 4.1          | 342             |
| Trade Dispute  | 80.0         | 18.6            | 1.4          | 70              |
| Political      | 16.7         | 0               | 83.3         | 12              |

**Table 12: 1836-1860, Sentence by Type of Incident**

Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova

| Mean Rank | Cases |                          |
|-----------|-------|--------------------------|
| 460.42    | 85    | TYPE = 2, Private Battle |
| 393.96    | 167   | TYPE = 3, Sectarian      |
| 484.27    | 166   | TYPE = 4, Direct Action  |
| 413.63    | 98    | TYPE = 5, Election       |
| 478.94    | 326   | TYPE = 6, Trade          |
| 463.23    | 62    | TYPE = 7, Political      |
| 773.33    | 12    | TYPE = 8, Unknown        |
| ----      |       |                          |
| 916       | Total |                          |

| Cases | Chi-Square | Significance | Corrected for ties<br>Chi-Square | Significance |
|-------|------------|--------------|----------------------------------|--------------|
| 916   | 33.2944    | .0000        | 34.7072                          | .0000        |

**Table 13: 1836-1860, Sentence by Size and Severity of Incident.**

*i Correlation of Sentence with Size of Incident*

SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

|                     | Sentence |
|---------------------|----------|
| Size of<br>Incident | .0140    |
|                     | N( 787)  |
|                     | SIG .348 |

*ii Correlation of Sentence with Severity of Incident*

|          | Severity of<br>Incident      |
|----------|------------------------------|
| Sentence | .0039<br>N( 828)<br>SIG .456 |





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12/1, 12/2, 13-18, 19/1, 19/2, 20/1,  
20/2, 21/2, 22/1, 22/2, 23/1, 23/2,  
24/1, 25/1, 25/2, 26/1, 26/2, 29/1,  
29/2, 30/2, 30/4, 31/1, 31/5, 32/1,  
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23-68
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4, 28

|       |   |
|-------|---|
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